Ideals of the Good Life:
A Longitudinal/Cross-Sectional Study of Evaluative Reasoning in Children and Adults

by

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Abstract

This four-year, longitudinal/cross-sectional study investigates the plausibility of a structural model of evaluative reasoning about ideals of the good life and justice reasoning with subjects ranging in age from 5 to 72. The construct of evaluative reasoning, which includes both moral and non-moral components, is specified both psychologically and philosophically and distinguished from other developmental constructs such as justice reasoning. It is claimed that the model is normative. Support is found for this claim in an analysis of five schools of thought from traditional ethical theory that results in a minimal conception of the good life upon which the differing ethical theories might agree.

A scoring manual for evaluative reasoning in the domains of good life, good work, good friendship, and the good person is presented with high reliability and internal validity. It is shown that, with the findings to date, the stage sequence constructed meets the general Piagetian criteria for a structural stage model. It is also shown that much of the meaningful content of evaluative reasoning can be classified according to categories derived from traditional ethics and metaethics.

Particular analyses are focused on adult structural development. It is shown that a significant percentage of individuals over 20 years old continue their development in both evaluative and justice reasoning and that the post-conventional stages that are postulated in both models are restricted to members of this age group. It is also shown that advanced education beyond the baccalaureate level is a significant factor in the development of post-conventional reasoning.

It has been a central tenet of structural-developmental psychology to focus on the consistent and universal, rather than the anomalous and unique aspects of human development (Piaget, 1968; Kohlberg, 1969, 1981). With this guiding principle, research has consisted of investigations of those human activities that share a universal function, for example, logical thinking (Piaget, 1954) and certain forms of moral, social, and epistemological reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981; Selman, 1980; Broughton, 1978). Following this paradigm, it is the purpose of this study to show that aspects of both moral and non-moral evaluative reasoning, conceived of here under the general construct "ideals of the good life," also conform to a universal human function and, as such, are appropriate for structural-developmental investigation and analysis.

Drawing from both developmental psychology and ethical philosophy, this work defines a structural, hierarchical model of evaluative reasoning about the good life. It general conclusions are that, although such reasoning varies across persons, it does not vary randomly. On the contrary, evidence will be presented here to show that value reasoning has underlying structural components that fall into a sequential pattern of developmental stages, the highest of which, it will be claimed, meets philosophical criteria of adequacy. Thus, parallel to Kohlberg's (1981; 1973a) model of justice reasoning, the normative aspect of this constructed model of evaluative reasoning about the good life relies on a philosophically justified articulation of the highest stage.

In addition to categorizing structures into developmental stages, it will be shown that the content of ethical reasoning can be categorized in a meaningful way, that is supported both empirically and theoretically. These categories represent "philosophical orientations," defined not in terms of the underlying structure of value reasoning, but in terms of the actual ultimate values that cohere an individual's philosophy of the good life. Thus, in conjunction with a theory of structural development, a content analysis model will also be presented.

The term "ideals of the good life" may bring to mind many different concepts. It represents the general construct of the present study and is constructed from both traditional ethics and structural-developmental psychology.

The operational definition of the good life that will be used in this study is, first, the combined set of human ideals that persons affirm in normative evaluative judgments about the good life, in general, and about good work, good friendship or relationship, and the good person, in particular. Second, it is the sets of reasons individuals give in support of these judgments.

Thus, operationally, ideals of the good life consist of two major components. The first is a description of what traits of character, objects, actions, or experiences are truly good. The second concerns the justification of this description. It is these ideals that are structurally represented in the sequential stage model.

The psychological approach to ethics has been to describe the phenomena and/or the development of human valuing. This approach interprets observable behavior and reasoning involved in the processes and consequences of ethical reasoning. The aim is to explain, rather than to prescribe, the development and expression of values or moral principles. In the present work, psychology is coupled with philosophy to form a philosophically supported psychological theory.

There are two main reasons for the necessity of philosophy in a study of evaluative reasoning about the good life. The first and most obvious reason is that ideas concerning value or the good are ethical in nature. To say something is good is to make an ethical claim and ethics is a philosophical domain. In this study, ethical theory provides not only a systematic analysis of morality and value, but also a philosophical conception of the person and of "the good life."

For example, the present conception of stages of evaluative reasoning is dependent on a philosophical conception of the person as a rational human being capable of making and acting upon autonomous life choices (Rawls, 1971). In accordance with Rawls, it is assumed that, to one degree or another, persons formulate rational life plans that are organized by their conceptions of the good. These conceptions are comprised of ideals and virtues, the fulfillment of which leads to happiness. In order for one to have a rational life plan based on the good, the organization of the plan must form a structure that is generally consistent across domains of experience; that is, each individual must construct a consistent philosophy of what is good. Generally, the structure of the good is viewed as an organization of values and ideals that provide individuals with both motivation and meaningfulness in life. Specifically, the structure of the good provides a consistent set of criteria that the individual uses in making evaluative decisions and judgments. It is this very philosophical conception that guides the present study of ideals of the good life and that has a significant impact on both its psychological theory and its methodology.

The second reason for the necessity of philosophy is that the present developmental model is a normative one; that is, it is claimed that the highest stage is most adequate. Such a claim requires a philosophical as well as a psychological conception of adequacy.

Although the fundamental scheme of this study is psychological and, thus, primarily descriptive, part of any developmental analysis includes an explanation of where development leads. Typically, such psychological analyses blur the boundaries between descriptive and prescriptive work.
Particularly noteworthy for a study that includes a normative model is the issue of whether the developmental model is the result of a collection of observations that fall into arbitrarily ordered categories. If so, criticisms concerning the leap from the empirical "is" (non-ethical premises) to the philosophical "ought" (ethical conclusions) are warranted. G.E. Moore (1903) first referred to this leap as the "naturalistic fallacy," an idea of increasing import in structural-developmental psychology. A way to respond to this problem is to incorporate in an empirical study of human valuing the support of philosophical justification. (For a discussion of the "naturalistic fallacy" in psychological research, see Kohlberg, 1969; in philosophy, Frankena, 1973.)

To address these concerns, an attempt first will be made here to highlight rather than obscure both prescriptive and descriptive elements, and to keep them distinct. Second, to the extent that this work will commend any particular form of thought, it will rely on normative ethics rather than empirical psychology for justification.

The psychological theory and methodology employed in this study relies on the structural-developmental research paradigm. A Piagetian/Kohlbergian structural analysis (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Colby & Kohlberg, in press; Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983) will be performed on both cross-sectional and longitudinal data, consisting of responses to open-ended interview questions, such as "What is the good life?" and "What is a good person?", from individuals comprising a wide age-range.

The first model integrating developmental psychology and formal philosophy was advanced by Piaget (1954). This model concerns the study of logical reasoning. Kohlberg (1958) constructed such a model for the study of reasoning about justice, or right action (1981; Colby & Kohlberg, in press). Reasoning about the good, however, has not yet received this form of research attention. The present work relies heavily on Kohlberg's model of the development of justice reasoning, but attempts to expand the domain of morality that is investigated developmentally beyond "justice," to include the moral good as manifested in ethical ideals of the good life.

In Chapter 1, the philosophical framework for this study will be presented. Philosophical issues concerning a study of evaluative reasoning will also be discussed.

Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the philosophical terms and concepts to be used throughout this work. Then, Chapters 3 through 7 present five normative ethical views of the good life. Although each view is put forth through the writings of a particular philosopher, each is meant to be representative of a different school of thought on the nature of human ends. Each view purports to describe somewhat different objective values for human beings. This review is not meant to be exhaustive of either a particular scholar's ethical system nor of all the possible schools of thought in traditional ethics. It merely describes exemplary models of ethical systems concerning the good life.

Chapter 8 compares and contrasts these five views. There it will be described how these views, taken as a whole, provide support for a normative model of ethical reasoning. In addition, it will be shown how the differences between the views inform the construction of philosophical orientations.

Section II initiates the psychological section of this thesis. In Chapter 9, the integrative model of psychology and philosophy is described and the structural-developmental paradigm to be used in this study will be presented. This description will draw primarily from the work of Piaget (1970, 1960) and Kohlberg (1981, Colby, et. al, 1983, Colby & Kohlberg, in press) in defining the general characteristics and specific criteria for a developmental stage model of ideals of the good life. This chapter also includes a discussion of Kohlberg's model of justice reasoning development and Selman's (1980) model of social perspective-taking development—two models of central import to the present work. In Chapter 10 a description of ten other psychological studies that relate to the present investigation of the good life will be presented. These studies present theoretical models and empirical findings that inform a developmental model of evaluative reasoning about the good life. They also provide empirical information for the construction of philosophical orientations.

The discussion in Chapter 11 will closely examine these studies correspondences not only with one another, but also with the structural-developmental paradigm in general. Under close scrutiny, discrepancies will be examined and implications from these studies about a developmental model of evaluative reasoning will be discussed.

In Section III, a cross-sectional/longitudinal study of evaluative reasoning about ideals of the good life conducted by the author will be presented. Chapter 12 contains the methods of the study, in general, and of the structural analysis, in particular. In addition, it will be shown that the validity and reliability of the good life assessment methodology is supported. Chapter 13 contains the first set of the study's results. There the stages themselves will be described in detail. Chapter 14 will describe the empirical construction of the philosophical orientations. In Chapter 15, the theoretical relationships between good life stages and both moral judgment and social perspective-taking stages will be discussed. The statistical results of the study will be presented in Chapter 16, including the empirical relationships between good life stages and a number of other variables, such as age, education, gender, and moral judgment development. In Chapter 17, a discussion of the empirical results will be presented.

Finally, in Chapter 18, both the psychological and philosophical considerations raised throughout this work will be discussed in terms of their relationship to one another. Implications and limitations the study will be discussed as well as plans for future research.

Section I

Philosophies of the Good Life

You pretend that you are not calculated for philosophy? Why then do you live, if you have no desire to live properly? (Diogenes Laertius [1925])

Chapter One

Philosophical Framework for a Study of Ideals of the Good Life

Traditionally the philosophic approach to ethics, including both "the good" and "the right," has been a systematic attempt to answer value-related questions of seemingly universal interest. In ethics, some typical questions are: what is the good life? what is worth wanting and working for? what is the right thing to do? what is a good person? The moral philosopher concerned with what is good or right is often working out a systematic explanation and justification of the primacy of certain values or principles over others.

Moral philosophy, or ethics, is commonly divided into two major classes. The first contains theories of the right, or of obligation; the second contains theories of the good. For the purposes of the present work, both the philosophical and the psychological focus is on reasoning about the good. Philosophical theories of the good are rarely constructed independent of a theory of right action; however, the reverse is not the case. There are a number of moral theories of right action that are constructed
independently of any particular conception of the good. (See, for example, Kant, 1785; Rawls, 1971.)

This author accepts the views of Kant and Rawls that theories of the right are not dependent on any particular conception of the good. It is merely proposed here that a consistent, generalizable theory of the good is also plausible.

There has been some controversy as to whether ideals of the good life fall within a category of phenomena designated as generalizable or universal, and thus be appropriate for developmental research. The major theme of this controversy has been philosophical in nature and concerns the distinction between the good and the right. For example, Rawls (1971) views good lives as pluralistic, focusing on the primacy of universal justice principles for the distribution of the conditions for the attainment of a good life. Similarly, Kohlberg (1981) has focused his discussion of the good or ideal life on its metaethical or religious components, such as the meanings of life and morality that are supportive of right action, rather than on any normative or prescriptive concepts of good. Boyd (1980) summarizes both of these views:

Conceptions of the good and ideals of human perfection are by no means unimportant for Rawls and Kohlberg. But they do not constitute the essence of morality nor adequately circumscribe the proper entry point into moral questions. For both pursuit of the good and human perfection is subordinated as a concern to adjudicating differences among individuals on how the good and human perfection are to be defined, furthered, and distributed. One cannot understand this entry point unless one understands that they assume that individuals do and will differ in this fundamental way. This presumption of human conflict rests on a more fundamental belief that the good, even for one individual, is not one but pluralistic. Choice of the good is seen as fundamentally subjective and pluralistic, and the moral point of view is seen as objectivity seeking, interpersonal, and adjudicatory.

From such a perspective, ideals of the good life, however rich and distinctive, can be reduced to the subjective preferences of particular persons. This then can lead to the notion that these ideals are, or can be, co-equally valid or, at least, that there is no justifiable way of advocating one preference over another. The thrust of Rawls' and Kohlberg's argument, however, does not concern the relativity and subjectivity of the good, per se but rather the insistence on the philosophical distinction between the good and the right, and the subordination of the former to the latter. In the main, their views are constructed as arguments against the utilitarian idea that principles of right action are to be derived from a theory of the good. Their concern is for the autonomy of morality, considered as the domain of right action or justice.

The present study affirms these theorists' views concerning the relation of the good to right action. It does not, however, conform to the psychological implication that all reasoning about the good differs in some fundamental way from reasoning about the right. Here certain aspects of evaluative reasoning are seen as consistent systems that have both moral and non-moral dimensions, but that exclude morally right action.

The issues of pluralism and the subjectivity of the good bring to this study a concern about the justification of value judgments. This is because if value statements cannot, in some sense, be shown to be objective, then the notion of a generalizable conception of the good life must have to be abandoned.

In ancient Greek ethics, the good life was thought to be the kind of life that persons ought to seek. The theoretical construct of the present study follows this concept. A common approach to defining the good life in these ancient works was to work out an analysis and description of human nature and then to construct a model of human life that would fulfill this nature, one to which some or all persons were capable of conforming. Concurrent with this task was the attempt to construct a justification as to why these persons should conform to a particular ideal as opposed to some other or none at all. In other words, Greek philosophers attempted to show that value statements in their model, such as "X makes a good person" or "X is good," are in some sense true.

The plausibility of, or the procedures for, the justification of value statements has remained central to ethics. The problem can be stated thus: if normative value statements are to be meaningful, they must be shown to be objective. Only if there can be truth in judgments that assert that certain traits, actions, or objects are good for all persons can value judgments have objectivity (Adler, 1981).

A review of the various philosophical approaches to the problems of justifying ethical or value statements is not required here (see Brandt, 1959, for a review). It is sufficient to state that, philosophically, the present work assumes that there are methods that can be used to show some ethical statements to be valid or true. Relying on the constructivist approach (Rawls, 1971; Piaget, 1970) it will be held here that methods of ethical justification must be constructed solely for that purpose because conceptions of ethics or of value constitute a special case in human experience. Once constructed procedures are applied, some ethical statements will hold up while others can be shown to be indefensible.

One point about the justification of value statements consonant with any philosophical view is that we cannot justify normative statements about the good solely by the fact that we desire something. Socrates refers to this problem when he repeatedly reminds us that our regarding something as good because we desire it does not make it good. The fact that we happen to desire something may make it appear good at the time, he tells us, but it does not make it truly good. But it is argued here that this need not mean that we can never make normative statements about the good.

Addressing a similar concern to Socrates', Aristotle (Ethics) distinguishes two broad categories of the good. The first contains non-natural values. These are values that are identical with the particular desires that individuals acquire and act upon over the course of an individual life. These values are relativistic goods that vary from person to person.

The second category, in contrast, contains values that are inherent in the human condition. They are rooted in human potentialities or capacities. These values are "natural values" and, in contemporary literature, are sometimes referred to as "human needs" (see Adler, 1981; Maslow, 1964).

In the present study, this distinction between natural and non-natural goods is used. The natural goods are defined here as those values that are considered common to all persons, not necessarily defined as "needs" but, rather, as objective values. The non-natural goods are considered here to be those subjective values that differ not only across persons but also within persons across time and context. As mentioned earlier, a developmental investigation relies on the identification of generalizable phenomena. Thus, to study the development of reasoning about the good, some conception of natural or objective values is required.

The natural values can be divided into internal and external values. Internal values are values of human rationality and choice. Their attainment is through activities in which persons voluntarily
engage. Such values can include those things we desire to do (for example, acting virtuously) or those we desire to be (for example, autonomous or wise). Internal values are internal in the sense that they have their existence in the person rather than being dependent on an external source.

In contrast, external values are partly or completely external to the person. They never depend solely on what one chooses to do. They are circumstantial values in the sense that the fulfillment of them depends either partly or wholly on circumstances beyond one's control. Figure 1 is a graphic representation of these categories.

Figure 1
Natural and Non-Natural Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATURAL VALUES</th>
<th>NON-NATURAL VALUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective; Universal</td>
<td>Subjective; Relativistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>Chance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational; Voluntary;</td>
<td>To do, To be</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With these distinctions made, the fuller, philosophical construct of the good life can be defined. Here, the use of the term good life will be understood philosophically to be limited to those objects, actions, traits, or experiences considered to be really valuable, that is, objectively valuable. It is the fulfillment of the objective values, those values that are good for all human beings (Adler, 1981).

However, being a good person (an internal, natural value), for example, does not by itself suffice for the achievement of a good human life. Some of the natural values that a person needs are external values of chance. Even the attainment of certain interior perfections is partly dependent upon favorable external circumstances. Hence, the modified Aristotelian model that distinguishes between objective and relativistic, and internal and external goods is accepted as part of a working model. In accepting this model, however, Aristotle's methods of justification need not be used. As mentioned earlier, for justification this work only assumes the view of the constructivists, namely that there are correct ways or procedures for answering ethical questions even if it is not yet known exactly what they are. The approach used in this study combines ethical philosophy, structural-developmental psychological theory, and empirical findings to support its claims.

With the philosophical construct of the good life, comprised as it is of the totality of the objective goods as espoused above, the question remains concerning what those goods may be. Five philosophical views on what the good life consists of are presented in Chapters 3 through 7.

The views that are to be presented can be classified as either hedonistic or perfectionistic. Theories that fall roughly under the heading of "perfectionism" generally hold that the valuable activity of life is the development (perfecting) of the capacities inherent in a living being. Perfection-our own or others'--is the ultimate value of life. But even among perfectionists, there is disagreement as to which capacities to perfect. Three different forms of perfectionism will be presented here: functionalism, unitarianism, and progressivism.

In contrast to perfectionism, the hedonistic view defines the good as that which is, or brings, pleasure--an intrinsic value to man. Under the doctrine of hedonism, the means to pleasure (even if those means are perfecting) are of secondary consideration; it is the pleasure consequences of an object, motive, or activity that is to be the basis for the identification of any good.

Within hedonism, as within perfectionism, there are divisions. Classical hedonism focuses on the good as it relates to the pleasure-consequences to the individual self. In contrast, social hedonism emphasizes the aggregate of pleasure of all persons concerned.

The presentation of the ethical philosophies in Chapters 3 through 7 has the general purpose of providing the philosophical support for the developmental model of reasoning about the good life. Indeed, these theories provide two forms of support. The first form of support lies in the inherent similarities among otherwise varying theoretical views. The existence of these similarities, it will be argued, supports a minimal conception of the good life as being comprised of agreed-upon objective values. This minimal conception will be shown to provide philosophical support for the normative nature of the good life stages. The second form of support is found in the way in which the variance of these theories can be categorized in terms of end-values. These categories are then used to categorize subjects' non-structural responses, forming the construct, philosophical orientations.

In summary, ethics provides the philosophical framework for the present study. Ethical theory is not only capable of informing a psychological model of evaluative reasoning, it is both an essential and interdependent aspect of it.

Chapter Two
Philosophical Concepts and Terms

Philosophical terms such as ethics and metaethics are rarely used with strictly identical meanings in the works of various authors. The terms being somewhat arbitrary, this chapter briefly delineates some general historic trends in their usage and clarifies how the terms will be used in this study.

In short, "normative and prescriptive ethics or statements" will here refer to theoretical systems or concepts that attempt to answer questions about how we ought to live and what we ought to be. In contrast, "metaethics" will refer to the analysis of moral concepts or terms such as the good or "the right" and to the justification and meaning of normative moral arguments. The goal of metaethics is not to commend or to prescribe what we ought to do, but to analyze and describe underlying meanings within normative and prescriptive ethical theory, argument, and language.

In the history of philosophy, theories such as those of Plato or Aristotle were ethical systems. These philosophers sought to provide general guidance concerning what we ought to do, what we ought to seek, and how to treat others. Their task primarily consisted of systematically setting forth first principles (criterion principles to which all other rules and principles should conform) and in showing how it is possible to justify such principles with metaethics. Such expositions would include both a conception of the good life for man and the philosopher's theoretical conceptions of the limits of justification (Nowell-Smith, 1954).

In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, some philosophers strongly questioned the normative or prescriptive element of ethical works. They argued that a philosopher had no special insight about either the good life or the right way to act. These authors saw the philosopher's work as the analysis of the meaning of ethical concepts, statements, and arguments. The common objective of their approach was not practice but knowledge. Of course, traditional philosophers also analyzed ethical concepts, but what distinguished the analytical philosopher
was the regard for analysis as the sole philosophical task. Thus, through the work of analytic philosophers, metaethics became a distinct school of thought (see, for example, C. I. Lewis, 1946; G. E. Moore, 1903; Nowell-Smith, 1954; R. B. Perry, 1926).

Previous and parallel to the development of such metaethical theories, however, the traditional, normative form of ethical theories continued to be advanced and has increased in the philosophical literature in the last two decades (see, for example, Rawls, 1971, 1980; Nagel, 1970; Nozick, 1974; MacIntyre, 1981). Current ethical theories, much like traditional ones, include metaethical considerations for the purpose of clarifying or underpinning various aspects of a particular ethical view.

The form of ethical theory that includes both metaethical and normative ethical considerations will be followed in the present work. Although the focus of this study will be on normative ethical reasoning, a full understanding of a particular theory of the good life depends, in part, on the knowledge of how concepts such as "good", "right", and "value" are to be understood.

In addition, "normative" is to be distinguished from "prescriptive." A normative judgment or theory will refer to values that are commended or advocated, but are not considered as morally obligatory (Ross, 1930). Prescriptive judgments will refer to moral judgments of right action that carry with them a formal, moral obligation or "duty", that is, a commitment to an action that is in accordance with them (Hare, 1952).

Right, Moral Good, Moral Worth, and Non-Moral Good

Like the terms "ethics" and "metaethics", the precise meanings of "right", "moral good", "moral worth", and "non-moral good" are obscure. Therefore, what is of central importance here is how these terms are used by various scholars, but rather how they will be used here. The definitions that follow rely primarily on the works of Frankena (1973), W. D. Ross (1930), and C. A. Campbell (1935), and are generally consistent with the works of Rawls (1971; 1980), R. B. Perry (1926), and C. I. Lewis (1946). These definitions are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Value</th>
<th>Moral Good</th>
<th>Moral Worth</th>
<th>Non-Moral Good</th>
<th>Non-Moral Good</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(aretaic) (intrinsic)</td>
<td>(extrinsic)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

actions; welfare motives ends means
obliga- (e.g., con- (e.g., con (e.g., painting, (e.g., scientious autonomy cars)
tions, sequences ection) (e.g., knowledge)

duties to others) knowledge)

First, the word "good" itself has no special moral or ethical connotation. It is used here with its most general meaning as an adjective of commendation, implying the existence a high, or at least satisfactory, degree of characteristic qualities which are either admirable in themselves or useful for some purpose.

The word "right", however, will be used here only in its moral sense. Consistent with the definition of "prescriptive" above, right will refer only to (a) human actions, and (b) only to those human actions that are considered morally obligatory, that is, considered a duty. "Obligation," or "duty," in this sense is not synonymous with compulsion; rather, it expresses the same meaning as "ought to be done."

By defining "right" in terms of human actions and obligation, other uses of right, such as "the right book" are excluded from the usage employed here. Thus defined, right is an irreducible notion (Ross, 1930; Hare, 1952).

In contrast to the meaning given to "right", "moral good" refers primarily to actions only when such actions proceed from an ethical, or morally good, motive. Right and morally good cannot mean the same thing. This follows from the Kantian principle that "I ought" implies "I can". One can act from a certain motive only if he or she has that motive; no one can choose, at least at a moment's notice, to be possessed of a particular motive. Thus it cannot be a duty or an obligation which "ought" implies, to act from (or to have) a morally good motive (Ross, 1930).

Aside from actions that proceed from morally good motives, moral good typically refers directly to the motives themselves, or to persons, intentions, or traits of character. In these cases, as in the case of morally good action as proceeding from a morally good motive, moral good is synonymous with moral worth—it is something that can only reside in the person. Judgments concerning the moral worth of persons are referred to as aretaic judgments.

"Moral good" can also refer to the consequences of an action, even when the intention of or motive for that action was morally bad. Consider Kant's example of the storekeeper who decides that a policy of honesty brings in the highest profit. To distinguish these two usages of the term "moral good", references to traits, intentions, motives, and the like that reside within the person will be referred to in terms of moral worth or aretaic judgments. In contrast, those references to the moral good, such as welfare consequences, that result from some particular state of affairs, with its cause external to persons, will be referred to as "total moral good", or "moraly good consequences."

There are also judgments of non-moral good, often called judgments of non-moral value. Here such judgments refer not to motives, traits of character, or persons, but to the total non-moral goodness of particular events or actions or to all sorts of other things such as paintings, tools, lifestyles, or furniture. Such things may be thought of as good either because they themselves possess good or value, or because they contain some form of good-making characteristics (Frankena, 1973).

Chapter Three
Function Perfectionism

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)

What is by nature proper to each thing will be at once the best and most pleasant for it. A life guided by intelligence is the best and most pleasant for man, inasmuch as intelligence, above all else, is man. Consequently, this kind of life is the happiest (1178 a5).

In the Ethics, Aristotle offers a detailed description of the good life—a system of activity lived by the good person in a just society. Rejecting a transcendent or divine source, Aristotle claims the good is to be found within the peculiar activity of human beings. Constructing a single-principle teleological theory, he identifies "the good" as a functional perfectionism; his goal is to define human beings' unique and supreme functions and then to identify the reasons and methods for the perfection of those functions.

For Aristotle, the ultimate end of human happiness is eudaimonia. Although a common translation of eudaimonia is "happiness," it seems better served by the term "well-being" (Ross, 1923; Ring, 1980). Eudaimonia is realized in activity; happiness tends to connote a passive state.
Eudaimonia is a quality in activity that persons are to seek over the course of a complete life. It is through activities of human goodness that we can achieve it.

For something to be an instance of human goodness, Aristotle claims, it must be self-sufficient. Only something that can be attained within the person, independent of external circumstances, is worthy of being chosen. This is the Aristotelian conception of natural goods that was discussed in Chapter 1. As ends in themselves, such goods are the activities of well-being.

In his discussion of what these activities must be, Aristotle identifies the functions peculiar to persons. The outcome of his analysis is the identification of the exercise of reason as not only the peculiar function of humans, but also the humans' highest faculty (1097a13-1098a20). Eudaimonia must be the force of this faculty and it must be an activity and not a mere potentiality (1098a6).

Other forms of life that do not hold reason as their primary value are rejected as a result of Aristotle's search for the ideal. He rejects the life of pleasure because pleasure is not unique to human beings—a life of pleasure, he argues, can be experienced by other animals. He also rejects the life of honor as the ideal because such a life depends more on the intentions, motives, and activities of others and is thus not under the one's sole rule. Finally, he rejects the pursuit of wealth as an ideal aim because it is not only dependent on others, it is also a means to something, rather than an end in itself. Throughout the Ethics, and particularly in the Book X, Aristotle tries to show that the life of theoretical contemplation, supported by the activities of practical reason, is the highest end.

Reason is most active in two broad arenas: theoretical and practical science. Although theoretical science is, for Aristotle, the highest form of knowledge, it is practical science that deals with the use of reason for the organization of life itself. The practical sciences of ethics and politics have as their end neither study nor reason per se, but rather the very activity of living a good life (Ostwald, 1979).

Practical and theoretical wisdom, as intellectual virtues, are thus central to the good life. Practical wisdom, in this context, is the power of good deliberation—not about how particular things are made but about things "good for oneself." In other words, it describes how a whole state of being that would satisfy human beings is to be brought into existence. In ethics and politics, it is the true aim of practical reason to identify "...not in a partial sense, for example, what contributes to health or strength, but what sort of thing contributes to the good life in general" (1139b28). The aim of practical reason in ethics is to act in a certain way. It is not abstract knowledge, but action, and it is action in accordance with moral virtue.

Like theoretical and practical wisdom, the moral virtues are characteristics that must not only follow the dictates of reason, but also must be solely within our own power and voluntary:

In the case of the virtues, an act is not performed justly or with self-control if the act itself is of a certain kind, but only if, in addition, the agent has certain characteristics as he performs it: first of all, he must know what he is doing; secondly, he must choose to act the way he does and must choose it for its own sake; and in the third place, the act must spring from a firm and unchangeable character (1105a30). Virtuous action is not good unless it proceeds from a good motive, which for Aristotle is the deliberate desire to perform our function well as human beings. This conception of virtuous action as proceeding from a good motive is consistent with the discussion of "moral worth" in Chapter 2. Table 2 lists the moral virtues identified by Aristotle. He also provides specific, corresponding actions for the expression of these virtues. These actions, however, are not central to this discussion. It is difficult to describe and understand the specific actions that Aristotle defines as those proceeding from a virtuous character without reference to the particular culture and society, in addition to the specific social roles, within which they are to take place (cf. MacIntyre, 1981). Therefore, for the purposes of the present analysis, it will suffice to have an understanding of the human characteristics, traits, or motives that precede virtuous acts, and a general sense of how such aspects are to be put into practice.

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excess</th>
<th>Virtue</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cowardice</td>
<td>COURAGE</td>
<td>[unnamed]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rashness</td>
<td>COURAGE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Profligacy</td>
<td>TEMPERANCE</td>
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<td>Prodigality</td>
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<td>Illiberality</td>
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<td>Vanity</td>
<td>SELF RESPECT</td>
<td>Humility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambitiousness</td>
<td>[unnamed]</td>
<td>Unambitiousness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irascibility</td>
<td>GENTLENESS</td>
<td>Unirascibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boastfulness</td>
<td>TRUTHFULNESS</td>
<td>Self-depreciation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buffoonery</td>
<td>WITTINESS</td>
<td>Boorishness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Obsequiousness</td>
<td>FRIENDLINESS</td>
<td>Sulkiness</td>
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### States of Feeling

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Defect</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bashfulness</td>
<td>MODESTY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Envy</td>
<td>RIGHTHEOUS</td>
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</table>

Although Aristotle's conception of moral virtue as actions or traits that proceed from good motives is consistent with the framework of the present study, Table 2 shows that he makes less distinction between moral and non-moral virtues (cf. Chapter 2). Where in the present work moral virtues consist only in those activities or traits that effect the welfare of others, Aristotle includes such traits as modesty and witiness that would be considered as character traits but not moral ones. The difference between these two conceptions of moral virtues can be best understood by recalling the Greek conception of virtue, which is to be understood as excellence in human function. This idea is far more broad or general than the limited conception of moral virtues described in Chapter Two.

Aristotelian theory is in particular accord with modern ethical theorists (for example, Rawls, 1971, 1980; Ross, 1930), however,
when it identifies self-respect as the central virtue of the good life. The person with true self-respect is he whose "deserts and claims are alike great" (Ross, 1923, p. 208). For Aristotle, this virtue presupposes all the others and enhances them. Self-respect is a result of acting knowingly in accordance with excellence in all the activities of life.

As can be seen in Table 2, Aristotle determines the proper experience of the virtues through the mean (1107a-1109b). Unlike the intellectual virtues, which can never be excessive, the degree of activity within moral virtues involves a calculation of a median between excess and deficiency for each individual (114b26). He goes to great lengths, however, to show that the mean cannot be defined in fixed terms, but must be a result of the deliberation of each individual considering his own particular capacities and desires (1106b15-1107a). The theory of the mean, a most original contribution to ethics, allows for individual differences of human will and choice, particularly the variability in moral or virtuous behavior. In Aristotle's view, this variability is a natural limitation in ethics:

Precision cannot be expected in the treatment of all subjects alike...Problems of what is noble and just, which politics examines, present so much variety and irregularity that some people believe that they exist only by convention and not by nature. The problem of the good, too, presents a similar kind of irregularity, because in many cases, good things bring harmful results. There are instances of men ruined by wealth, and others by courage. Therefore, in a discussion of such subjects...we must be satisfied to indicate the truth with a rough and general sketch...(1094b15).

But, even with these limitations, we must continue to cultivate and rely upon our ability to construct as well as follow the rules of "right reason." The obedience to such rules, within the context of risks or unknowns, is at the foundation of moral virtue.

It has been established that well-being is activity in accordance with virtue. Aristotle goes further to claim that the activity "should conform with the highest virtue and that is the virtue of the best part of us" (1177a12). Since reason is the highest aspect of human beings, it is clear that man's highest activity in accordance with virtue is the exercise of intelligence in theoretical wisdom.

Although theoretical reason is both a human being's highest capacity and the aspect of his existence that most closely resembles the divine, Aristotle acknowledges that the capacity is yet a small part of the total human self. He advocates that we continually strive toward perfect realization of this divine capacity, while simultaneously acknowledging that to achieve this end fully would be no longer the living of a human life (1177b30). In his view, it is only through daily practice of both the intellectual and the moral virtues over the course of a complete lifetime that one can achieve eudaimonia.

Aristotle also acknowledges still further basic requirements for achieving eudaimonia. For example, material wealth, which provides physical comfort and security, is necessary to free the individual to pursue the good life.

Aristotle on Friendship

As critics have noted (for example, Ross, 1923), much of Aristotle's Ethics appears egoistic or individualistic in that the importance of others in the good life is rarely mentioned. Through careful attention to Aristotle's discussion of friendship, however, this criticism can be attenuated. In fact, Aristotle considers friendship to be a most important form of human activity and, in so doing, recognizes the essential social nature of man: "No one would choose to live without friends even if he had all other goods" (1155a5).

Aristotle identifies both the need of all persons for friendship, as well as a range of types of friendship, but the ideal friendship holds a special place in his ethics, and, like the good person, is an end in itself.

Aristotle's focus on morally good motives is particularly clear in his discussion of friendship. There are three motives from which we feel affection, he tells us: the good, the pleasant, and the useful (1155b180). To be friends, each partner must wish for the good of the other on the basis of one of these motives, and must be aware of the other's will. Each of these three motives are the foundation of three distinct types of friendship.

The first type of friendship is grounded in utility--"the partners do not feel affection for one another per se, but in terms of the good accruing to each from the other" (1156a10). Because this form of friendship is not directly dependent on what sort of person one is, but rather on what each person brings to the other, Aristotle believes that such friendships are easily dissolved since "...usefulness is not something permanent, but differs at different times" (1156a222). Moreover, since we regard a thing as useful when it serves as a means to something else, we cannot say it is worthy in itself of affection.

The second type of friendship is one based on pleasure: a union in which individuals care for one another because of the pleasure each affords the other. This form of friendship is superior to one based on utility; it bears a closer resemblance to ideal friendship. Both partners have the same thing to offer one another and find joy in the same objects. There is also a greater element of kindness and generosity. Moreover, for Aristotle, pleasure can be a good in itself. Although pleasure is good, this friendship cannot be intrinsically good because it is not based on each partner's intrinsic good or character.

The third and highest form of friendship is based on mutual respect and attraction to the goodness of one another's character; in essence, each person is cared for as an end in himself. Moreover, the characteristics of an ideal friendship are viewed as ultimate ends in themselves. In this friendship, usefulness, pleasure, and goodness are combined.

Although affection is part of the ideal friendship, it is not sufficient in itself. Aristotle rejects affection as the foundation of ideal friendship because it is possible to feel affection for inanimate objects and animals. Thus, it is not an emotion specific to the functions of persons. The ideal friendship involves a higher form of reciprocal affection that springs from a characteristic rather than an emotion (1157b30-35). All activities that take place between friends of this sort are activities in accordance with virtue, and, therefore, the characteristics of the ideal friendship are the same as those of the good man.

A thoroughgoing sense of reciprocity and mutuality appear to be central to Aristotle's idea of true friendship. Similarity, however, is to be distinguished from mutuality. Mutuality, says Aristotle, requires much time and many shared experiences for its development. Indeed, becoming familiar enough with the other person is among the most difficult activities of true friendship (1158a15).

There are two major aspects through which mutuality is manifested: trust and mutual moral support. Importantly, trust allows for the opportunity to share more intimate words and thoughts. This is not only the proper form of closeness between
human beings (1170b10-12), but it is also a source of comfort since a true friend "...knows our character and the things which give us pleasure and pain" (1171b0-5).

Mutual moral support means that each friend comes to the aid of the other's character: "They neither go wrong themselves nor let their friends do so" (1159b3). Together, good friends wish for what is good and just, which is in their common interest. In essence, they have identical aims. Each makes it easier, more pleasant, and more possible for the other to live a life in accordance with virtue. A good friend will always support the good action of the other as he would his own; and he would wish him, as he would himself, the greatest good as a human being.

It is here that Aristotle likens ideal friendship to self-love. A good man loves those things in his friend that he also loves in himself (1166a). In this way, Aristotle breaks the antithesis between egoism and altruism in that whatever good one does for others also increases one's own good.

Aristotle counsels that we must be content to find only a few friends of this kind. Such friendships are infrequent not only because they are difficult to develop, but also because the persons with whom one could have such a friendship are rare. If it is achieved, however, it is lasting, for it combines all requisite qualities for the highest human relation.

In summary, Aristotle offers us a vision of the good life that involves the theoretical and practical sciences. The aim of the former is theoretical wisdom—not the search for truth, but the contemplation of truths already attained. It is the exercise of the best of us on the best of all objects, those that are eternal and unchanging, sufficient unto themselves.

In the practical sciences, however, person is seen as agent. Here, the end is neither the contemplation nor the creation of something that will exist independent of the creator. Instead, the aim is the living of a certain kind of life.

We gather from Aristotle a multiplicity of virtuous activities, both individual and social, that will make up this life. All variance, however, can be contained under the principle of human excellence, built up from his conception of human nature as both rational and social. Conceptions of pleasure or satisfaction do not conflict with Aristotle's good life. In his view, one enjoys or is satisfied most by those activities in which one achieves excellence (cf. Rawls, 1971). To live the good life is to be good at being human, and in that activity, rationality reigns supreme. Theoretical wisdom or contemplation and practical wisdom or action in accordance with virtue all require the cultivation and active expression of rationality, preceding from deliberate, autonomous choice. Living in accordance with rational principles—things that are distinctly human—is our aim.

If some of the more obvious idiosyncracies are set aside, Aristotle's general conception of the good life remains attractive and popular today (see Adler, 1981). Ideals that rest on the idea of fulfilling one's function as a human being, particularly the development of rational capacities and of the awareness of voluntary choice, are central to many modern philosophical conceptions of the good life, as well as psychological conceptions of mental health.

Chapter Four
Classical Hedonism

Epicurus (341-270 B.C.)

...we say that pleasure is the beginning and the end of living happily, for it is this which we have recognized to be the good, primary and congenital, and it is from this that we make our departure for choice and avoidance, and it is to this that we go back again insofar as we judge every good by the standard of feeling (pathos) (D.L. X129).

Epicurus maintained a practical hedonism throughout his philosophy of the good life. His thinking turned away from the previously held ideal of persons as organic members of a social order and focused on the private individual. Several hundred years after the fall of Greek civilization, much of philosophy assumed a practical orientation. For Epicurus, if there were any good attainable, it must be found by each person within himself. He rejected both Greek skepticism and idealism. Relying on the incontestability of immediate experience, he claimed that sense data represent the only truth.

For Epicurus, the ideal life is "ataraxia". A condition free from all pains and anxieties, ataraxia (like Aristotle's eudaimonia) is self-sufficient. It is not dependent on the outside world for its creation or maintenance; it is a condition in which..."the soul has escaped the tempest" (D. L. X128). To attain this state is to fulfill one's telos; it is the best condition attainable within the limits of human corporal nature (D.L. X146-148). Epicurus likens the condition of ataraxia to one of pleasure, and, for him, the feelings of pleasure and pain that accompany sense experience determine the ultimate good and evil. Indeed, all statements about good and evil are only meaningful in relation to these feelings: "Feeling is as immediate a test of goodness or badness as sensation is a test of truth" (D. L. X130).

Contrary to modern popular opinion, Epicurus does not advocate the pursuance of sensuous and luxuriant pleasures. To him, the greatest pleasure is found in a certain peaceful state of complete equilibrium of which the gods were exemplars. It is the absence of disturbance, rather the presence of sensory stimulation that results in ataraxia: "...when we feel no pain, then we no longer stand in need of pleasure" (D. L. X130).

There are two major obstacles that Epicurus identifies as impeding the individual's progress to the good life. The first concerns unfounded fears of the supernatural and of death. The second concerns false opinions as to what pleasures we ought to pursue. These obstacles are not insurmountable, he argues, and can be eliminated through the study of natural philosophy (science) and the exercise of practical reason.

Epicurus asserts that men's unfounded fears of the gods and of death destroy their peace of mind. Although he does not deny the existence of the gods, he claims they are to be neither feared nor loved. Their purpose is to serve as ideal models of peacefulness and carefree pleasure. The unnecessary fantasies that men entertain concerning the powers of the gods upset the plans of life, trouble one's future, and put repose and happiness beyond one's reach. Only ignorance causes us to imagine that events are brought on by supernatural interference—true reason and science tell us a different story.

He posits that the fears associated with death can be attributed to fantasy. Through the study of natural philosophy, death is recognized to be merely the limit or cessation of experience, and, therefore, irrelevant to the quality of experience. Epicurus stresses that clear, practical ideas should affect the control of life, much like the affect of medicine upon the health of the body.

In the choices between pleasures, practical wisdom pays consequences their due regard, often accepting pains that lead to greater pleasures while rejecting pleasures that lead to pain. Epicurus counts Aristotle's traditional virtues, such as temperance,
justice, and courage among the means for attaining the good life. The virtues, however, are not good in themselves—it is the pleasure that accompanies the exercise of them that makes them good. He asserts that pleasure and virtue are inseparable and that it is impossible to live pleasantly without living wisely and justly (D.L. X132).

For Epicurus, the wise person distinguishes between desires that are natural and necessary, for example, the desire of sociality or shelter; others that are natural, but not necessary, such as the desire for sexual experiences; and those that are neither natural nor necessary, such as the desire for luxury or power. The wise person is able to determine the minimum his or her nature requires and to satisfy those needs quickly and easily. When these needs are satisfied, a person's constitution is in self-sufficient equilibrium.

Consistent with all the philosophic views to be presented here, Epicurus asserts that those who pursue wealth and power seek security where it cannot be found. In his view, the individual who longs to be rich, famous, or powerful is dragged through his life by his ambition, only to be exposed to envy and the daily risk of ruin and winning nothing truly pleasurable in the end:

If anyone thinks his own not to be most ample,
he may become lord of the whole world, and will
yet be wretched (D. L. X130).

The chief good for Epicurus lies in mental pleasures, but what he means by this is not the strenuous intellectual life advocated by Aristotle. For Epicurus, intellectual enjoyments are found in the exercise of the virtues and in stimulating conversations between friends. In his view, however, only the philosopher or student of science could have freedom (absence of fear) required for the pursuit of proper pleasures.

He advises that we scale down our desires, overcome useless fears, and turn to the pleasures of the mind that have the highest degree of endurance. The ultimate pleasure that human nature seeks is repose, which is experienced by the absence of pain. What living is supposed to do is to bring us pleasure—this is the nature and, therefore, the function of living.

Stumpf (1966) is quick to point out that just as Epicurus sought to detach himself from entanglements with the tyranny of exotic pleasures (neither natural or necessary), he also sought to detach himself from entanglements with other people, and particularly with the poor people whose needs and problems were great. It is certainly the case that his concern was not primarily with human society, but with individual pleasure. Even the life of the philosopher was looked upon as a means for avoiding pain and not as an influence for creating a good society.

Nevertheless, Epicurus' views were popular with members of common society who did not enjoy the advantages of wealth, station, and education. To them, Epicurus recommended the suppression of desires that went beyond natural needs, the cultivation of friendship, and the enjoyment of natural pleasures. It is not a strenuous ideal; it calls for neither heroism nor great sacrifice. On the whole, Epicurus' good life appears quite attainable. As a working theory, the basic philosophy of Epicurus has remained attractive throughout history and in contemporary society as well (Stumpf, 1966).

Chapter Five
Perfectionism (unitarianism)

Benedict Spinoza (1632-1977)

The wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, is scarcely ever moved in his mind, but being conscious by a certain eternal necessity of himself, of God, and of things, never ceases to be, and always enjoys true peace of soul. If [this] way...seems very difficult, it can nevertheless be found. It must indeed be difficult since it is so seldom discovered, for if salvation lay ready to hand and could be discovered without great labor, how could it be possible that it should be neglected almost by everybody? But all noble things are as difficult as they are rare (1949, p. 280).

To find a good that would so fill the mind that all dependence on contingent circumstance and uncertainty would vanish was Spinoza's aim. He developed a monistic philosophy that identified the one substance, reality, or essence of which all things are expressions. He called it God or Nature. Spinoza's philosophy, couched in abstract and scholastic terms, was ultimately practical: its purpose was the guidance of life and the redemption of the individual.

Spinoza presents the good life as the life of knowledge. It is only through knowledge that happiness can be found, and fundamentally, it is "...the knowledge of the union existing between the mind and the whole of nature..." that will bring us peace and serenity (1949, p.6). From this highest form of knowledge, Spinoza tells us,

arises joy attended with the idea of God as its
cause, that is to say, the love of God; not insofar
as we imagine him as present, but insofar as we
understand him to be eternal; and that is what I
call the intellectual love of God (p. 273).

The love of God, though, is not the love of a divine being. It is the state that results from the power of understanding of our place in an eternal universe.

One can never achieve peace and happiness without understanding their place in the whole of Nature. The ignorance of one's true nature and purpose causes not only the pains and anxieties of all personal losses, but also those that accompany hatred and envy of, and competition with, one's fellows.

Thus Spinoza joins Aristotle in envisioning a naturalistic morality by means of which persons could achieve virtue and happiness by fulfilling their natural capacities or end. But Spinoza adds that human nature must find its source and its ultimate end in God or Nature. For this reason, human nature alone does not contain its own standard of fulfillment, nor does its standard come completely from without. It is the recognition of God within human nature, and, along with that, the recognition of God as each person's cause, which is the foundation of human freedom and fulfillment.

The complement of Spinoza's assertion that human happiness and fulfillment result from knowledge and understanding is the notion that human unhappiness, in both intellectual and emotional experience, can be traced to a lack, or absence, of such understanding.

Unhappiness is, therefore, a result of the love of what is perishable and beyond human control: "Our sorrows and misfortunes mainly proceed from too much love toward an object which is subject to many changes and which we can never possess" (p.267). Happiness or unhappiness, in Spinoza's view, is wholly dependent on the quality or the character of the object we love, and it is only the love of a thing eternal and infinite that "...fills the mind wholly with joy and is itself unmingled with any sadness"
To achieve any form of happiness in intellectual or emotional arenas, Spinoza tells us, we must transform our futile efforts into purposeful activities. This requires the transformation of our inadequate, confused ideas, which we only think explain our motives and actions, to the adequate, "true" ideas that find their parallel in God or Nature. Inadequate ideas, driven by unreasoned feelings, are a result of the interaction between real objects of contemplation and our sense organs.

Opposed to Epicurean thought, Spinoza considered sense knowledge to be irrational, inadequate, and confused. This is the knowledge to be transformed. In his view, God or universal Nature is manifested in the nature of the human mind. Thus, to have adequate ideas is not only to have God's ideas, or "truth," but also to grasp and be guided by the law of our own nature. Adequate ideas are at once the means and the end of "living in the true sense." Knowledge, then, constitutes the power of being.

Even when emotions are transformed by an adequate idea of them they continue to be real parts of human nature. It is from the bondage of emotions that persons must free themselves. Freedom from emotion's governance rests in the mind's ability to understand them. Emotions are bad only in so far as they are passions: "An emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it" (p.256). Here, Spinoza anticipates Freud by thinking that being aware of the affective causes that move us means that one no longer falls victim to them.

But such understanding of one's true motives is not to be conceived of as emotionless intellect. Understanding and knowledge involve an active emotional side that constitutes an integral part of the good life in Spinoza's view. It is only emotional disturbances that are depressing, devitalizing, and obstructive to understanding that he wishes to extinguish. Spinoza argues for cultivating a cheerful and expansive mood; for pleasure and cheerfulness are life-affirming—pain and sorrow are always bad and work against self-improvement. Life cannot be promoted by checking its exuberance. Rather, the individual grows by fixing her mind on the good and the possibilities of achievement, not on evils and deficiencies. Even pity, repentance, and humility are, for Spinoza, motives (emotions) to be avoided. They lower vitality and concentrate the individual's attention on weakness, making her blind to her true strength.

To have adequate ideas of one's emotions is to be moved no longer by anything that lies beyond oneself. We are to govern our emotions such that we only act upon those desires that will enhance our true nature as part of the perfect and eternal arrangement of Nature or God. To understand one's emotions clearly, the individual must do more than merely identify them; he must study them to the extent that the idea of them is rendered to be completely true. To achieve such clarity, one must study not only our emotions, but also the whole of Nature, for it is only from the perspective of eternity that we can understand our particular emotional experience. From this perspective, one sees all events through the idea of God as the true cause; by seeing the true cause of all things, one will not want them to be otherwise.

In his Ethics summary, Spinoza describes the benefits of accepting his doctrine: First, it teaches what the person's highest felicity or blessedness consists of—the love of God or Nature, which finally sets the soul at rest. Second, it teaches that the things that depend on fortune, and, so, not within the individual's power to control, do not follow from one's true nature. Third, it teaches "...to hate no one, to despise, to ridicule, to be angry at no one, to envy no one..." and to be content with what the individual has. Finally, it shows how society ought to be governed: "all individuals are to be free to do what is best" (p. 125).

Thus, the good life, for Spinoza, consists of the life of knowledge and can be described in terms of attitudes, emotions, and goals. The attitude is one of both acquiescence and activity. It is active in the power of being and understanding and it is acquiescent in that it allows the individual's focus to change from the finite to the infinite. One can accept one's losses, even one's own death with equanimity for persons would loves God as the embodiment of life and place less importance on finite individual lives. Moreover, to the extent that we acknowledge the manifestation of God in the mind, we experience that we too are, in some sense, eternal.

In the good life, the emotions are positive, both for oneself and for others. For the self, there is the desire by which each person endevors, from the dictates of reason, to preserve his own being. For others, there is generosity, the desire by which, from the dictates of reason alone, a given person endevors to help other people and join with them in friendship. It is not that one ceases to have desires, but merely, as stated above, the desires apparent in the life of the free man arise from adequate ideas.

Hence, one is aimed at a goal common to all persons—freedom and rationality. Such freedom is achieved through the abolition of individual enslavement. This emancipation is attempted, in conjunction with all persons, for the common good and perfection of all. According to Spinoza, one should recognize the truth in the laws of Nature and thus discover the laws that should guide one's own nature.

As in the case of Aristotle and Epicurus, Spinoza's central ideas can be found in many modern-day conceptions of the good life. In particular, the notion that the laws of Nature provide the correct understanding of value can be found to underlie modern theories of natural law (see, for example, Tillich, 1952, and his student, Martin Luther King, 1965; Teilhard de Chardin, 1968; Kohlberg, 1981).

Chapter Six
Social Hedonism

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

There is in reality nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself until it has become so (1861, p. 48).

John Stuart Mill received his training in philosophy under the tutelage of his father, James Mill, also a philosopher as well as a friend and collaborator of Jeremy Bentham. Before the age of twenty, John Stuart Mill was recognized as a leading representative of Bentham's utilitarianism, a role planned for him by his father.

However, a "mental crisis" that stirred Mill deeply turned him away from the strictly quantitative conception of pleasure underlying Bentham's philosophy to the quality of intellectual and emotional pleasures peculiar to human experience. He saw that a weakness of Bentham's theory lay in its supposing that the factors that make up disposition or character are of value only as moving us to special acts that produce pleasure (Mill, 1873).

In contrast, Mill identified human character as having a worth of its own, more important than the calculation of specific results:

I, for the first time, gave its proper place, among the prime necessities of human well-being, to the internal culture of the individual. I ceased to attach almost exclusive importance to
the ordering of outward circumstances...The cultivation of the feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical and philosophical creed (1859, p. 143).

Thus, Mill spent much of the balance of his life attempting to rework Utilitarianism to be a justifiable philosophic system.

Bentham's "greatest happiness principle" is still supported by Mill as the sole guide for deciding how one ought to live. For Mill, however, the pleasures of the intellect, of feelings and imagination, and of moral sentiments result in a higher form of happiness than do the pleasures of mere sensation. He takes his stand with Epicurus in arguing that "...human beings have faculties more elevated than animal appetites, and when once conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification" (1861, p.11).

As implied in Mill's support of the greatest happiness principle, however, he rejects, alongside Bentham, the egoistic aspects of the Epicureans:

The happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned...In the Golden Rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility, "to do as one would be done by," and "to love one's neighbor as oneself" constitutes the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality (p. 22).

It is primarily Mill's conception of human nature that leads him to distinguish his idea of happiness from that of Bentham. Denying the uniformity of human nature, Mill argues that persons are not interchangeable. Human beings, like other species, are pleasure-seeking. What, however, is peculiar to them, and what gives human nature its distinctive character, is how they seek it. In Mill's view, human beings do not obtain pleasure merely through pleasurable sensations, but through the realization of certain projects (Wollheim, 1975). The different projects of each individual will have a tendency to cohere and, under favorable circumstances, coalesce into an overall project or a "plan of life." Happiness, for Mill, becomes the realization of an individual's particular plan--which highlights the fact that one person's plan may not, in any way, bring happiness to another. Consequently, human happiness is a result of a match between an individual's own distinct interests and desires, and the plan that she or he chooses.

There is no reason that all human existence should be constructed on some one or some small number of patterns. If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode (1859, p. 83).

Mill's recognition of individual differences in the sources of happiness is coupled with an awareness that people often encounter difficulty identifying their own sources of happiness as distinct from others'. Mill argues that each individual must develop his or her intellectual and emotional faculties so that they will be able to interpret experience in their own way.

He who lets the world, or his portion of it, choose his plan of life for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself employs all his faculties (p. 73).

Thus, self-development and individuality, both necessary for an individual's proper choice of pursuits toward the good life, become principle goods in Mill's philosophy. Happiness results from individuals fulfilling their own true nature. Although there was, and continues to be, much controversy over Mill's views, many now believe his works represent the most influential philosophical articulation of a nineteenth century liberal, humanistic morality (Schneewind, 1967).

Another aspect of Mill's conception of human nature is his observation that people are naturally closed-minded. Each person is naturally one-sided, or prejudiced; every single individual has limited knowledge and understanding. This unfortunate aspect of human nature, Mill argues, hampers the progress of scientific knowledge, individual freedom, and human happiness and points to the need for broad experience and education.

Mill views social liberty as a precondition for developing the full possibilities of individual human nature. And he believes that society must be governed in such a way as to lead people away from closedmindedness toward freedom of thought and speech. Social and political planning should rely primarily on scientific knowledge, Mill argues, rather than on authority, custom, religious revelation, or prescription. In his assertions of personal freedom and the growth of strong individual character, he argues that even eccentricity is better than mass uniformity. We can have sound views and ideas, however, only if we appreciate the truths in others' views, an appreciation that can come about solely through education and effort. Mill advocates free education for all persons--education that focuses not only on the development of the mental faculties, but also on the development of character and the emotions.

Free and open discussion and the consideration and pursuit of experience and opinions in all their variety are pre-requisites if the individual is to intelligently decide how his own unique nature is to be fulfilled. Moreover, Mill argues that once individuals are exposed, through education, free experience, and discussion to the higher pleasures resulting from mental and emotional cultivation, they will also prefer them over simple, physical, or selfish pleasures.

Defining moral sentiments as "...the conscientious feelings of mankind," it is again the case that Mill advocates development. He posits that such feelings have no mystical, a priori qualities; nor are they natural but, instead, acquired through cultivation. He believes that the more well-developed the human being or the society, the more prominent such feelings become:

In an improving state of the human mind, the influences are constantly on the increase which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest; which, if perfect, would make him never think of, or desire, any beneficial condition for himself in the benefits of which they are not included (1861, p. 41).

Mill thus gives a prominent place to moral directives that do not clearly fall under the principle of utility. Critics frequently claim that he contradicts himself by saying that self-development and the greatest happiness principle are each the highest good. But, for Mill, there is no contradiction in his views. He holds that self-development is not only a strong motive for personal action, but also the best way for an individual to work for his own as well as the common good. Moreover, Mill considers the principle of utility to be so abstract that it is unlikely to find actual application except in cases where two secondary rules come into conflict with one another. This appears particularly true when Mill discusses the principle of utility being exercised "...in the largest sense, grounded in the permanent interests of man as a progressive being" (1859 p. 16). There is no doubt, however, that there can never be a right action that contravenes the principle (1861, V.).

For Mill, the good life is one as full as possible of enjoyable
experiences. It is a result of cultivation and lies in the appreciation of the higher qualities of particular pleasures, including those of connectedness with others. The good life takes place in a liberal and just society in which all individuals are free to pursue their distinct interests with the aim of realizing their own particular natures and where social justice rests on principles that maximize these pleasures.

Mill's view of both the personal and the societal good life is not only consistent with modern views, but is still considered the most prevalent view held in Western society today (Rawls, 1971). One can, however, hold Mill's view of the individual's good life without adopting a utilitarian conception of social justice. Indeed, even if a conception of social justice opposed to utilitarianism (for example, see Rawls, 1971) is upheld, Mill's idea of the good life as the cultivation and culmination of enjoyable experiences that involve individual interests and choice remains a most popular good life concept.

Chapter Seven
Perfectionism (progressivism)
John Dewey (1859-1952)

In the degree in which we become aware of possibilities of development and are actively concerned to keep the avenues of growth open, in the degree in which we fight against induration and fixity, and thereby realize the possibilities of recreation of ourselves, we are actually free (1980, p. 172).

John Dewey used the term "instrumentalism" to represent the functional nature of thought, which is realized through the control and manipulation of the environment. Naturalistic in his approach, Dewey affirmed the application of the scientific method to the ethical domain; he asserted that values are found neither in a priori principles nor in supernatural causes, but rather within the context of human character and experience. Dewey applied his philosophy to the problems of persons, attempting to go beyond traditional debates between philosophers and concerning himself with the "real-life" predicament of man in society. Dewey's philosophic commitments, in broadly stated terms, were much like those of Mill—both were empiricists in the theory of knowledge and liberal democrats in political philosophy. Yet Dewey developed much of his own philosophic position through the articulation of his disagreements with John Stuart Mill. Indeed, much of Dewey's philosophy is considered a critical reworking of the prevailing liberal, empiricist, and moral theories of John Stuart Mill (Sidorsky, 1977).

In his primary criticism, Dewey rejected Mill's interpretation of man as motivated by the desire to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. This interpretation of persons, he held, is a "caricature" of the many complex motives that actually underlie human behavior. Moreover, Dewey argued against Mill's assumption that pleasure is the highest good to be sought. The claim that any particular policy is the "right" or "good" one is, for Dewey, an empirical prediction about how the implementation of that policy will meet genuine human needs. It is to be evaluated like all empirical claims—by its consequences in experience.

Influenced by Darwinian biology, Dewey's central insight into human nature was that of its essentially adaptive, rather than determined, quality and its capability of continuous improvement. The tractability of human nature means that there can be neither fixed limits for human growth nor fixed antecedent patterns for future social planning. Moreover, there is no fixed moral end in life. That to which we must aim is a process—not a destination. That process consists of involvement in intellectual and moral growth. For Dewey, that life itself is a process of development is an empirical fact: "It is becoming, and becoming for better or worse." However, he adds, "...it is in the quality of becoming that virtue resides. We set this and that end to be reached, but the end is growth itself" (1980, p. 172).

To "grow" is to expand one's conception of the meaning of oneself and one's environment. Furthermore, it is to perceive and act upon the inherent relations between the two. Such expansion is related to Dewey's general conception of happiness since he holds that a person's happiness depends upon the degree to which his activity has meaning (Scheffler, 1974).

Dewey's conception of intelligence as the experimental dimension of experience underlies the expansion of meaning. Thinking becomes distinctive when it is an intentional endeavor to discover specific connections between something that is done and the resulting consequences. The notion of intentionality is fundamental to Dewey's assumption that it is purposes and interests that give rise to human actions.

In applying the methods of science to the domain of ethics, Dewey encourages us to take responsibility for the continual evaluation of the means and ends of our actions. In short, we are always involved in the reconstruction of value.

Dewey (1939) begins his treatise on valuation with an argument against equating the notion of value with desire, or with any other human feeling. He says that persons need not rely on "inner experience" because they can determine value from actual observation. Using a scientific framework to define the processes of valuation, Dewey posits that people can compare and contrast the results of different acts of valuation that they observe. Such comparisons become the subject matter of future valuations.

Thus, a statement of evaluation or appraisal does not represent something already complete. Instead, it states a rule or norm for the determination of an act to be performed in the future. Such rules or norms must be subject to inquiry. They must be tested as to whether they are capable of stating relations between things as means and ends, as opposed, for example, to expressions of customs or conventions. Such relations must themselves be empirically ascertained and tested in ways similar to ways in which the relation of cause and effect is tested.

In Dewey's argument for a means-ends relationship in any valuation act, he states that every case (outside of sheer instinct or complete trial and error) involves observations of actual materials and their potential force in the production of a particular result. Each valuation process begins with an "end-in-view," or intended result, and the observations of the actual outcome obtained are to be compared to what was intended. Such observations throw light upon the actual fitness of the means employed and the appropriateness or adequacy of the initial end-in-view, making for better judgments in the deliberation of future acts.

Consequently, ends or values cannot be conjured in a vacuum. They cannot be merely attributable to a given state of mind. Not only do they require empirical observation and analysis for their development to occur, but also the development of a value occurs only when something is lacking in an actual situation—it must be a problem that has arisen. Further, values or ends can only be foreseen as ends in terms of the conditions by which they are brought into existence. Without the consideration of their means, Dewey argues, ends would be idle wishes or futile fantasies.

Contrary to the notion that an ideal is arbitrary if it is causally conditioned by the actual situational needs of persons, Dewey posits that valuation should be a precise process of meeting just
those criteria. He believes that means and ends must be judged in terms of their function instead of their origin. For Dewey, valuation is active; it must be viewed in a context of an ongoing stream of events. In a way analogous to scientific thinking, effects and causes are never viewed as being final and, as in science, a proposed conclusion (the end-in-view) is evaluated as to its worth on the grounds of its ability to resolve the problem presented by the conditions under investigation.

Dewey's pragmatic approach to valuation, particularly his normative model of deliberation, depends not only upon an evolutionary perspective on human nature, but also upon a certain conception of the self as inherently social. Building on Mead's (1934) sociological studies, Dewey's system defines a self that finds meaning only in and from social interaction. It is the social self, therefore, that is to be realized, a self that cannot be considered independent of others:

Interest in the social whole of which one is a member necessarily carries with it interest in one's own self. To suppose that social interest is incompatible with one's health, learning, advancement, power of judgment, etc., is literally nonsensical. Since each one of us is a member of social groups and since the latter have no existence apart from the selves who compose them, there can be no effective social interest unless there is at the same time an intelligent regard for our own well-being and development (1980, p. 165).

Dewey sees education as an integral part of the development of the individual, in particular, and of the society, in general. He is unique among major philosophers in the priority he assigns to educational theory and practice. It is the aim of education, Dewey argues, to instill the qualities of critical thought required for participation in a democratic society, and for contending with life's problems, in general. In its far-ranging goals of cultivating intelligent habits of mind, Dewey sees education as the formal institution of social change; he places the social problems of the larger society at the center of the school's focus. Since Dewey's ideal society is "...an association that allows for the maximum growth of each person through his own activity and self development" (Scheffler, 1974, p. 242), he views education as a formal institution that has as its purpose the building of the foundations necessary for the realization of these goals.

An integration of Dewey's conceptions of intelligence that bestows the ability to effect the natural and social environment and the social self can also be found in his idea of good work--an area of activity he considers central to the good life. Occupation, to Dewey, is a concrete term for continuity in experience. To be good, work must include variety as well as a challenging environment; it must provide the individual with the opportunity to follow up on intellectual interests that a problem may stimulate; it must be the realization of purposeful activity rather than merely the production of material objects; it must expand the individual's understanding of relations; lastly, it should enhance the individual's capacity to realize her social nature (1944, pp. 306-308).

The individual's occupation has tremendous import because it is a major arena for the manifestation of the self. The self is not something ready-made. Dewey contends, but something in continuous formation through choice of action. Choice of occupation, therefore, is a choice of the kind of self one wants to become (1944, p. 352). Within society, moreover, one's occupation is unique in that "...it is the only thing which balances the distinctive capacities of the individual with his social service" (1944, p. 308).

For Dewey, the good life is the active pursuit of new meanings, which results in the simultaneous improvement of the self and the social environment that the self creates, and within which it acts. It is the expression of effective intelligence, which results in the active expression of relations, particularly those that bind us to others (1957, p. 332). Differing from the philosophies of Aristotle and Spinoza, Dewey's form of perfectionism is of an ongoing nature. There is no finite endpoint to be reached; rather, the good life is the constant, active participation in successive adaptation and development. On the one hand, it is the individual who continues to develop into that which he is capable of becoming. One the other, it is the society that creates an environment that liberates the powers of the individuals that form it, and engages them in activities that enlarge their meaning.

Although not as widely held as Mill's view, Dewey's ideals of the social self, the continuously developing person, and his primary idea of the interconnectedness of persons for the realization of self are central to many modern good life conceptions. This is, of course, not surprising since Dewey was a modern-day, post-industrialist thinker himself.

Chapter Eight
Discussion and Conclusions of Section I

Ethical theories are, in general, based in part on moral principles, in part on a psychology of human nature, and in part on a religious or metaphysical perspective on the human condition (Kohlberg, 1981). These various aspects are integrated within the theories presented in this work in not only a formal theory of the good, but also in a set of practical outcomes. Each of the five ethical theories, together with its respective outcomes represents a competing claim. Each theorist attempts to define the good aims for all persons. Yet one of the tasks in the present work is to determine a minimal conception of the good life upon which these five philosophers might agree.

The review of philosophies began with Aristotle, not only because his works are the oldest, but also because of his explicit recommendation of the exercise of human reason and autonomy as the precondition of any ethical judgment. Aristotle thus articulates a conception of ethical rationality that becomes a foundation of the good life acknowledged and built upon by the theorists who succeed him. Whatever the ultimate aims to which human activity is to be directed, it is upon our inherent capacity for reason that we must tenaciously depend for their realization.

In the views of Epicurus and Mill, the presence of pleasure or happiness and the absence of pain are the universal objects of human desire. With consensus in psychological hedonism, the two philosophers take the next step and argue that since pleasure-seeking is embedded in human nature, the good or ideal life results from the rational maximization of pleasurable experiences. These theorists differ from one another, though, with respect to the types of human activities that will most effectively bring about human pleasure, or the good life.

Epicurus constructs an essentially self-centered philosophy, concerning himself with individual pleasure. He also differentiates between the qualities of various pleasures. Calling into question the delights of sensuality and extravagance, he recommends peaceful equilibrium attained through self-knowledge, a virtuous character, and the company of intellectually stimulating friends.

Mill rejects the egoistic aspect of Epicurus' thought. He argues that the good life takes place in a social environment in which the consideration and maximization of all persons' pleasure is paramount. But he does agree with Epicurus that the qualities of different pleasures must be taken into account; Mill, like Epicurus, asserts that the pleasures resulting from persons' higher faculties,
including pleasure that results from a virtuous character, are superior to "sensuous pleasures."

It is difficult to consider the respective differences between these hedonistic theories without also considering the socio-historical and physical-environmental elements that may have, at least in part, affected their design. Epicurus lived during a time in history when social justice was considered unattainable by many, and philosophy was looked to for the practical organization of one's life so as to find value, given extant social conditions and beliefs. In the nineteenth century, Mill shared Bentham's political motives. Bentham had sought a general, impersonal, and objective principle that could control the subjective reactions of individual persons. He fought against the then prevalent tendency in favor of intuitional theories that, he held, directed citizens into unquestioning dogmatism. Thus, Mill built upon Bentham's thought in order to support democratic government that, for him, provided for a society in which individuals could pursue the distinct pleasures of their own nature through free experience and autonomous choice.

The means to the good life, however, are often identified differently by different hedonistic theories, and seem, to a certain extent, context bound, that is, dependent on the existing cultural, as well as physical, environment. Thus, the identified means and their relationship to specific ends must be considered carefully.

As is the case of the theories of Epicurus and Mill, the perfectionistic theories of Aristotle, Spinoza, and Dewey are, in part, responses to the extant conditions under which they have been created. It can be said that Aristotle responded to the popular conviction that man depended on divine sources for the good, whereas Spinoza responded to religious dogmatism, and Dewey to the problems of a technological, capitalist democracy.

Moreover, the perfectionistic theories presented here contain some aspects quite disparate from one another with respect to the fundamental conception of human nature and, as has been shown earlier, it is partly upon these fundamental beliefs that each ethical theory is constructed.

Aristotle perceives man as flawed and imperfect in comparison to divine beings. So much so that to be a good person, an individual must not only be male and wealthy, but must also be trained in philosophy and science from early childhood. In addition to these favorable circumstances over which the individual has little control, he must also overcome his flaws through the active exercise of reason and strive, throughout his life, for divine perfection.

Spinoza sees persons as blind to their fixed and true circumstances, that is, their causal connection with God, or Nature. Although he does not prescribe specific external circumstances, Spinoza also believes that human freedom is dependent on a tremendous amount of study and reflection, which is to result in this awareness.

Dewey views human nature as malleable and evolving, with God or Nature as neither cause nor standard by which to judge the self. He advocates a faith in human morality that has its foundation in the progressive realization of the social self through interaction with others.

Similar to the point raised about the hedonists, one can speculate as to how these perfectionistic theorists might have treated certain aspects of their conceptions of the good life differently had other socio-cultural, scientific, or physical conditions prevailed at the time of their inception.

Yet, each theorist denies the subjectivism or cultural relativism of his particular view. That is, they all deny that what is ultimately good is dependent on any relation between a person and a culture, object, or environment. Indeed, the claims made by these theorists continue even today to preoccupy the individual in daily life, as well as the philosopher.

Ethical and cultural relativism are conceptions that can be found at least as early as 500 B.C. in Plato's character, Protagoras. Protagoras believed that moral principles could never be shown to be valid for everyone. Hence, he advised that one ought to follow the conventions of one's group. This metaethical stance at once undermines the attempt to generate any general conception of the good life. It is certainly agreed by almost any philosophical theory that, in some instances, conflicting ethical values can be equally valid. But here we are attempting to determine whether there are any specific, minimal criteria (value requirements) that underlie most, if not all, philosophical ideals of the good life.

In attempting to address the issue of ethical or cultural relativism, I have adopted Brandt's (1959) idea that the main feature that makes an ethical view non-relative and worthy of consideration is its degree of consistency or generalizability. Part of what underlies consistency or generalizability is that the position from which the statement is made is both informed and impartial.

By these criteria, none of the five views of the good life presented here are ethically relative. The ethical statements of each are considered by its proponent to be both consistent and generalizable. Furthermore, each view is clearly informed. These philosophers go to great lengths to identify what humans are capable of doing, what they should do with such capacities, and what sorts of impediments they are likely to encounter. Although neither Aristotle nor Epicurus was impartial in that they did not see all persons in their particular cultures as capable of the good life, they were, however, both impartial in the sense that they attempted to construct a model of the good life for man qua man, rather than a good life that fulfilled their own peculiar desires or that merely reflected a particular time in history. Thus, it will be assumed that the five views presented are generalizable, impartial, and informed, and, therefore, worthy of considerable. If it has been ascertained that none of the five views is culturally or ethically relative in the main, the next task is to determine what objective goods or values, if any, can be agreed upon by all five.

The distinction made in the introduction between objective values (those values good for everyone) and relativistic values (those values that are peculiar to particular individuals), and their counterparts, internal and external values, is perhaps too general and can now be further specified. Campbell (1935) suggests a distinction between two types of natural, internal values. The first he refers to as value-in-itself, the second as value-for-self. Although these are two distinct types of values, neither need be
subjective or relative. The two are distinguished by their moral or non-moral qualities.

Value-in-itself is both objective (natural) and internal. It is good for everyone and resides in the person. Value-in-itself contains moral value and, consistent with Campbell's conception, is applied only to moral worth and morally right action (see Chapter 2). Value-for-self is also generalizable to all persons, that is, it is a natural good. But it is non-moral and as such is a quite different sort of value. Campbell's notion of value-for-self can be thought of as good-for-persons. It is those non-moral values that are common to all persons because they have a common nature. Each of these values (or goods) is "...an object of an independent, integral and relatively permanent liking [preference] of human nature" (p.287). Thus, value-in-itself, or intrinsic value resides in moral worth and morally right action and, therefore, concerns particular motives, intentions, traits of character, and actions springing from moral feelings of duty or obligation. Value-for-self, which is non-intrinsic yet universal value, is also consistent with the Aristotelian notion of natural, internal values. These values are good for all human beings by virtue of their human nature, but not by virtue of anything inherent in the thing that is valued.

Looking only to the category of value-in-itself, we find agreement among the five philosophers on the primary virtue of autonomy. It is a value-in-itself because it is a requirement in a normative conception of the good person. The meaning of autonomy for these authors includes, but goes beyond, the ability to make one's own choices or to know one's own preferences. Autonomy does mean self-governance, but this self-governance takes a certain moral form.

Drawing from Kant, Rawls, and Dewey, Hawes (1983) proposes a model of autonomy. In this model, autonomy is self-governance, but with reference to standards or truth conditions that are judged to be adequate not only by the person using them, but also by others under similar circumstances. Hawes cites the following criteria for testing the notion of autonomy:

A person is autonomous if and only if:

1. He acts in accordance with standards in appropriate circumstances.
2. Acting according to standards X is justified in the circumstances in which he acts upon them.
3. Acting according to standards X is intrinsically valuable.
4. He knows 1, 2, and 3. (P.94)

This model is consistent with the notion that autonomy is a normative concept. To call someone autonomous makes not only factual claims about a person's actions and her knowledge, but also normative claims about the standards by which the action is being assessed (Hawes, 1983, p.94). The presence of the justification condition, in particular, and the intrinsic value condition, in general, distinguishes this model's conception of autonomy from the idea that to be autonomous means that a person's actions or judgments merely "must include a reference to his own choices, deliberations, decisions..." etc. (Dearden, 1972, p.453).

This model's conception of autonomy is consistent with the ethical views considered here. There is some variance, however, in what the standards of autonomous judgments and actions ought to be. This is to be expected. As put forth in the introduction, justification can remain central to ethical statements and discussion even when the perfect standards for such justification are not yet completely known. The ethical systems presented here construct such standards, advocate that such standards are necessary, and, certainly, presuppose the self's knowledge of this process.

It should be noted that this model's conception of autonomy addresses a problem, often associated with the term, that concerns the sociality of the autonomous person. Specifically, autonomy is often conceived of as an extremely individualistic stance. But, in this model, the fact that the standards by which judgments and actions are to be justified must be capable of being regarded as justified by an impartial observer dispels this conception. It shows connection between the idea of autonomy and the possibility of autonomous persons coexisting under shared and mutually understood standards (Hawes, 1983, p.124; Rawls,1971). This notion is particularly apparent in the more modern works of Mill and Dewey in which shared knowledge and understanding are central to the basic development of character.

This definition of autonomy also includes another value-in-itself that is agreed upon by the five ethical views. It concerns the fourth condition in the model, the value of self-knowledge. Each of the philosophers, differing only in small ways, regards the good person as knowing what he is doing. Such self-knowledge is considered a necessary condition of freedom not only by the philosophers whose views have been presented here, but also by Kant (1785) and Rawls (1971), as well as others. Dewey put it most simply: "We are free in the degree to which we act knowing what we are about" (p.250, 1960). Both self-knowledge and external knowledge are clearly among the highest values shared by the five ethical views. Although there is variance of opinion as to the results of self-knowledge, the understanding of the self, and of its relation to the natural world, is paramount, as is the knowledge of others and of the external world. For Aristotle and Spinoza, the results are known: our relation to God or the contemplation of truths. Epicurus relies on self-knowledge for freedom from fears and anxieties. Mill also relies on self-knowledge for freedom, but freedom to discover one's own character as well as to appreciate the greater pleasures. For Dewey, self-knowledge is the continuous discovery of one's own meaning, and meaning is the source of happiness.

In addition to autonomy and self-knowledge, we can include in the category of value-in-itself the virtues of courage, loyalty, self-respect, and a sense of duty or of justice. These virtues are not only consistent with the five ethical views, they are also consistent with contemporary views, such as Rawls' (1980) conception of a moral person.

Although there is agreement on this limited conception of moral worth, there might be disagreement if one were to expand the conception to include other virtues. However, our goal is to identify a set of minimal requirements for the good life, even though it is conceded that other things would also be necessary.

Within the category of value-for-self, or non-intrinsic, universal value, it appears that pleasure and/or personal satisfaction stands at the forefront. Again, the source of, and means to, pleasure and satisfaction, as well as their respective rankings in a hierarchy of values, do differ. Along with pleasure and/or self-satisfaction, knowledge of the social and natural world is considered a universal value in all five philosophical views. For these theorists, knowledge and understanding of the world and our place in it is a capacity unique to persons, and essential to our meaning as human beings. Moreover, such knowledge includes the meaning of value, and the source of value in a human life.

Finally, in addition to the natural internal values of autonomy, self-knowledge, knowledge of the external world, sociality (interdependence), and pleasure or satisfaction, we can also place basic human necessities in the category of natural, non-intrinsic goods. These are the most fundamental requirements for all persons to live a good life. These include food, shelter, a necessary amount of wealth, rights of liberty, etc. A most contemporary
version of such "primary goods" that is consistent with the present conceptualization has been developed by Rawls (1971, 1980) and presented in Table 3.

Table 3

Primary Goods

(1) The basic liberties (e.g., freedom of thought and of conscience, etc.)
(2) Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities.
(3) Powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility.
(4) Income and wealth.
(5) The social bases of self-respect.

There are, of course, non-moral, non-natural goods that could also be considered. But, since these goods tend to be relative only to particular persons, circumstances, and the like, they do not concern the attempt to construct a model of the good life that is, to whatever degree possible, generalizable to all persons.

Now we are able to state the minimal requirements for a good human life upon which we would likely gain consensus, accepting that there might be disagreement about other things. Even the minimal conception of the good life is ambitious. It is first the life of moral and intellectual virtue. It is lived by persons who retain and act out of a sense of duty and justice, who are autonomous, making choices through rational deliberation and the use of common standards, who affirm their interdependence on others, are courageous, temperate and loyal and, finally, who maintain their self-respect. In addition, the good life is the changing and expanding life in the pursuit of knowledge of the self and of the social and physical environment, and especially the pursuit of understanding what is of value in a human life.
It is the life of activity and interaction (cooperation) with others. Finally, the good life has, at its foundation, a basic social and physical support system that allows the individual to cultivate, pursue, and obtain the good life.

In Chapter 11 it will be shown how this general conception of the good life informs and supports the psychological, developmental model of evaluative reasoning about the good life.

As mentioned in the introduction, dissimilarities in these ethical views are also relevant for the study that follows. It is to these dissimilarities that we must now turn, for they are important to the formation of philosophical orientations. Figure 2 illustrates these differences.

**Figure 2**

Summary of Differences in Philosophical Views of the Good

### THE GOOD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSICAL HEDONISM</th>
<th>SOCIAL FUNCTIONALISM</th>
<th>UNITARIANISM</th>
<th>PROGRESSIVISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HEDONISM</strong></td>
<td><strong>PERFECTIONISM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(egoistic)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-interest</td>
<td>collective fulfillment</td>
<td>Nature; Development;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of function</td>
<td>God succession</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The differences described in Figure 2 concern not what is good but why something is good. The categories represent differences in the ways in which normative judgments of the good are justified. Such differences rely, in part, upon the philosophers' conceptions of human nature, in particular, and their metaethical positions, in general.

As hedonists, Epicurus and Mill find the good to reside in pleasurable experience. However, although they agree on certain values, their justifications for the supremacy of these values would differ in part by their different conceptions of human nature and of the person. Whereas Epicurus refers to the experience of the individual for justification, Mill tends to rely on the experience of all persons as a criterion.

Such justification, it is claimed in this study, is made up of particular sets of ultimate, or second-order, end-values that justify first-order normative claims. These two sets of end-values, the egoistic and the social, give form to the two philosophical orientations referred to as classical hedonism and social hedonism.

Likewise for the perfectionists—Aristotle, Spinoza, and Dewey—something is good when it corresponds to the fulfillment of aims that are derived, in part, from their conceptions of human nature. These scholars agree that the general aim of life lies in the development, realization, or perfection of what is central to human existence, not as a means to attain pleasure, but as an end in itself. However, they vary on what they consider central to human nature and existence and, thus, what it is that one should perfect. For Aristotle, it is the highest human functions, practical and theoretical wisdom that one must perfect. For Spinoza, it is the recognition through self-knowledge of our connection with Nature or God. For Dewey, it is progressive development of meaning through interaction with the social and physical world. These three forms of justification, it is claimed here, produce distinct sets of end-values. These sets have been used to construct the three philosophical orientations referred here as functionalism, unitarianism, and progressivism, respectively.

Thus, when integrated with empirical findings, five sets of end-values, taken together, underlie the theoretical construct referred to as philosophical orientation, which will be discussed in Chapter 14. The operational definition and procedures for the assessment of philosophical orientation are found in the scoring manual in Appendix A.

This concludes the section devoted to philosophical issues related to evaluative reasoning about the good life. What follows is predominantly psychological in nature. To the extent that it concerns issues of value, however, it continues to be interdependent with philosophical concepts.

### Section II

**The Psychology of the Good Life**

In the introduction and Chapter 1, it was discussed how philosophical analysis and justification are required to avoid the naturalistic fallacy. There it was claimed that the leap from the empirical "is" to the theoretical "ought" in psychological research requires a systematic, integrative analysis of value in addition to observations of human reasoning and behavior. In this section, a parallel claim is made. The leap from the "ought" to the "is" could be referred to as the "philosopher's fallacy." In other words, while a psychology of the good life would be left barren without a supportive philosophy for its justification, the philosophy of a good life that is either unattainable, or generally undesirable by the individuals who are to live it would be clearly counter-productive.

A study of the good life should include a psychological investigation of how people actually think about the good life and what people actually think is good. Although the philosophical works presented in this thesis incorporate a psychology of the person as part of their overall views, they, with the exception of Dewey's work, rely exclusively on their own casual observations as evidence. In this sense, psychology informs philosophy by providing valid models of interpretation and analyses concerning human behavior, interests, capacities, motivation, and systems of rationality.

The normative philosophic theories delineated in the previous section have as their common purpose identifying how we ought to be or live. In this section, psychological theories and findings related to evaluation and ideals of the good life are presented. The psychological systems presented here are not normative in the same sense; they are empirical and descriptive, rather than ideal...
formulations. Although the psychologist (like the moral philosopher) enters into an investigation of human reasoning and/or behavior with specific assumptions about the person and about human nature generally, the explicit aim is to test those assumptions through controlled observation.

Chapter 9 will describe the structural-developmental paradigm, which provides the primary theoretical and methodological approach for the present study. Included there are reviews of Kohlberg’s (1981) study of moral judgment development and Selman’s (1980) work on social perspective-taking stages. These two works not only follow the structural-developmental model the most strictly, but they also constitute the most pertinent work for the present study.

Chapter 10 will review what are referred to here as neo-structural theories. Both the structural and neo-structural theories attempt to identify forms of reasoning (or general stages) that are consistent, generalizable, and sequential in development. But the neo-structural theories, while following the general theses of the structural-developmental paradigm, have not provided a strictly Piagetian account of the stage sequences they study, nor do they limit their investigations to structural phenomena. Rather than demonstrating the structural qualities of their developmental sequences through Piagetian criteria, these studies tend to rely on progressions in age, cognitive complexity, and inclusiveness to determine the nature and sequence of stage development. In addition, neo-structural theories typically (but with some exceptions) do not posit their models as normative. That is, in these systems, the highest stage is not necessarily claimed to be the "best" stage. These works include investigations of ego ideal development (Van den Daelen, 1968), faith development (Fowler, 1981), ego development (Loevinger, 1976), care and responsibility development (Gilligan, 1982), and the development of conceptions of friendship (Selman, 1980).

Two semi-developmental and one non-developmental study will also be presented. These studies directly investigate the realm of human valuing, but with differing approaches. They are Maslow’s (1964) study of self-actualization, Green’s (1974) study of the relationship between Maslow’s study of human needs and Kohlberg’s study of moral judgment development, and, finally, Rokeach’s (1973) study of prominent values in adult populations.

All of these works provide differing perspectives on, and information related to, evaluative reasoning and ideals of the good life.

In Chapter 11 these works will be summarized and discussed in terms of their contributions to the study of evaluative reasoning about the good life. There the hypotheses of the present study will also be presented.

Chapter Nine
The Structural-Developmental Paradigm

This study has adopted the structural-developmental approach in order to investigate the development of good life evaluative reasoning. Thus, major focus is placed on the history and principal theoretical components of this approach.

The structural-developmental psychological paradigm was initiated by Piaget (1926, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1954, 1970) in his seminal work on cognitive development. Although other theorists, particularly Baldwin (1906, 1913), had already articulated many similar concepts (see Broughton & Freeman-Moir, 1982), Piaget developed a theoretical and methodological approach that changed the nature of western psychology. The ideas he put forth concerning the universal human development of reason, through an invariant sequence of organized structures has guided four generations of psychological research in cognitive, social, ethical, religious, and moral development.

In recent years, various aspects of the Piagetian framework have been called into question and numerous researchers working within the paradigm are suggesting different forms of revision. Nevertheless, most of the central assumptions of this approach continue to withstand criticism from many psychological, as well as philosophical, camps. These assumptions, such as the concepts of stages, sequential development, transformation, and equilibration, remain central to all structural-developmental research (cf. Broughton, 1984).

Although Piaget coined the term and concept of structuralism for psychology, structuralism was central to anthropology, philosophy, biology, and mathematics. Across these areas, it is commonly agreed that the essential feature of structuralism lies in its recognition of the "fundamental contrast between structures and aggregates, the former being wholes, the latter composites formed of elements" (Piaget, 1970, p. 6). Structuralism takes a relational perspective; its emphasis lies neither on the whole nor on the elements that form the whole but, rather, on the relations among elements and between the whole and the elements. Thus, structures (the "wholes") have elements, but the elements of a structure are subordinated to certain laws and it is in terms of these laws, rather than in terms of the composite elements, that the structure itself is defined. The structures themselves are seen as self-regulated systems of transformational laws that govern the organization of elements.

Piaget's (1970) conception of structure can be summarized in three formal criteria: (1) wholeness; (2) transformations; and (3) self-regulation. He also makes a distinction between "global" and "analytic" structuralism (the latter of which he also refers to as "authentic" structuralism). Global structuralism refers to "emergence"--to wholes which themselves arise from the union of components. Social structural theories such as Durkheim's (1972) are given by Piaget as examples.

The concept of analytic, or authentic, structuralism centers on the "laws of composition"--it seeks to identify and define the details of transformational interaction; that is, to make a detailed account of the transformational laws within a structure. Where global structuralism holds to a system of observable relations and interactions, which are regarded as sufficient unto themselves, analytic structuralism seeks to explain such empirical systems by postulating "deep structures" from which the observable relations can be derived.

Piaget (1970) recognizes that the application of authentic structuralism to the domain of psychology is a formidable task, as compared to its application to mathematics or logic, since psychological structures entail transformations that unfold in real time. In addition, he says that psychological transformations are governed by laws that are not entirely reversible (in the sense that, for example, multiplication is reversible by division). They depend on the "interplay of anticipation and correction (feedback)" (p.15).

Applying his concepts of structuralism to psychological development, Piaget defined the formal construct "stage", in which the assumptions about "structure" are embodied. Thus, the criteria for a developmental stage not only presuppose the formal definition of structure, they also include distinctions as to the processes and contingent phenomena inherent in psychological development over time. The four criteria Piaget cites for a stage are listed below.

1. The notion of stage implies a distinction or qualitative difference in modes of thinking that still serve the same basic
function (for example, intelligence) at various points in development.

2. These different structures form an invariant sequence, order, or succession in individual development. While cultural factors may accelerate, retard, or arrest development, they do not change its sequence.

3. Each of these different and sequential modes of thought forms a structured whole. A given stage response on a task does not merely represent a specific response determined by knowledge and familiarity with that task or tasks similar to it; rather, it represents an underlying thought-organization. The implication is that various aspects of stage structures should appear as a consistent cluster of responses in development.

4. Stages are hierarchical integrations. As noted earlier, stages form an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated structures that fulfill a common function. Accordingly, higher stages displace (or, rather, integrate) the structures found at lower stages (adapted from Piaget, 1960).

With these criteria Piaget set the essential theoretical standards for research in structural development.

A central feature that pervades these standards is the thesis that the human subject is a creator, not just a creature, of meaning. Stages in the human construction of meaning may be, in part, convenient fictions of the theorist, but they ultimately reflect efforts to represent the human experience of making meaning in a particular domain (Kohlberg, 1979).

Kohlberg (1980) describes the structural-developmental approach to stage identification as phenomenological, relational, and philosophical. First, observations are made phenomenologically through attempting to take the role of the subject. The researcher must be able to see things from the subject's viewpoint, understanding what the subject is thinking or saying in his or her own terms. Second, the approach is relational; it focuses on the relations between ideas or contents of an individual's thinking. It is assumed that there is a pattern of connections within these relations that make up, in part, the subject's meaning. This pattern, structure, or set of relations and transformations, is assumed to be common to all individuals at a particular stage of development. Finally, the approach is philosophical in that the definitions of the subject's structures are identified in terms of the meaning he or she finds in the world. The relations that form the patterns of the subject's meaning are represented in the structural-developmental concept of a stage.

To maintain a methodology that can identify psychological structures requires a number of distinctions. The first contrasts "stage structure" with a theory of that structure. Inferring structure is different from inferring a theory of a structure. One cannot infer from observation theoretical constructs such as "reversibility," or "transformation," one can only postulate them and deduce indicators of the construct. Under certain rules, however, one can abstract or infer stage structure (not a theory of it) from observation (Colby & Kohlberg, in press).

In order to infer structures from observations, the distinction between content and structure must also be made. Similar to the Piagetian distinction described above between "wholes" and "aggregates," the distinction between content and structure is one between the "whole," or organized system of thought, and that to which the system of thought is applied. Whereas structure is the organization of operations, content consists of what is operated on. A structure such as "reversibility," for example, must have something to act reversibly upon, such as a problem, conflict, or idea. All psychological structures, then, are manifested through operations in content. Without the presence of content with which, and upon which, to operate, structures would have no observable manifestation.

Content and structure are easily and, to a certain degree, inevitably, confounded. To minimize these effects, a methodological system must be constructed that accounts for their difference and has methods of categorizing content in a way that makes structures more observable.

The final distinction to be made is between competence and performance, which overlaps with the distinction between content and structure. Since current structures, by definition, have transformed and integrated earlier structures, to identify structures of reasoning is to identify highest-level competencies. Habituated previous structures become the content of the present structure. Thus, a methodology of observation must be able to decipher an individual's highest competence from his or her immediate performance. Performance, therefore, can be considered a form of content, while competence can be seen to represent structure.

Moral Judgment Development

While studying cognitive development through the theoretical principles of structuralism, Piaget (1932) also conducted an investigation of moral reasoning in children. Through observations of children's reasoning about the rules and regulations of their marble games, he identified two central stages of moral thought: the heteronomous stage, attained in early childhood, and the autonomous stage, attained in later childhood or adolescence. The heteronomous stage represents an ego-centric orientation through which children understand rules as fixed and given. They, therefore, assume that everyone else sees and respects the same rules, and in the same way.

At the autonomous stage, children view rules from varying perspectives. These children are more flexible, viewing rules relatively, and recognizing that they are based on the construction of persons and the agreement of the individuals involved in the game.

Kohlberg (1958) began his work in moral development by testing the validity of Piaget's early findings. His work supported Piaget's central hypothesis—that there is an ordered, hierarchical sequence in the development of conceptions of rules and laws. Kohlberg's work, however, immediately extended and altered some of Piaget's initial conclusions. His findings supported three hypotheses that would require major revisions of Piaget's analyses. First, Kohlberg found that the earliest stage is not based on respect for rules and authority, as Piaget had concluded. Rather, there is a confusion of morality with power and punishment. Second, the autonomous stage, rather than occurring in late childhood or early adolescence, occurs in late adolescence or early adulthood, if it occurs at all. Third, Kohlberg found that between the heteronomous, or "pre-conventional," and autonomous stages identified by Piaget is a "conventional" stage, generally attained in adolescence.

With this initial study, Kohlberg (1958) began what would be twenty-six years of theory construction and empirical analysis resulting not only in the most comprehensive application of Piagetian theory, but also in the most comprehensive model on the development of moral reasoning. Although Kohlberg (1969, 1971, 1973a, 1973b, 1981; in press) has gone far beyond Piaget's investigation of moral reasoning, he has remained loyal to the Piagetian construction of structural development.

Within the Kohlbergian model, moral development involves
the progressive transformations of moral structures. The moral structures are embodied in six stages of justice reasoning that are posited to meet the Piagetian stage criteria (cited above). Table 4 presents Kohlberg's six stages of moral judgment development.

Table 4
The Six Stages of Moral Judgment Development
(Kohlberg, 1981)

Stage 1. The Stage of Punishment and Obedience
Right is literal obedience to rules and authority, avoiding punishment, and not doing physical harm.
1. What is right is avoiding breaking rules, to obey for obedience's sake, and to avoid doing physical damage to people and property.
2. The reasons for doing right are avoidance of punishment and the superior power of authorities.

Stage 2. The Stage of Individual Instrumental Purpose and Exchange.
Right is serving one's own or other's needs and making fair deals in terms of concrete exchange.
1. What is right is following rules when it is to someone's immediate interest. Right is acting to meet one's own needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what is fair; that is, what is an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.
2. The reason for doing right is to serve one's own needs or interests in the world when one must recognize that other people have interests, too.

Stage 3. The Stage of Mutual, Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Conformity.
Right is playing a good (nice) role, being concerned about other people and their feelings, keeping loyalty and trust with partners, and being motivated to follow rules and expectations.
1. What is right is living up to what is expected by people close to one or what people generally expect of people in one's role as a son, sister, friend, husband, and so on. "Being good" is important and means having good motives, showing concern for others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, maintaining trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude.
2. Reasons for doing right are needing to be good in one's own eyes and those of others, caring for others, and because, if one puts oneself in the other person's place, one would want good behavior from the self (Golden Rule).

Stage 4. The Stage of Social System and Conscience Maintenance
Right is doing one's duty in society, upholding the social order, and maintaining the welfare of society or the group.
1. What is right is fulfilling the actual duties to which one has agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties and rights. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.
2. The reasons for doing right are to keep the institutions going as a whole, self-respect or conscience as meeting one's defined obligations, or the consequences: "what if everyone did it?"

Stage 5. The Stage of Prior Rights and Social Contract or Utility
Right is upholding the basic rights, values, and legal contracts of a society, even when they conflict with the concrete rules and laws of the group.
1. What is right is being aware of the fact that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to one's group. These "relative" rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some non-relative values and rights such as life and liberty, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.
2. Reasons for doing right are, in general, feeling obligated to obey the law because one has made a social contract to make and abide by laws for the good of all and to protect their own rights and the rights of others. Family, friendship, trust, and work obligations are also commitments or contracts freely entered into and entail respect for the rights of others. One is concerned that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility: "the greatest good for the greatest number."

Stage 6. The Stage of Universal Ethical Principles
This stage assumes guidance of universal ethical principles that all humanity should follow.
1. Regardless of what is right, Stage 6 is guided by universal ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individuals. These are not merely values that are recognized, but are also principles used to generate particular decisions.
2. The reason for doing right is that, as a rational person, one has seen the validity of principles and has become committed to them.

In this scheme, each moral stage represents a system of prescriptive operations in response to moral conflict. The stages embody minimal operative frameworks of justice structures that concern conflict resolution in the presence of competing moral claims.

Kohlberg and his colleagues continue to present theoretical and empirical evidence that support analyses in terms of Piagetian moral structures. Based on the judgments and reasoning of subjects in response to hypothetical moral dilemmas, Kohlberg presents evidence for the first criterion, qualitative differences. He claims that each stage represents a unique form or system of reasoning in response to the same universal issue, for example, punishment. The second criterion, invariant sequence, is supported through a number of longitudinal studies, most notably Kohlberg's own twenty-six year investigation. In these studies, individuals progress through the stage sequence, without skipping stages or going backwards. Although an individual's development can cease at any point in the sequence, development that actually occurs does so toward the next ordered stage.

In addressing the third criterion, structured whole, Kohlberg claims that 68% of a subject's moral reasoning across different dilemmas takes place at a single stage, with any variance resting at an adjacent stage. He argues that, without the existence of a "thought organization," moral reasoning should vary across all of the stages.
Kohlberg address the last criterion, hierarchical integrations, by claiming that each stage transforms the previous one into a more highly differentiated and integrated structure, rather than simply adding to what had existed before. (See Colby, et al., 1983, for a detailed description of these results.)

In the context of attempting to meet Piagetian stage criteria, Kohlberg's assessment methodology, which has undergone numerous revisions, attempts to separate both content from structure and competence from performance. With a system of norms and elements, the system accounts for and categorizes content within responses. This makes plausible the identification of moral structures within diverse content (See Colby & Kohlberg, in press, for a complete description of this methodology).

The results of Kohlberg's work appear to demonstrate the appropriateness of the structural-developmental stage model for the study of moral reasoning development. But these moral stages do not stand alone. They are substantively linked to Piaget's stages of cognitive development. Each moral judgment stage requires a parallel cognitive stage for its development (Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg & Haan, 1977). Moreover, each moral stage also requires a parallel social perspective-taking stage for its attainment (1974; Selman, 1971; Selman & Damon, 1975). Thus, the model is one of either horizontal or stepped development within and across these three domains. This relationship is discussed more fully below.

Social Perspective-Taking Development

Social perspective-taking can be thought of as the individual's underlying organization of the relations between the self and other. As already noted, social perspective-taking is an essential construct to the Kohlbergian moral development research approach. The good life stage model to be presented also relies on social perspective-taking as a necessary element of every stage. This reliance is also found in other stage models such as Fowler's (1978, 1981), Broughton's (1978) and Kegan's (1982).

Selman (1980) defines social perspective-taking stages as representing the "developing conception of the structure of the relation between self and other(s)" (p. 6). As such, it is a general, structural organization of the perceived relations in individuals' constructions of their social world.

Selman attempts to distinguish the relational aspect of social perspective-taking from the epistemological aspect of social cognition. He emphasizes what the individual knows about the relation between A and B, not what A knows about B, etc. Selman sees this difference as the difference between "understanding how human points of view are related and coordinated with one another" (perspective-taking) and what the "social or psychological information" looks like from an alternate individual's perspective (role- taking or social cognition) (p.22-23). Social perspective-taking is thus to be distinguished from social role-taking, he claims, which implies either taking the other's perspective and knowing the contents of it or the content results themselves of reflection upon the self's perspective.

As mentioned above, theorists such as Kohlberg (1981), Fowler (1981), and Broughton (1978), as well as the present author, claim that a social perspective-taking stage is a necessary but insufficient condition for the development of a parallel stage in the alternate domain of study (moral development, faith development, metaphysical development, and evaluative reasoning development, respectively). Empirically, this means that a particular social perspective-taking stage develops either earlier than, or concurrently with, parallel stages in the other domains; it is therefore a stage upon which these other stages are constructed.

Theoretically, it means that social perspective-taking stages exist logically prior to the development of parallel stages in the other domains. They are logically prior in the sense that a particular organization of relations between the self and the other is required in order for an individual to perform the task of the parallel stage in the other domain. Figure 3 illustrates these relationships.

The Relationship Between Cognitive, Social Perspective-taking, and Good Life, Moral, and Faith Stages

Stage 4 role-taking builds upon the mutual role-taking of the previous stage. But it adds a new level of complexity. Now there is a concern to see and judge oneself and one's
own outlook in the light of others' outlooks or world-views. Both in the effort to maintain the boundaries of one's own (or one's group's) world-view and in the interest of justifying one's own truth in the face of competing perspectives, Stage 4 persons typically distort their constructions of others' perspectives in unconscious ways. Conscious recognition of these subtle distortions become one factor indicating the limits of one's Stage 4 faith (pp. 71-72).

In this description, one glean some important and aspects of faith construction at this particular stage, but it is difficult to ascertain precisely what the formal perspective is. Statements such as "Now there is a concern...", "...in the effort to maintain...," "...in the interest of justifying...," and "Stage 4 persons typically distort..." all describe the functional results of the stage in question. The "structure of the relations between self and other"--as Selman defines perspective-taking--is not spelled out.

These comparisons are not completely straightforward, however. For, although Selman wants to emphasize the structural, relational aspect of social perspective-taking, it is sometimes difficult to abstract these elements from the content embedded in many of his own stage descriptions. Nevertheless, Selman's descriptions contain these elements. Thus, at least his descriptions of social perspective-taking Stages 0 through three appear more structurally "relational" than those of Kohlberg's or Fowler's higher-level descriptions.

The social perspective-taking Stages 4, 5, and 6 in this study have been constructed by the author in an attempt to extend, rather than revise, the perspective-taking model developed by Selman. These levels represent the structure of relations between social and physical systems in adult thought in the same way that Selman's stages represent the structure of relations between individuals (or individuals' perspectives) in child and adolescent thought. Table 5 paraphrases the formal definitions of Selman's social perspective-taking Stages 0 through three and the extended Stages 4 through 6.

### Table 5

#### Social Perspective-Taking Stages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAGE 0: Undifferentiated and Egocentric</th>
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<tr>
<td>Self and other are clearly differentiated only as physical, not psychological, entities. The child does not relate two points of view. There is a confusion between the subjective (psychological) and the objective (physical) aspects of the world. Actions are often considered only in terms of their physical, rather than psychological, consequences.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>STAGE 1: Differentiated</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The child (or adult) clearly differentiates physical and psychological characteristics of persons. The subjective perspectives of self and other are clearly differentiated and recognized as potentially different. Relating of perspectives is conceived of in one-way unilateral terms, in terms of the perspective of, and impact on, one actor.</td>
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<tr>
<th>STAGE 2: Self-reflective/reiprocal</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The child or adult can mentally step outside herself and take a self-reflective or second-person perspective on her own thoughts and feelings, and she recognizes that others can do the same. Differences among perspectives are viewed relativistically. This two-way reciprocity, however, is concrete. Each individual views herself and the other in relative isolation, without awareness of the relational system between them.</td>
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<tr>
<th>STAGE 3: Third-Person/mutuality</th>
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<tr>
<td>The individual cannot only step outside her own immediate perspective, but also outside the self as a totality, or system (&quot;observing ego&quot;). The third-person perspective simultaneously includes and coordinates the perspectives of self and other(s). Thus, the situation or system, which includes the self, is viewed from a &quot;generalized other&quot; perspective. This &quot;system,&quot; however, is made up of those persons and experiences with which the individual has direct, face-to-face relations. It does not include a system such as &quot;society.&quot;</td>
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### STAGE 4: Multiple Systems

The individual can apply the "generalized other" perspective to distinct, multiple abstract systems such as the societal perspective, the moral perspective, or Nature's perspective, which are differentiated from the interpersonal system perspective of Stage 3. Although there is recognition of multiple, separate systems, the individual is as yet unable to coordinate them. There is an absence of attempts to reconcile potential conflicting relations between systems. That is, the individual can take the perspective of each of the systems independently, but not take multiple system perspectives simultaneously.

### STAGE 5: Second-order Reciprocity

With the awareness of the need for the reconciliation of potentially conflicting or contradictory systems comes the construction of reciprocal relations between abstract systems. Systems are identified, analyzed, and coordinated through formal and consistent mechanisms (theories) of checks and balances. Individual systems or sets of systems remain discrete entities to be dealt with in multiple pair-wise relations.

### STAGE 6: Second-order Mutuality

The individual coordinates all distinct systems by reconceptualizing them as sub-systems, or elements, of a coordinated, fully equilibrated meta-system (meta-mutuality). Where at Stage 5, systems were coordinated through reciprocal relations between each set, Stage 6 individuals construct a meta-system that maintains its own equilibrium and whose operations effect all elements, elements that were discrete systems at Stage 5.

In the present work, as in the work of the other theorists mentioned, each of these stages is thought to form the foundation for the construction of the parallel good life stage. The stage descriptions of social perspective taking are highly formal. That is, they describe the underlying structural relations of thought and not the content of that thought.

### Chapter Ten

#### Neo-Structural and Non-Structural Literature Review

**Ego Ideal**

In constructing an ego-ideal developmental framework of five stages and ten levels, Van den Daele (1968) attempts to find a common ground for the work of G.H. Mead, the neopsychoanalysts, and the cognitive developmentalists. He attempts to include social learning, affect, and cognition into each of his identified stages. His model is thus not completely structural. It is focused on evaluation, however, but it is evaluation of the self.

Van den Daele defines ego-ideal as "an internal standard by which the person measures himself" (p. 1). These standards are applied to aspects of personal appearance, property ownership, achievement, and role relations, as well as moral and social imperatives, and likes and dislikes. He claims that ego-ideal is central to human experience since it "inspires, guides, and directs behavior" (p. 3).

Van den Daele and his colleagues interviewed 108 students in different grade levels between two and twelve (age range = 8-18 years), plus 18 5-year-olds. He first categorized responses by (1)
occupational goals, (2) materialistic goals, (3) social goals, (4) community goals, and (5) body goals. Clinical analysis of these categories led to the identification of five stages and ten levels of age-related development. The levels apparently represent successive development between stages. This brief discussion will be limited to the stages he identified.

He reports that at the lower stages (Stages 1 and 2), children's conceptions and reasoning about the ideal self are undifferentiated from the emulation of important adults. He also finds evidence of extremely dichotomous evaluations, with the world ordered in terms of "good" and "bad," "nice" and "not nice." Furthermore, Van den Daele defines Stages 1 and 2 as egostoic hedonism, where good for the self is determined by amounts of pleasure and fun, and where short-term interests are dominant.

At Stage 3, he reports that the ideal self is achieved through conformity to the expectations and evaluations of others and that the subject "strives to gain others' approval, acceptance and liking."

The Stage 4 ideal self, he finds, is realized as a consequence of one's self-affirmation through reference to one's internalized values and beliefs. The values and beliefs, however, are those prescribed by society. At Stage 5, Van den Daele maintains, the ideal self consciously strives for self-realization in terms of personal/social or transcendent good. He describes individuals at this stage as "thinking upon reflectively derived principles of evaluation," and goes on to say that "choices are highly integrated."

Van den Daele reports his empirical findings in terms of levels rather than stages. He claims that the ordering of the levels is consistent with a hierarchical model because "the more primitive levels have highest frequencies at earlier ages and more mature levels have highest frequencies at later ages." This holds at least for ages 8 to 16. This led him to postulate that ego-ideal development "levels off at around age 16" (p.40).

Comparing subjects' modal scores at age 5, he reports that almost 100% of the subjects to have attained stage one (Levels 1 and 2). By grade 2, however, almost 100% were at Stage 2. In grade 4, 72% of the subjects were still at Stage 2, while the rest were at 3. In both the sixth and eighth grades, approximately half the subjects remained at Stage 2, with approximately 40% at Stage 3 and 10% at Stage 4. In the tenth and twelfth grades, approximately half the subjects were at Stage 3, with the rest evenly distributed between Stages 2 and 4, except for 6% of the twelfth graders who reached stage 5. Age was highly and significantly correlated with ego ideal level, as was IQ in the tenth and twelfth grade.

Van den Daele also administered moral judgment interviews (Kohlberg, 1958) to his subjects. Moral judgment stage scores were significantly correlated with ego-ideal level (r = .67), but in an ANOVA that included moral judgment scores and age, only age was found to be a significant factor in predicting ego-ideal level.

Finally, Van den Daele identifies unique experience, or at least the unique interpretation of experience, as an necessary antecedent to the attainment of higher stages. He claims that development to Stage 4 is continuous, each stage being initiated through the acquisition of new cognitive structures, but that advancement to stages above 4 is better thought of as horizontal decalage (application of previously attained structures to new content or experience). He posits that advancement to Stage 5 does not require the acquisition of new cognitive structures, but rather "a reorientation of commitment away from social prescriptions and toward unique goals" (p.236). Such "unique goals" are disengaged from socially-defined values, resulting from a model of behavior predicated upon the self-defined goals of individuality or autonomy.

In a description of the structural construction of the ego-ideal model, Van den Daele remarks that the stages are based on "general reasoning" rather than on content choices, and that "levels correspond to differentiations and reorganizations of structures, precipitated through new cognitive acquisitions and new sets of experiences" (p.51). He defines his use of "structure" in the "general sense, as a correlated group of affective-cognitive dispositions" (p.51). He claims that the model meets the criterion of hierarchical integrations because "the later levels of thinking virtually include the earlier levels of thinking. Each level subsumes those which preceded it" (p.51). And, finally, he states that the hierarchy of the model is based on an invariant sequence of increased cognitive differentiation: "Ego ideal development involves both a cognitive and an affective component. The successive cognitive differentiations proceed in an apparently invariant sequence, rendering a more general scheme of information processing" (p.57).

Van den Daele's study of ego-ideals is an ambitious attempt to couple previous non-developmental and unreliable concepts of ego-ideal and self-concept (Wiley, 1961) with a developmental model. Furthermore, there are some strong similarities between his stages and Kohlberg's and Selman's stages as well as between his stages and other stage conceptions, to be described below. There appear to be some inconsistencies, however, between his findings concerning age correlates and the current developmental literature, as well as some inconsistencies with structural models in general.

Although his stage descriptions are very similar to those of Kohlberg and Selman, as mentioned, as well as to the work of this writer (Armon, 1984; Erdynast, Armon & Nelson, 1978) and to a number of other theorists, Van den Daele observes these stages in a much younger sample. Kohlberg (Colby, et al., 1983), for example, reports finding Stage 4 only after age 20, 4/5 after the mid-twenties, and Stage 5 after that. This inconsistency is also confounded with another. Van den Daele claims that, on the one hand, his ego-ideal model is "structural" (in his general sense) and, on the other hand, development to Stage 5 is not a structural transformation but, rather, horizontal decalage. This claim might explain why he finds Stage 5 in eighteen-year-olds, but not why he finds Stage 4 in sixteen-year-olds. It may also explain the low statistical relationship with moral judgment stages found once he had controlled for age. In general, his attempt to mix structural-transformational stages with other forms of stages results in a stage sequence that is somewhat difficult to interpret.

Even more disturbing is that these findings led Van den Daele to conclude that ego-ideal development ceases in mid-adolescence.

It appears that the structural nature of the ego-ideal stages depends purely on the cognitive elements of the stages and, therefore, that development in ego-ideal parallels cognitive development. If this is the case, ego-ideal is reduced to content associated with cognitive stages. This interpretation is supported by two points. First, Van den Daele claims that "...while levels 4 through 7 correspond to the subject's increasing sophistication in generalizing and differentiating cues, these levels reflect in a relatively direct way the peer and social culture of the subject. Thus, the characteristics of the intermediate levels appear grounded in a particular culture" (p.54). The second form of support is provided by an explanation Van den Daele gives of Stages 4 and 5 (Levels 7 and 8, 9 and 10). He claims that, at Levels 7 and 8, individuals exercise autonomous, a priori principles of cognition; at Levels 9 and 10, third-order cognitive operations. He gives no specific ego-ideal data to explain why these stages are higher than others. One is led to assume that the model is essentially a
cognitive one.

New literature in cognitive and social development in adulthood tends to support Van den Daele's higher stage definitions (see Commons, Richards, & Armon, 1984). In this literature, however, these higher stages are identified in individuals much older (usually thirty to fifty years old) than those in Van den Daele's sample.

Although space does not permit a more extensive review, Van den Daele's more recent work (1974) includes a reformulation of this model, coupling structuralism with an information-processing model of ego development, based on the same 1968 data combined with "biographical reports from the general literature" (p.63).

In spite of the problems mentioned, more consistencies than inconsistencies are apparent when Van den Daele's (1968) model is compared to other neo-structural theories. He himself states, for example, that "The developmental ordering of ego-ideal principles...parallels Loevinger's synthesis of ego transformations" (p.63).

Ego Development

Loevinger's (1976) conception of ego development is characterized by qualitative changes in complexity as the developing ego passes through an invariant hierarchical sequence of stages. The stages integrate "strands" of personality development across dimensions of character, interpersonal style, conscious preoccupation, and cognitive style. Ego development represents the development of "structures" in the structural-developmental sense of "an inner logic to the stages and their sequence" (1982, p.11).

Her investigation combines a psychometric or quantitative assessment measure (sentence-completion test) with a structural-interpretive model. With this approach, a subject's ego stage is determined by a cumulative statistical transformation of the various stage scores obtained from 36 completed sentence stems.

Like Van den Daele, Loevinger's stages proceed from egoistic, hedonistic concerns, through instrumentalism, to conformity to group norms, to conscientious, internalized self-evaluative standards, to autonomy, and, finally, to acceptance and reconciliation. Hundreds of studies have replicated Loevinger's initial findings and reliability, and construct validity estimates are quite high for her measure.

Loevinger's ego development model shares a number of assumptions with structural-developmental models. Both agree on the general requirements of Piaget's hierarchical model, as delineated above, and both accept the idea that moral judgment and character are major aspects or dimensions of ego development that relate to a more general ego stage. In test construction, Loevinger's approach is consistent with structuralism (Loevinger & Wessler, 1970). She agrees that the test constructor finds developmental structures, not by an inductive method, but by an "abductive method," which involves a working back and forth between theoretical reflections of the constructor and the actual responses of subjects.

In contrast to a structural model, however, Loevinger's scheme considers structure less a form of thinking than general, stable and consistent personality content and functions--the usage implied in the psychoanalytic concept of character. Structure in Loevinger's terms is more a hypothetical, underlying entity of personality like the psychoanalytic ego. Because structure is an underlying hypothetical construct, it can never be directly observed. The existence of a structure can only be inferred from probabilistic signs of the hypothetical structure, rather than abstracted from observations of a phenomenon. Loevinger's actual assessment measure is based on categories of content, or mixtures of content and structure, as probabilistic signs of an underlying structure.

Another contrast to structural models is that Loevinger's theory, by definition, addresses the unity of the self (Loevinger, 1982), and is thus dependent on the individual's reflections upon the self's psychology. Although the stages appear to have qualitatively different organizations, such systems of reflective thinking represent "theories" that individuals construct, not structural forms.

Finally, there is some ambiguity as to the inner logic of the ego development stages, which reduces the plausibility of formulating a normative model of development, a central criterion of structural stage models (hierarchical integrations). Loevinger herself explicitly denies a normative model and makes no claim that a higher ego stage is a more adequate stage.

Who is so wise as to say which is the highest stage? Each investigator in the field has a different idea of how the highest stage should be defined (1982, p. 7).

If not strictly structural, Loevinger's stage definitions and stage sequence remain relatively consistent with structural theories as well as with other neo-structural ones. In addition, particular aspects of her findings are directly relevant to the investigation of evaluative reasoning.

Responses concerning the value of certain personal goals and social institutions are elicited by specific sentence stems. In the scoring manual (Loevinger & Wessler, 1970; Loevinger, Wessler, & Redmore, 1970), "ideal-type" responses are given for each stem at each stage that have been constructed through an analysis of over a thousand cases. Such ideal-type responses can provide important information concerning developing conceptions of the good life and the good person.

The phrase "A good mother..." is an illustrative example. At Stage 2, this phrase elicits a description of a mother who satisfies the unlimited instrumental demands of the child. At Stage 3, it elicits a description of one who fulfills conventional, usually stereotypical, role expectations, particularly those of "loving and caring" for her children. At Stage 4, the traits of a good mother are those expected of a woman who can balance and weigh contradictions, examples being tolerance and broadmindedness. There is also sensitivity to the child's inner life and a concern with the development and independence of the child at this stage. At the higher stages, 5 and 6, the necessity for reconciliations between the parent's responsibilities and the child's needs to find herself and achieve eventual autonomy is acknowledged. This last ideal of a good mother introduces the value of autonomy into the conceptions of both the child and of the mother.

Another of Loevinger's stems, "education..." is indicative of conceptions of social institutions and has implications for both the good life and the good person. Subjects at the lower stages (2 and delta) tend to see the value of education in instrumental terms, especially its usefulness in obtaining employment. At the third stage, education is seen as only one important factor in getting a job, and particularly as affecting the degree of desirability of the work obtained. At the transitional stage 3/4, education is perceived as important for social development and status; at Stage 4, as important for personal growth; and, at Stage 5, it has intrinsic value and promotes the understanding of oneself and others, leading to self-fulfillment.

For the purposes of the present work, it is a problem that
Loevinger's instrument and scoring procedures do not require subjects to supply the reasoning that supports their response to any item. Also a problem is the fact that the scoring manual does not describe the subjects' reasoning at every level on either of the above-mentioned stems. Nevertheless, Loevinger's ideal-type responses to these phrases are similar to the findings reported by Van den Daele and others. Both theorists support a general, developmental trend in individual evaluation from a stage of ego-centric instrumentality, through conventional norm-following, to the recognition of individuality, and, finally, to the acknowledged need for autonomous self-definition.

**Faith Development**

Fowler (1976, 1978, 1981) introduces a model of hierarchical, ideal types, each of which represents the individual's framework of philosophic-religious reasoning. Similar to the other neostructuralists' work reviewed above, his descriptions of developing conceptions of faith attempt to combine formal structuralism with other aspects of personality, particularly the unconscious dynamics and symbolic functioning of psychoanalytic approaches.

Fowler separates faith from a strictly religious conception and refers to the individual's orientation to, and conception of, the ultimate determining realities in his or her life. Faith is "a mode-of-being-in-relation to an ultimate environment" (1978, p.24). Each stage represents a way of "being" and a way of "seeing the world," which are reciprocal functions "that arise out of contrasting ways of composing the ultimate conditions of existence" (1981, p.99).

Similar to Loevinger's global ego construct, each of Fowler's faith stages includes seven "aspects:" (1) forms of logic (Piagetian cognitive development); (2) forms of world-coherence; (3) role taking (Selman's social perspective-taking); (4) locus of authority; (5) bounds of social awareness; (6) forms of moral judgment (Kohlberg's stages); and (7) the role of symbols. In an attempt to bridge the gaps that he identifies in other models between morality and value, knowing and thinking, affect and cognition, reasoning and imagination, moral judgment and symbolic representation, Fowler ambitiously proposes an inclusive model that claims to account for these relations (1981, p.99). The way a protocol is scored is to first attain scores within each aspect and then to average them. Finally, all of the averaged aspect scores are averaged.

Fowler posits that part of what his stages represent is "different thought and value patterns, some of which can be systematically accounted for in developmental terms" (1978, p.26) [italics added]. The present interest in giving specificity to the value patterns to which Fowler refers is not easily satisfied due to the inclusive nature of his investigation and the personal richness of his open-ended interview protocols. However, when he refers specifically to value issues, his findings support the general developmental trend apparent in the works of Van den Daele and Loevinger.

At his lower stages (1 and 2), Fowler (1978) does not present criteria for valuing because, in his view, they are not yet matters of conscious reflection. At Stage 3, the attainment of mutual role-taking capacities results in individuals becoming dependent on significant others for the sanction and validation of their beliefs and values. Fowler notes that at this stage there is a heavy reliance upon interpersonal virtues as criteria for judging the truth-value of others' perspectives. He posits that identity and faith are developed from membership in a group or groups characterized primarily by face-to-face relationships.

Advancement to Stage 4 is distinguished by the emergence of independence and a determinant outlook on faith. There is a major concern for explicit meaning at this stage. Internal consistency in one's perspective of the self and reality is seen as a prerequisite for the construction of personal values. At Stage 5, however, the individual goes beyond the struggle to be explicit and firm, which is characteristic of Stage 4. The individual now accepts ambiguity. In the social realm, Stage 5 reasoners feel committed to securing values such as justice and equality for persons beyond their own social group or system. Fowler's Stage 5 subjects combine a principled respect for the personality and autonomy of others with feelings of obligation to express their own values to others and to teach what they have learned through experience.

However, Fowler characterizes the fifth stage in terms of a paradox. He claims that the experience of paradox, or division, is a result of the individual being "caught" between the universalizing demands of justice-the possibility of an inclusive commonwealth of being—and the need to preserve one's own well-being. One must act, therefore, out of conflicting loyalties, both of which are compelling.

At Fowler's Stage 6, the conflict between the individual's apprehensions about his personal preservation is resolved by its actualization in experience. Thus, there is a rejection of traditional, individualistic notions of security, survival, and personal significance in favor of the identification of self with the universal community of being. Fowler's Stage 6x subjects advocate the realization for everyone of the interdependence of all selves on all other selves, and the annihilation of all barriers between persons, as well as between person and nature. His ideal person at this stage not only acts upon this principle of universal holism, but also commits his or her life to its advancement.

As mentioned, Fowler's stages include a number of aspects, of which specific valuing is but one. Space does not permit a complete explanation of the stages, but when taken in their complete form, the stages continue to support the same developmental trend.

One might conclude from the all-inclusive nature of the faith stage model that the stages do not represent single structures. Fowler (1981), however, claims otherwise. Indeed, he claims that faith stages do meet the Piagetian criteria for a structural stage:

They provide generalizable, formal descriptions of integrated sets of operations of knowing and valuing. These stage-like positions are related in a sequence that we believe to be invariant. Each new stage integrates and carries forward the operations of all the previous stages (p. 100).

Moreover, in reference to the necessity for a normative model of development, Fowler states:

In the domain of faith the assertion that more developed stages are in significant ways more adequate than less developed ones has to be made with even greater cautions and qualifications than in the cognitive or moral reasoning spheres. Yet we cannot (and will not) avoid making and trying to corroborate that claim. (p.101)

Fowler uses Kohlbergian psychological criteria to support his claims for a normative model of faith development, such as increased competence, autonomy of thought, complexity, and accuracy in role-taking. Although he refers to the thinking of well-known philosophers and theologians in many of his explanations of the faith stages, he provides neither philosophical arguments for the greater adequacy of his highest stage nor philosophical distinctions
between the various aspects of the stages.

Kohlberg (1981) refers to Fowler's stages as representative of "ethical philosophies" (p.335). Kohlberg claims that the stages are neither strictly moral nor strictly religious but, rather, concern "a general unity to the development of valuing activity in the human personality" (p.335).

Like the stages in Loevinger's model, stages of faith appear to represent reflections on the self's ethics and epistemology, including reflections upon the meaning of life and reality. As was noted about Loevinger's model, such systems of reflective thinking represent individuals' constructed "theories," rather than systems of operative reasoning. This interpretation is supported on two grounds. First, Fowler has published neither a scoring manual nor adequate corresponding reliability and construct validity data (cf. Fowler, 1981, p.314), which would be necessary to support his structural claims. Second, although he defines a stage as "an integrated set of operational structures" (1981, p.49), he has not yet presented a formal model of the operations that are to be observed in faith stage responses, where operations are understood as interiorized forms of action (Kohlberg & Armon, 1984).

More research and analysis are needed to establish the structural quality of the faith stages. For the purposes of the present work, it is only necessary to establish a relatively clear view of the general developmental trends in valuing that the faith stages represent and to articulate briefly the claims about the structural quality of the model.

Friendship

Philosophical conceptions of the good life often involve aspects of interpersonal relationships, generally, and those of friendship, in particular. Aristotle's specific treatment of friendship and the emphasis on social relations by Epicurus, Mill, and Dewey are illustrative examples. It is in the direct interest of this work, then, to review Selman's (1980) descriptions of the development of conceptions of friendship.

Selman places friendship conceptions within the domain of interpersonal understanding, which he studies in four areas, referred to as persons, parent-child relations, peer-group, and friendship. A major purpose of Selman's work is to bring together "the formal, structural analysis, or the description of social concept development, and the functional analysis, or the study of actual social conceptual usage" (p.76). For the purposes of the present work, only the stages of friendship will be described.

At Stage 0, Selman (1978, 1980) identifies a physicalistic orientation that limits concepts of friendship to a criterion of coincidental proximity. Positive attributes of a friend are confined to physical and functional similarity. At Stage 1, friends are understood to be persons that perform specific overt activities that one wants done. A good friend is someone who knows what the individual likes to do, and will do it with, or for, him or her. There is an absence of reciprocity, and all causes of conflict are seen as unilateral.

Stage 2 is characterized by the ability to see the reciprocal relations between interpersonal perspectives. Selman posits that at this stage each person is seen as capable of taking into account the other's perspective on the self's motives, thoughts, and feelings. Yet, the individual still sees the basic purpose of reciprocal awareness as serving his own interests, rather than in the service of mutual concerns.

At Stage 3, however, the focus is on the relationship itself, rather than on each individual separately. Selman claims that there is a shift from the reciprocal coordination of the other for the sake of the self's interests to the notion of collaboration for the sake of mutual interest and sharing. Good friendships at Stage 3 are long-term, developing over time, and resulting from shared mutual experiences. Moreover, the participants make a substantial effort to maintain the relationship.

Friendship at Stage 4 is in a constant process of formation and transformation. Friendships are seen as open, relational systems available to change, flexibility, and growth in the same way that individuals are susceptible to such development. An important function of a close friendship is to help provide the individual with a sense of personal identity. Each person helps the other and allows him or her to develop independent relations. Each individual's need for both dependency and autonomy are recognized in the friendship, and the mutual meeting of those needs is realized in basic trust. At this stage, attending to the deeper psychological needs of the other is a primary virtue.

These descriptions, although limited to the domain of friendship, also follow general developmental trends similar to the stage descriptions found in the works of Van den Daele, Loevinger, and Fowler, as described above. One major difference, however, is that the sequence does not include a Stage 5 or 6. It is not clear whether Selman thinks Stage 4 is the highest friendship stage that can be achieved or only the highest stage that he identified within his samples.

A comparison of Selman's stages of friendship with his stages of social perspective-taking suggests that the friendship stages contain the stages of social perspective-taking, but exceed them to define social conceptions. Indeed, each of the stages within the friendship domain appears to include three aspects: (1) an aspect of social perspective-taking (structural relations between the entities, self and other); (2) an aspect of social cognition (a conception of what "friend" or "friendship" means--epistemology); and (3) an aspect of value (the criteria for a "good friend"). Selman (1980) makes the distinction between social perspective-taking and interpersonal conceptions by referring to the former as structure and the latter as the content upon which the structure operates. At the same time, however, since he claims that the stages of interpersonal or social understanding themselves are coherent wholes that meet Piagetian criteria for a stage. Consequently, the "content" of the stage must also retain developmental features. This, however, is not fully demonstrated: Selman does not make a distinction between the social-cognitive and the valuing aspects of friendship concepts. Thus, although Selman's stages of friendship demonstrate developmental trends similar to the stage theories reviewed earlier, it is unclear which features of the stage constructions contain structural aspects.

Care and Justice Development

Gilligan (1982) asserts that there are gender differences in the ways individuals respond to moral questions, particularly Kohlberg's (1979) justice dilemmas. She claims that men more frequently use deontic justice responses, while women tend to use judgments "tied to feelings of empathy and compassion" (p.69), although both sexes have the capacity to use either form of response. She goes on to claim that this difference has not been given adequate attention and that the result has been interpreted as a failure of women to develop. The reason for this neglect, she explains, is that psychological theories and research on moral development, specifically, as well as philosophical work on morality, in general, have been created by men who have studied predominantly male samples. Gilligan's main argument appears to concern the distinction between obligation (duties and rights) and responsibility, where responsibility is understood as the ability to respond in an empathetic and caring way (p.100). Gilligan's
ultimate aim is to clarify an "adult moral conception," one that must include more than abstract rights, rules, and principles.

However intuitively guided, she claims that her views are purely empirical in origin. From an analysis of interviews collected from women who had decided to have abortions and one-year follow-up interviews of the same women, Gilligan observed that personal crisis appeared to magnify developmental transition (p.107-108). She describes a general pattern, or sequence, in the development of some of these women, that is characterized by understanding of responsibility and relationships. She calls the sequence "transitions in the ethic of care" (p.109).

Gilligan makes no direct claims about the structural nature of these transitions, which are described through a rich narrative and are complemented by anecdotal protocol material from females aged fifteen to twenty-five. For convenience, however, I will refer to these organizations as "levels."

The first level she identifies is characterized by a "concern for survival." There is a preoccupation with the individual's own needs and a struggle to insure her own survival. The individual also perceives the outside world as exploitative and threatening. Gilligan provides an excerpted response to Kohlberg's "Heinz dilemma" for a subject at this level. The response would be scored in Kohlberg's system firmly at Stage 2.

The transition from this level is described by Gilligan as one from survival to goodness, and from selfishness to responsibility. At the second level, "mutual care and affection have replaced coercive and exploitative deals" (p.113). In this case, the moral judgment material provided would be scored stage at either 2/3 or 3 in Kohlberg's system.

The final transition is referred to as one from goodness to truth. At this higher level, women realize the truth of their own participation in events, while also discovering their "inner voice." At this level, "The truths of relationship...return in the rediscovery of connection, in the realization that the self and other are interdependent and that life, however valuable in itself, can only be sustained by care in relationships" (p.127). No Heinz dilemma material is presented for this level.

Gilligan has thus attempted to expand the domain of morality suitable for developmental investigation. Since women define their identity through relationships of intimacy and care, she claims, the moral problems they encounter pertain to issues of a different sort than rules, laws, and states of justice, and both forms of moral conceptions require acknowledgement. Gilligan summarizes this distinction as follows:

"the morality of rights is predicated on equality and centered on the understanding of fairness, while the ethic of responsibility relies on the concept of equity, the recognition of differences in need. While the ethic of rights is a manifestation of equal respect, balancing the claims of other and self, the ethic of responsibility rests on an understanding that gives rise to compassion and care (p.164-165).

Gilligan also claims that resolution of the conflict between these two perspectives is indicative of maturity in adulthood for both sexes. "Both integrity and care must be included in a morality that can encompass the dilemmas of love and work that arise in adult life" (p.165).

More recently, Lyons (1982), collaborating with Gilligan, developed a coding scheme for the "care orientation" and the "rights orientation." This system provides criteria for the identification of these orientations in responses to Kohlberg's moral judgment interviews, as well as other, "real-life" dilemma interviews that Lyons constructed. In support of Gilligan's thesis, Lyons finds significantly more care-orientation responses in females and more rights-orientation responses in males, although both sexes use both orientations. In a similar investigation, Langdale (1982) reports not only that women use the care orientation more than men in response both to Kohlberg's and to "real-life" dilemmas, but that this difference is more significant in the real-life dilemmas. She also reports, however, that both men and women use the care orientation more in response to real-life dilemmas than to Kohlberg's justice dilemmas.

Gilligan's work is both popular and controversial; it is also difficult to critique for two reasons. First, many of the claims made are so broad as to make specific comment seemingly inappropriate. Second, neither Gilligan, Lyons, nor Langdale addresses many of the genuine implications, both psychological and philosophical, that arise from their claims. On the psychological side, no direct claims are made concerning the Piagetian conception of stage, other than to imply that it is inadequate. It seems reasonable, then, to assume that the "levels" Gilligan identifies are not intended to represent structural stages in the formal sense. It is not clear, however, how the organization of these levels is intended to be understood. They seem to be rather global organizations of structure and content, affect and cognition, structure and function, similar to the stages of Loevinger. Indeed, Gilligan often weaves Eriksonian functionalism into her expositions. The relationship between Gilligan's three levels and the "care orientation" is elusive as well, but a reasonable interpretation is that the levels represent developmental, hierarchical organizations of the care orientation.

Lyons (1982) claims that the care orientation has its own "inner logic," but this seems implausible. If it is the case that the orientations are purely empirically derived, one assumes an absence of a "prior" logical framework with which to analyze the inner logic of the orientation. Similarly, Gilligan, Lyons, and Langdale argue that it is the subject and not the researcher who defines the nature of morality, which is the construct under investigation. Thus, the parameters of the moral domain potentially vary from individual to individual. With a theoretical construct in this state of empirical flux, it is difficult to understand against which criteria such "inner logic" could be examined and corroborated or disconfirmed.

On the philosophical side, there appears to be a striking similarity in Gilligan's distinction between feminine and masculine morality and the distinction between the good and the right (as discussed in Chapter 2). Specifically, Gilligan's claim can be interpreted such that women's morality focuses on the morally good (responsibility, interpersonal virtues, aretalic judgments, and the like), while male morality focuses on the morally right (duties, rights, and obligations). This interpretation is supported by Langdale's finding that both men and women use the care orientation more in real-life dilemmas than in justice dilemmas. Kohlberg's justice dilemmas are constructed to elicit "justice reasoning." It is unlikely that typical real-life dilemmas concern issues of justice in the strict sense. Real-life dilemmas tend to focus on conflicts of personal and social values and responsibilities, that is, both moral and non-moral values, rather than on conflicts of rights and formal obligation (see Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983).

In Gilligan's concept of maturity, these two domains become integrated. This interpretation of maturity is similar to Kohlberg's (1981) vision of "Stage 7" in which deontic moral principles and the principle of *agape*, or universal love, are integrated.

NON-STRUCTURAL THEORIES
Self-Actualization

In pursuing the empirical study of self-actualized persons, many of Maslow's (1964, 1968, 1971) theoretical assumptions differ from those of the structural developmentalists. Blending normative moral philosophy with empirical psychology, he calls himself a "normative social psychologist," and proposes that self-actualization is a process that not only occurs in healthier, "better" people, but also that it ought to occur, based on a phylogenetic model: "Man has a higher and transcendent nature," he argues, "and this is part of his nature, that is, his biological nature as member of a species which has evolved (1964, p.xvi)."

His use of normative language and his biological implications are, in part, an outgrowth of his own training in traditional, clinical psychology, which he ultimately rejected as limited either to the study of man as essentially a system of psychopathology, or to the cure of psychopathology. He argues that such an approach does not supply us with the psychology of the "higher," or "spiritual" life--"of what the human being should grow toward, of what he can become" (p.7).

Maslow's system is developmental, not in the structural but rather in the functional sense. Maslow sees development as an evolution of need satisfaction, where the needs are hierarchically ordered. Simply put, when "lower" needs are satisfied, "higher" needs gain priority. The focus of his model is on the end-point of this development, since this is where the goals and aims of psychology can be found.

Maslow's system grew out of his fundamental belief that "valuelessness" is the ultimate disease of our time, and that something can be done about it through the rational efforts of individuals. In his view, the only cure is a "validated, usable system of human values, values that we can believe in and devote ourselves to because they are true" (1964, p.83). Maslow attempts to chart such a system of values through the analysis of descriptions of "peak experiences" by "healthy" individuals.

"Peak experience" is a term Maslow uses to refer to the best moments of human being, the happiest moments of life experiences, of ecstasy, rapture, bliss, and joy. He posits that the knowledge and values gained from peak experiences alleviate "valuelessness" and "meaninglessness" in life because the individual learns that life can, in fact, be worthwhile and beautiful. Table 6 presents the "being values" which he cites as most often reported in descriptions of peak experiences.
Table 6
Being Values¹¹

1. Truth: honesty; reality; (nakedness; simplicity; richness; essentiality; wholeness; perfection; completion; uniqueness; honesty).

2. Goodness: rightness; desirability; oughtness; justice; benevolence; honesty.

3. Beauty: rightness; form; aliveness; simplicity; richness; wholeness; perfection; completion; uniqueness; honesty.

4. Wholeness: unity; integration; tendency to oneness; interconnectedness; simplicity; organization; structure; order; not dissociated; synergy; integrative tendencies.

4a. Dichotomy-transcendence: acceptance, resolution, integration, or transcendence of dichotomies; polarities; opposites; contradictions.

5. Aliveness: (process; not-deadness; dynamic, eternal; flowing; self-perpetuating; spontaneity; self-moving energy; self-forming; self-regulation; full-functioning).

6. Uniqueness: (idiiosyncrasy; individuality; singularity; non-comparability).

7. Perfection: (nothing superfluous; nothing lacking; unimprovable; justice; completeness).

8. Completion: (ending; finality; fulfillment; finis and telos; totality; fulfillment of destiny; climax; closure).

9. Justice: (fairness; oughtness; suitability; necessity; inevitability; non-partiality).

9a. Order: (lawfulness; rightness; rhythm; regularity; symmetry; structure).

10. Simplicity: (honest; nakedness; purity; essentiality; succinctness; elegance; abstract).

11. Richness: (totality; differentiation; complexity; intricacy; comprehensiveness).

12. Effortlessness: (ease, lack of strain, striving, or difficulty; grace; perfect and beautiful functioning).

13. Playfulness: (fun; joy; amusement; gaiety; humor).

14. Self-sufficiency: (autonomy; independence; self-determining; environmental transcendence; separateness; living by its own laws; identity).

Most characteristic of Maslow's self-actualized person is an internalized, clear perception of the unity and order of the universe, and one's belongingness to it. This "unitive consciousness" brings with it an awareness of one's unique individuality in addition to an acceptance of all others as unique and of equal worth. Being values supply a naturalistic certainty of unity between persons and between individuals and the universe. The experience of this certainty, Maslow claims, can prevent suicide, tendencies to violence and injustice, various neuroses, and diminish the fear of death.

For Maslow, being-values are the result of visions of the world as it is. They require neither specialized faith nor reflection.

The path to ethical and value decisions, to wiser choices, to oughtness, is via "isness;" via the discovery of facts, truth, reality and the nature of the particular person (1971, p. 107).

Peak experiences are processes of "ego transcendence" that allow the individual to experience reality. It is in the perception of reality that being values are found.

Moreover, being values are not only within all individuals as human beings, they are also what all individuals yearn to experience and to be possessed of. He argues that self-actualized persons experience the world as it is, in terms of descriptive facts or truths. Those descriptive facts, as truth, have value as all truths of nature have value. Since they retain true value, we ought to see them, acknowledge them, and know them. Such knowledge fulfills our need, at least our higher needs as human beings, because to know such truths makes us more fully human. His method for charting the progression from the is of experience to the ought of development is based on a transcendence of the discrepancy.¹²

Is becomes the same as ought. Fact becomes the same as value. The world which is the case, which is described and perceived, becomes the same as the world which is valued and wished for (1971, p. 150)

Maslow has made a radical impact on clinical psychology with his pioneering work in "being psychology," which he alternately terms "the psychology of perfection" and "the psychology of ends." Through his normative social psychology, he attempts to identify and define the values of psychologically healthy people--ones he considers more fully human. He claims that man has innate drives toward such values. Often, however, in life experience, these drives are weak and poorly affected by the environment.

Maslow's theoretical assumptions and research methodology are so different from both the structural and neostructural models as to make them appear incomparable. There is a common ground, however. The "being values" reported by Maslow are strikingly similar to the values reported in the highest stages of all the structural and neostructural models described earlier. To find this form of similarity from two radically opposed paradigms only lends support to the validity of the proposition that these values are extant in highly developed adults.

Developmental Self-Realization

In an attempt to demonstrate the importance of Maslow's value/need hierarchy in individual development, Green (1974) investigated the relationship between a subset of Maslow's concepts of motivational needs and moral reasoning development, by means of Kohlberg's model. He hypothesized that the needs of "safety," "love and belongingness," and "esteem" would be most salient.

According to him, the safety needs require a predictable, secure, and orderly world. When these needs are insufficiently satisfied, the individual will see others (and himself), as well as the world in general, as unsafe and unjust. Love and belongingness needs gain prominence when one develops an image of the other as a consistent role performer. When individuals feel relatively secure in having their safety needs met, they begin to feel the desire to possess affectionate relationships with other people. As a person moves through (satisfies more and more) the indicative needs, he or she begins to feel needs which center on establishing a high sense of self-worth. Green interprets these needs or motives not as unconscious drives but as conscious aims, plans, norms, and desires. He predicted a linear relationship would obtain between moral judgment scores and motivation, controlling for cognitive development, and hypothesized that individuals whose primary
needs are those of safety would have difficulty attaining moral judgment stages beyond Stage 3.

Green's sample consisted of 49 white, middle-class, junior and senior high-school boys. The sample was controlled for IQ and for level of cognitive development; each subject had reached at least the beginning formal operational level. Green administered Arnoff's (1971) sentence-completion test to determine subjects' relative priority of the three central needs, safety, love, and esteem, as well as Kohlberg's (1958) moral dilemma interview.

As predicted, Green found that subjects who scored highest in the safety needs, scored lowest in moral judgment (mean = 225); those who scored need for love and belongingness highest were in the mid-range (mean = 252); and those who scored highest in the esteem need had the highest moral judgment scores (mean = 319). He also reported not only that the needs hierarchy and moral judgment scores were highly correlated, but also that each of the needs was significantly associated with a particular moral judgment stage. He found safety needs predominant at Stage 2, the need for love and belongingness at Stage 3, and esteem need at Stage 4. As to the relationship between motivation and moral judgment, he concluded that "motivational growth is necessary, but insufficient for moral judgment development" (p. 110).

Looking at the cross-sectional age-related data on needs alone, Green reported what he considered to be his main finding. Supporting Maslow's developmental hypothesis, Green reported that the extent to which an individual resolves safety needs is a direct determinant of the development of esteem needs.

Although Green's work demonstrates rigorous statistical analyses, some of the conclusions are suspect. For example, it is not clear how he supported his first hypothesis, that of safety needs being an inhibitor of Stage 4 moral judgment development, when none of his subjects demonstrated consolidated Stage 4 reasoning with or without the priority of safety needs. This problem presumably stems from the fact that the subjects were simply too young to exhibit the level of reasoning that was being tested. Green's finding that individuals who gave low priority to safety needs achieved higher Moral Maturity Scores (a mean of 319 MMS points) than those who gave high priority to safety needs (a mean of 225 MMS points) suggests the possibility, but does not necessarily support, the idea that those individuals of the former group would eventually attain Stage 4, while the others would not.

Second, the mix of structural-developmental and biological motivation paradigms may have some inherent theoretical problems. Green, as mentioned earlier, associated particular needs with particular stages. But the needs he associated with Stages 5 and 6 (esteem and self-actualization) seem to be theoretical speculations since there is no mention of these stages in the text. The stage-need associations he claimed to be significant concern Stages 2, 3, and 4. And, since Green had no Stage 4 subjects, this critique will focus on Stages 2 and 3.

Green claims that safety needs are significantly related to Stage 2 and love and belongingness needs to Stage 3. This association may be intuitively appealing but, in fact, negates some of the theoretical constructs of a structural-developmental stage. From this perspective, "needs" (defined by Green as conscious aims, goals, etc.) are considered to be content, to which qualitatively different structures are applied. Thus, it seems that a particular need, such as the safety need, could be present at every stage with the same degree of salience, although it would be conceived of in qualitatively different ways. For example, at Stage 2, safety could mean security through successful, instrumental manipulation of the environment toward the fulfillment of personal desires. At Stage 3, safety could mean feeling secure and accepted in a mutual, interpersonal context. At Stage 4, safety could mean financial security and stability in society as well as in one's lifestyle. These are, of course, also theoretical speculations, based on the stage descriptions and the empirical findings of the theorists already described above and on this author's own work. One way to assess the meaning of Green's findings more clearly would be to have a better understanding of the way in which he assessed "priority needs." It would seem that if the safety need, for example, were defined as a Stage 2 characteristic, it would be reasonable to expect that it would be associated with Stage 2. But in order to make Green's claim, the assessment of "needs" would have to be represented in a way that would be salient at all stages.

Although Green's work appears to leave many questions unanswered, research on the antecedents of higher-stage development is rare although important. It is also very difficult to mix theoretical paradigms, given the necessity of maintaining clarity on multiple sets of assumptions. Nevertheless, the structural-developmental paradigm alone may not be sufficient to explain the actual internal and external causal factors in higher-stage development. Thus, attempts to introduce other perspectives are necessary and must be pursued.

Survey Values Research

Rokeach (1973, 1976, 1979) has done extensive survey and experimental research on the existence, measurement, and manipulability of individual values. He enters into the investigation with different interests and theoretical assumptions than those that underlie the models presented above. His primary interest is in ascertaining the value hierarchies present in representative adult populations.

Rokeach (1979) summarizes his conceptions of the nature of human values as follows:

...that the numbers of human values are small, the same the world over, and capable of different structural arrangements, that they are learned, and determined by culture, society, society's institutions, and personal experience, that they are determinants in turn of attitudes, judgments, choices, attributions, and actions, that they are capable of undergoing change as a result of changes in society, situation, self-conceptions, and self-awareness, and finally, that changes in values represent central, rather than peripheral changes, thus have important consequences for other cognitions and social behavior (p.2-3). [italics added]

For Rokeach, a value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence (1973, p. 5). A value system is, then, an enduring organization of these beliefs. His investigation focused on the relative priority of certain values over others, rather than on the distinct nature of single values. He claims that all individuals possess the same or similar values, but that the hierarchical priority given to these values is what distinguishes persons.

Rokeach (1968) claims that the primary origin of values rests in "primitive beliefs." Primitive beliefs are beliefs about the natural and social world and about the self, which are formed early in life and rarely, if ever, questioned by the individual. Moreover, they are generally believed by the individual to be consensual:

Primitive beliefs are fundamental beliefs rooted in individual experience and reinforced by total social consensus. It is upon these that other "derived beliefs"--including social attitudes and opinions are based...It is the
nature of primitive beliefs to persist unquestioned in most societies (1968, p 40).

It is out of this primitive system that the total value system grows.

Rokeach distinguishes three types of beliefs: (1) descriptive or existential beliefs, those capable of being shown to be true or false; (2) evaluative beliefs, wherein the object of the belief is judged to be good or bad; and (3) prescriptive and proscriptive beliefs, wherein the means or result of action is judged to be desirable or undesirable. A value, for Rokeach, is a belief of the third kind--prescriptive or proscriptive.

Rokeach (1973) distinguishes between two major categories of values--terminal and instrumental. Terminal values are desirable end-states of existence, whereas instrumental values are desirable modes of conduct. "Terminal values" are further subdivided into categories of "personal" and "social;" likewise "instrumental" values are comprised of "moral" values and "competence" values.

Rokeach claims that these values are central to human activity. They represent standards that directly guide conduct. As such, they affect conflict resolution and decision-making, serve motivational, adjutivive, and ego-defense functions, and, finally, can further knowledge and self-actualization.

Although Rokeach's research approach is similar in some respects to Maslow's, it is radically different from a structural approach. His method of measurement requires subjects, usually in large numbers, to rank the eighteen terminal and eighteen instrumental values in order of relative priority.

Table 7 presents these values as they are presented in his instrument.
rely for their creation on both individual needs and societal and animal capable of such processes. Such cognitive representations and transformations of needs, and man is the only values" (p. 20). For Rokeach, values are the cognitive representations and transformations of needs, and they could be, he says, "the lowly rat, to the extent that he can be said to possess needs, should to the same extent also be said to possess values" (p. 20). For Rokeach, values are the cognitive representations and transformations of needs, and man is the only animal capable of such processes. Such cognitive representations rely for their creation on both individual needs and societal and institutional demands. Thus, although an individual's needs become cognitively represented as values, societal values also strongly influence value formation, and changes in social issues and values can directly effect change in an individual's values.

Although the precise nature of external, societal affects on value acquisition is somewhat elusive—"A person's individual needs somehow become cognitively represented as values, and so also do societal goals and demands"—such affects appear paramount to Rokeach's theory. For example, in the context of "oughtness," or prescriptivity, he states: "A person phenomenologically experiences 'oughtness' to be objectively required by society in somewhat the same way that he perceives an incomplete circle as objectively requiring closure" (1973, p. 9); similarly, "...the person who prefers one [value] believes that same one to be consensually preferred" (p.10); and,

"We may expect that similarities in cultures will sharply reduce the total number of possible variations [in value rankings] to a much smaller number, shaping the value systems of large numbers of people in more or less similar ways. Further reductions in the possible variations can moreover be expected within a given culture as a result of similar socialization by similar institutions...." (p.23).

Rokeach and others have administered his instrument to a number of large, predominantly adult, samples. He reports his findings in terms of median and composite rankings of the values. In an American national sample of 1,409, for example, he found that both sexes place "a world at peace," "family security," and "freedom" at the top of the terminal hierarchy. In contrast, "an exciting life," and then, "pleasure," "social recognition," and "a world of beauty" Were ranked at the bottom. Ranked at the top of the instrumental value hierarchy were "ambitious," and "responsible," while "imaginative," "obedient," "intellectual," and "logical" were placed at the bottom.

Rokeach (1973) claims that any approach to the study of values must remain value-neutral. He does concede, however, with respect to Maslow's normative hierarchy of values, that the conception of higher- and lower-order values can be useful. "To the extent that a person's value system reflects a differential preoccupation with values that are adjutice, ego-defensive, and self-actualizing, we may say that he is operating at higher or lower levels." He does not discuss, however, the specific criteria of higher values.

Findings from Rokeach's (1979) numerous studies concerning experimentally induced long-term value change are also noteworthy. He reports successful long-term value change in 23 studies, all of which focused their intervention strategy on exposing contradictions that existed within the subjects' own belief systems. He also reports, however, a unidirectionality to change, supporting the idea that the direction of change cannot be arbitrarily manipulated. Rokeach explains the process as one of inducing self-dissatisfaction about contradictions that will implicate self-conceptions. "The value change is presumably motivated by a desire to maintain and, if possible, enhance one's conception of oneself as moral and competent" (1973, p. 242). Such standards of competence and morality, are, however, in Rokeach's view, externally derived.

Thus, to reduce or remove felt dissatisfaction, a person should be willing to undergo an increase or decrease with regard to any given value mainly in one direction—in whichever direction a person perceives to be defined as competent or moral by the particular social institutions and reference groups with which he or she most identifies (p. 242). [italics added]
Rokeach's approach to the study of values contains a mixture of psychological and sociological assumptions. All in all, three features appear central to his approach. First is the importance of values as individual standards for everyday behavior; second, the universality of particular values coupled with a culture-bound ranking; and, third, the interactional model of value acquisition involving individual needs and societal demands.

The assumptions of this model both parallel and oppose a number of structural-developmental assumptions. The similarities between the two models will be discussed first. The notion that individual values are relatively stable and that they are cognitive, and therefore conscious, is accepted by both models. In addition, a model of interactional development between internal processes of the individual and external social demands is also postulated by both models, albeit in somewhat different ways.

The contrasts between the two models are relatively striking, however. First, Rokeach's research approach does not focus on individual value acquisition. Where developmentalists report their attempts to trace the patterns of individuals' thinking or valuing, Rokeach reports group statistical means of hundreds of individuals; as a result, no information on any particular individual can be gained. He focuses only on the mean value rankings in a "society" or "group," neglecting the outliers who represent the extreme ends of the spectrum.

Second, Rokeach relies significantly more on culture, as well as individual self-respect and self-esteem for the ultimate derivation of values. His implications follow sociological notions that the endpoint of maturity or "adjustment" rests in acceptance and congruence within one's culture. This is in dramatic contrast to the work of other theorists such as Kohlberg (1981), who cites Socrates and Martin Luther King, who fought for ideals generally unacceptable to society, as exemplars of the highest stage of development. Rokeach's position is vulnerable to traditional philosophical criticisms of ethical cultural relativism--specifically, his idea that whatever values are upheld by the culture become the most valuable and the most moral is ethically unjustifiable.

Although these differences exist, Rokeach has much to offer a developmental investigation of human valuing. His many studies have charted paths through a difficult maze of theories and assumptions about, for example, exactly which values are prevalent and worth study. Moreover, a purely structural model may be insufficient in investigating the complexities and variety apparent in the domain of human valuing, particularly in the area of specifying content values.

Chapter Eleven
Discussion and Conclusions of Section II

The eleven models reviewed here have far-reaching implications for any field concerned with human activity and development. Their contributions to the understanding of individuals' valuing processes and outcomes are of particular interest to this study. These studies commonly support and corroborate the importance of human valuing not only as a central aspect of personality, but also as a central activity of human life.

Traditionally, psychological studies of thinking and reasoning have not emphasized the valuing aspect of human activity. They have tended to disregard this aspect as content that varies from person to person, or even moment to moment. This conceptualization of evaluation would render the subject inappropriate for developmental investigation.

Analysis of the findings reported here, however, suggests not only that valuing plays an important role in the ways individuals make meaning of themselves, others, their judgments, and their actions, but also that the ways in which individuals evaluate have consistent patterns that can be expressed in developmental terms.

These findings provide evidence of consistent, general phenomena that are related to the development of evaluative reasoning. Indeed, the degree to which these stages and their sequences, defined in terms of diverse content, reveal commonalities of value aspects is strikingly high. Table 8 presents the nine developmental models that were reviewed, in order of their presentation here.
Justification of the choice and definition of the construct. Thus, it is not so delimited, the work of distinguishing content under investigation. Both Piaget and Kohlberg require a philosophical and psychological account of what it is that is being studied. Structural analysis requires this form of demarcation for a number of reasons. First of all, if a construct is not so delimited, the work of distinguishing content from structure would be overwhelming. For another, structural-developmental theory requires a philosophical rationale for the justification of the choice and definition of the construct. Thus, it must be clearly specified. In Chapter 1 of the present work, the necessity for a philosophically defined construct of the good, or of value, was described. In Chapter 2, the distinction between the good and the right, as well as between moral good and non-moral good was presented. Each of the developmental models appears to demonstrate developmental patterns in, or associated with, valuing activity. These distinctions, coupled with structural-developmental criteria, will serve as a framework for sorting out the valuing elements and attempting to determine their structural quality.

Excluding Piaget, Kohlberg is most explicit in defining these parameters. For Kohlberg, the construct under investigation is a "moral judgment," which is limited to a prescriptive, universalizable statement of action in response to a problem of conflicting moral claims. The second most explicit theorist is Selman, whose perspective-taking construct is narrowly defined. It is not surprising that Kohlberg and Selman would be presented here as the most structurally oriented and as the most strict in defining their domain of study.

This leads to the next distinction, the one between content and structure. Once the construct under investigation is specified, the structures must also be adequately specified so that they can be theoretically distinguished from content. There must also be a methodology to empirically account and control for content in order to observe the specified structure. The degree of breadth in a construct will determine, in part, the extent of variety in content one can expect to elicit.

In Kohlberg's current assessment measure (Colby & Kohlberg, in press), for example, responses are categorized into three separate content categories before formal justice structures are identified. First, a given response is categorized by the content of the choice; second, by the content of the justification of that choice; and, third, by the value content appealed to in that justification.

Although all of these developmental models adhere to some theory of structure, they address the requirements of a structural approach in different ways. Van den Daele's ego-ideal construct does not appear to be clearly specified. Its definition includes a number of aspects such as ego development, evaluation, and cognitive development, but it is not clear how these aspects are related to one another. Ego-ideal itself does not appear to be defined as a structural construct. Rather, as noted, the structural-developmental aspect of ego-ideal seems to depend on developing structures of cognitive operations. What results are defined structures of cognition and a theory of ego-ideal, or ego development. Thus, though it is unclear as to whether the valuing elements possess structural qualities, in the ego-ideal model they do appear to undergo transformations along with cognitive structures.

Loevinger's ego development construct is a broad unifying construct proposed to unite the entirety of personality. Her theory and methodology, however, do not clearly distinguish content from structure, nor are the structures of the ego defined in a way that can be observed, as previously mentioned. Although it is possible to identify the evaluative elements in the ego development stages, it appears impossible to distinguish them from the general ego construct, as Loevinger defines it.

Fowler's faith-development model seems similar to Loevinger's ego-development model. It appears to represent a unifying organization that attempts to account for the relations among a number of structural domains, referred to as aspects. Valuing seems to be a major part of this organization, but it is not distinguished psychologically or philosophically from other constructs, such as moral virtue, moral good, moral worth, and non-moral good, or from justice reasoning.
Kohlberg (1981) has referred to the faith stages as "ethical and religious philosophies," which implies metaethical reflection, not structural operations. But the stages appear to include more than metaethics. For example, the faith construct includes normative moral reasoning and Piagetian cognitive structures. Fowler claims that the stages represent "knowing and valuing operations," but, philosophically, knowing and valuing represent distinct domains. It is not clear why these two domains should be co-equal. No argument is provided, for example, as to why an individual at a certain epistemological level would be at the parallel level in evaluative or moral reasoning. In addition to not clearing addressing the issue of whether these two constructs are distinct or integrated, Fowler does not define the knowing and valuing operations.

Moreover, how is "valuing" to be understood? Can valuing be separated from faith? When an individual reasons about the value of her work, for example, is she reasoning within the faith domain? It is unclear to what extent the valuing elements themselves are structural, or developmental, above and beyond justice reasoning about the right.

Rather than conceiving of the faith stages as structured wholes within themselves, or as being limited to "ethical philosophies," it seems more reasonable to interpret the faith stages as broad, overarching organizations that unify the more structural subdomains and the metaethical philosophies that deal with faith issues.

Selman's concepts of friendship also raise questions about construct definition and about the distinction of structure from content. Within the stage descriptions, it is difficult to distinguish what part is social knowledge (the meaning of the concept "friendship") and what part is normative or evaluative (what makes a "good" or "close" friend). Snarey, Kohlberg, & Noam (1983) refer to the friendship model as "social epistemology," but this forces a philosophical distinction that is not apparent in the model itself. The stages include normative conceptions of friendship, as well as aretai judgments of persons, in terms of moral virtues. From a philosophical perspective, this is to be expected since "friendship" is a normative term; that is, the concept "friend" carries with it an element of value. Neither Selman nor Snarey, et al. make this distinction, however. From the perspective of the present study, Selman's stages of friendship provide support for a developmental conception of normative valuing because normative valuing appear to be central to the stage constructions.

Gilligan makes no direct claims for the structural qualities of her levels or the "care orientation." But, since both are presented as an alternative, yet parallel, "voice" to justice reasoning, some form of structuralism is implied. As has been discussed, Gilligan does not strictly specify the moral construct she studies; it appears to be partly ethical, in terms of benevolence and aretai judgments of the proper criteria for the good person, and partly psychological, in terms of ego or social development. It also appears to be partly structural and partly functional. Indeed, Gilligan consistently weaves Eriksonian functionalism into her descriptive narratives of the ethic of "care."

In contrast, Lyons' (1983) assessment methodology for the care and rights orientations appears to represent a content analysis. The process involves coding statements that use particular terms such as "moral," "love," "care," "responsibility," on the one hand, and "rights," "justice," "fairness," on the other, rather than coding forms of reasoning. This logically follows from Lyons and Gilligan's empiricist approach, which rejects a priori analytic models. Nevertheless, to the extent that Gilligan's levels include aretai judgments, they appear to support the notion of developing levels of reasoning about the good, with respect to the self and others.

Maslow's semi-developmental, normative model presents a number of interesting problems for a structural model of evaluative reasoning. The main construct, self-actualization, is defined in functional, rather than structural, terms. That is, development is seen to occur through the satisfaction or resolution of earlier, lower-level needs, rather than through transformations that result in new responses to, or new interpretations of, the same needs.

Another difference between Maslow's model and a structural one lies in his justification of the "higher" values. Numerous criticisms have been leveled at the normative element of Maslow's model. It is sufficient to point out that his "is-to-ought" continuum is fraught with philosophical problems that would be unacceptable in a structural model.

Given the basic discrepancies between paradigms, the similarities between the values of self-actualized people that Maslow reports and the values associated with higher stages in the other studies reviewed here are surprising. Indeed, if one separates Maslow's findings from his theory of those findings, there is little discrepancy. "Need" is a theoretical construct that cannot be directly tested. His empirical results, however, inform both a conception of valuing and a conception of adult development.

Green's empirical findings support the notion of a developmental pattern in Maslow's needs/values hierarchy. In terms of importance, particular values appear to be transformed with age, at least in adolescence. It is unfortunate that he tested no adults.

With very different interests, Rokeach's studies provide some methodological tools with which to investigate values directly. To compile the 18 terminal values used in his survey instrument, he interviewed graduate students in psychology and 100 randomly chosen adults and he reviewed prominent philosophical and psychological literature on values. The several hundred values compiled were then systematically reduced through a number of complex criteria.

For the instrumental values, he began with Anderson's (1968) list of 555 personality trait words. Anderson had derived his list from the 18,000 trait-names originally compiled by Allport and Odbert (1936). These were also then reduced by numerous criteria-philosophical, empirical, and practical. Little philosophical distinction is made, however, between the different values. Nevertheless, the prominent values cited are consistent with the developmental models reviewed. Both Maslow and Rokeach provide important information on the prominent values associated with adulthood.

The works that have been reviewed in this dissertation vary in terms of their specification of the construct under study. The specification that is provided is predominantly of a psychological, rather than philosophical nature. That is, with the exception of Piaget and Kohlberg, these theorists do not provide philosophical support for the way in which their constructs are defined. Thus, there is little philosophical distinction among, for example, Van den Daele's "ego ideal" and Gilligan's "ethic of responsibility." From a theoretical perspective, these constructs may, to varying degrees, overlap, include one another, or may even represent the same thing, expressed differently.

An extreme example is Loevinger's ego development model, which, by her own account, includes all of the constructs reviewed here: "There is but one major source for all of the conceptions of moral and ego development, one thread of reality to which all of the conceptions give varying access" (1976, p. 441).

The notion of a unifying ego that incorporates various domains
of thinking and feeling, such as Loevinger's, is not inconsistent with the structural-developmental approach. The concept of an ego, from a Piagetian structural perspective, represents a fundamental unity of personality organization, and the concept of a developing ego represents the progressive redefinition or reorganization of the self in relation to the nonself, both nonpersons and other persons (Snarey, et al. 1983).

Kohlberg (1980; in press; Snarey, et al. 1983) has long argued, however, against an indivisible, unidomain ego simultaneously engaged in different types of structuring activities--logical, moral, etc. Rather, he claims that there are several related but differentiated lines of development within a multifaceted, but unified ego. This view implies that the ego comprises relatively circumscribed, philosophically specifiable subdomains, each of which is characterized by a relatively distinct substructure included within the holistic superstructure of the unifying ego. Thus, structural subdomains of ego development can be viewed as growing out of specific types of reasoning about distinct spheres of human activity. Kohlberg proposes three types of reasoning that correspond to three basic realms of philosophy: epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics. This distinction is useful since each of these forms of reasoning implies a set of issues and questions--a context--that can be specified. The category of epistemology would include forms of knowledge and sequences of the development of knowing in social and physical domains. Ethics can, and should, be divided between the "good" and the "right." The category of the right would include deontic moral reasoning, or judgments of action and obligation; the good can include everything involved in making judgments of value, such as approval, commendation, prudence, welfare, and wisdom (Scheffler, personal communication). Metaphysics could include reflections on ontology and cosmology, as well as reflections on morality, or metaethics.

Loevinger's model of ego development, as well as other ego development models, such as Kegan's (1982), offers a neo-structural account of a broad domain of ego development within which specified "sub-domains" could be included. A broad and inclusive domain of development is necessary to understand the stability, intricacy, and development of human personality. Moreover, it provides a context for the interrelations of the structural and non-structural dimensions of personality. On the other hand, specified sub-domains of development are also necessary for fine-grained formal analyses that seek to determine universal structures of mental development, strict specification and delimitation are required.

The developmental models reviewed here could be described as results of attempts made to define either the superstructure that relates sub-domains, or to define the sub-domains themselves. But, thus far, evaluative reasoning has not been specified as a distinct sub-domain. Taken as a whole, however, these models provide reasonable support for an investigation of evaluative reasoning as a single construct--within a structural sub-domain. Such a construct would fall into the ethics category, on the side of the good.

It has already been discussed how an adequate structural methodology must account for associated content, which provides the plausibility for identifying structures. However, analysis of the structures of ethical reasoning would not appear to exhaust the examination of ethical thought, particularly ethical thought in adults. As stated before, all of the models demonstrate a level of consistency in what, from a structural viewpoint, would be considered associated content. Forms of consistent content should not be disregarded in the formation of a model of adult ethical thought.

For adult development to be meaningfully understood, the content of ethical reasoning should not be considered trivial, particularly in light of the consistency found in such content in the studies reviewed here.

While the structural-developmental researcher is predisposed to be interested in how individuals reason, the actual beliefs expressed and the claims advanced by adults as to what they reason about is also important in a different way. The content of ethical reasoning provides important information about both the actual activities in which individuals are involved and the aims to which they aspire.

Van Den Daele, Fowler, Maslow, and Rokeach, in particular, demonstrate consistency in the actual beliefs and values reported by adults. These works inform the construction of a model of associated content that could be coupled with a structural account of the development of evaluative reasoning.

Section III
The Empirical Study of Ideals of the Good Life

The basic design of the study is longitudinal/cross-sectional (Baltes, Reese & Nesselroade, 1977). It was first executed as a cross-sectional study in 1977. In 1980, subjects agreed to be interviewed over a twenty-year period. They were interviewed again in 1981. Thus, the following description of the study leads to cross-sectional results from both 1977 and 1981, as well as longitudinal findings over the four-year period.

Chapter Twelve
Methods and Reliability

METHODS
Subjects

At the first interview time (1977), 43 individuals were elicited through advertisement in Los Angeles, California and interviewed (Erdynast, Armon & Nelson, 1978). There were 11 5-13 year-olds and 32 individuals ranging in age from 23 to 72 years. The distribution of males and females was approximately equal in both groups. Adult education levels ranged from high school completion to doctoral degrees.

In 1981, all previous subjects were contacted. And 39 out of the 43 subjects agreed to continue their participation in the longitudinal study by being interviewed again with the same instruments.

Instruments

Two interviews were given at each test time (1977,1981). "The Good Life Interview" and the Standard Form Moral Judgment Interview [Form A] (Kohlberg & Colby, in press). The Good Life Interview was designed and piloted with college students in 1976 and 1977. It consists of three parts. The first part contains a set of general questions concerning the Good Life and its subdomains (Issues), such as good work, good friendship, the good person, good education, the good of truth, beauty, knowledge, and so on. The subject is asked to make normative judgments about value in these areas and to give reasons for those judgments. The second part of the interview contains questions concerning the individual's "real life" experiences in decision-making where "goods" conflicted. The third part contains questions concerning the individual's "real life" experiences in making moral judgments (as opposed to discussing hypothetical situations and ethical dilemmas). (See Appendix B for full interview.)

The Moral Judgment Interview consists of hypothetical stories that feature deontic moral conflict. The subject is asked to make prescriptive judgments about what should be done to resolve
particular conflicts, and to give reasons in support of those judgments. (See Appendix C for full interview.)

Administration

The Good Life and Moral Judgment interviews were given in alternate order to each subject with a half-hour break between them. Each interview was conducted on an individual basis and was tape-recorded and transcribed. Total interview time ranged from one-and-a-half to three hours.

The interview method is a modified version of Piaget's clinical method. The interviewee is first asked a descriptive "what?" question and is then probed with "why?" questions. For example, in the Good Life Interview, the subject is asked, "What is good work?" and then "Why is that good?" In the Moral Judgment Interview, the question, "What should Heinz do?" is asked, followed by "Why should he do that?" Why questions have the purpose of eliciting the underlying values and reasoning behind the choice of the what content.

Analyses

Good Life Stages

The structure and development of the normative conceptions of the good is the primary object of analysis. Normative judgments are those that express and affirm particular ideals. This should be distinguished from metaethical formulations of the nature and validity of the word or concept "good" (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of this distinction).

The process of structural analysis begins with the identification of consistent ways of reasoning that correspond to the theoretical specifications for a "structure of thought." In this study, a sample of reasoning was considered potentially structural if it contained thought patterns that showed evidence of a self-regulated, organized system of thought. The identified structures were then considered part of a stage hierarchy if, when compared, they could be ordered and if, in this order, each posited system of thought could meet the Piagetian criteria discussed in Chapter 9.

As discussed in Chapter 9, a significant problem in the identification of structures of reasoning is the confounding of content and structure. In this study, a system of norms and value elements was constructed for the classification of content in subjects' responses. (See the scoring manual in Appendix A for a complete discussion of norms and value elements.) Norms are used to classify initial, general value statements in response to good life questions. Value elements serve to classify specific reasons given in support of a Norm. By classifying content, structures of thought are more easily identified.

The actual structural analysis was applied to 12 construction cases with two interviews for each case. Although the interviews contained responses to numerous content domain questions, the analysis was restricted to four issues: good life, good work, good friend, and good person. The general analysis proceeded as follows:14

I. The 24 interviews were coded with random numbers.
II. All general value statements were classified and coded by the norm.
III. All specific, supportive value statements were classified by value element.
IV. Holding norm and element differences constant, remaining differences across interviews were examined for systematic patterns of evaluative thought.

V. Differences that appeared systematic were examined for levels cognitive complexity and social perspective-taking levels.

VI. The patterns that appeared hierarchical in nature were then used as the raw material for good life stage constructions. These constructions then led to the development of the scoring manual (Appendix A).

Philosophical Orientations

Another analysis had the purpose of developing philosophical orientations. Briefly, philosophical orientations represent individuals' metaethical philosophies of value built up through a combination of a general psychological theory, or a conception of human nature, and a set of values that are viewed as ultimate or intrinsic. The method of analysis involved identifying, in the same interview data, values seen by construction case subjects to be intrinsic and comparing these values to a number of other value systems: (1) with the intrinsic values set forth by the philosophical views of the good life in Chapters 3 through 7; (2) the value element system devised by Colby & Kohlberg (in press); (3) values research, e.g., Rokeach (1979), Maslow (1971).

This comparison and contrast analysis resulted in five philosophical orientations. They are presented in detail in Chapter 14; procedures for assessing philosophical orientation are in Section 6 of the scoring manual (Appendix A).

Moral Judgment Stages

The moral judgment stages were scored by the author using the standard issue scoring manual (Colby & Kohlberg, in press).

Moral Types

Heteronomous and autonomous moral types were assessed using the moral dilemma interview material by a trained scorer using the moral types coding manual (Poley, Tappan, Kohlberg & Armon, in press).

Reliability of the Good Life Scoring System

There are three sets of reliability data on the Good Life scoring system. The first is interrater reliability data. Twenty cases were scored on a nine interval scale with five stages and four transition points by two raters; one was a graduate student in developmental psychology and the other was the author. The Pearson correlations between the two raters were all significant15 and are reported below:

Good Life: .98
Good Work: .99
Good Friend: .98
Good Person: .95
EMS: .98

Interrater reliability on the more purely structural good life stages was indexed by a Spearman rank-order correlation of .98.

Percent agreement was also calculated. The two scorers attained 100% agreement within a half stage. Complete agreement rates were as follows:

Good Life: 98%
Good Work: 99%
Good Friend: 98%
Good Person: 95%
EMS: 98%
The complete agreement rate on philosophical orientation was 83% with the five categories.

Another form of reliability data is test-retest results. Test-retest interviews were given three to six weeks apart to seven subjects. The same interview was given each time. Subjects were chosen from elementary and secondary schools, college, and graduate schools in the Cambridge area. They ranged in age from 6 to twenty-eight. There were 4 females and 3 males. The orientations at both test times were identical. The Pearson correlations between the two test times on each good life issue score were as follows:

Good Life: .99  
Good Work: .98  
Good Friend: .96  
Good Person: .96  
EMS: .99  

The Spearman Correlation for global good life scores was .99

Since the correlations could be high without stage agreement, the percent agreement rates were calculated. Agreement within 1/2 stage was 100%. The complete agreement rates are presented below.

Good Life: 86%  
Good Work: 72%  
Good Friend: 86%  
Good Person: 72%  
Global Stage: 86%  
Philosophical Orientation: 100%

The last index of reliability was derived from the long-term test-retest correlations of good life scores across the four years for the whole sample.

The Pearson r's are presented in a matrix in Table 9, below.

Table 9  
Correlations of Issues and EMS Scores between 1977 and 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIFE</th>
<th>WORK</th>
<th>FRIEND</th>
<th>PERSON</th>
<th>EMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFE77</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORK77</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRIEND77</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSON77</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMS77</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Spearman correlation for global stage over the four-year period was .94.

Philosophical orientation also remained stable over the four years.

For the whole sample, the complete agreement percentage was 81.
Table 10
Distributions of Philosophical Orientation in the Whole Sample and in the Adult Group
(N = 38, n = 27)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whole Sample</th>
<th>Adults</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>6 4 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egoistic</td>
<td>0 16 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 15 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>0 1 5 0 0</td>
<td>0 1 5 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfectionism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionalism</td>
<td>0 0 0 4 1</td>
<td>0 0 0 4 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfectionism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progresivism</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 1</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfectionism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard Error of Measurement

The calculation of the standard error of measurement is dependent on a reliability estimate as well as a measure of the standard deviation (S.D.) for the population under study (Nunnally, 1967). The correlations presented here for test-retest, interrater reliability, and long term test-retest over the four-year period are so high as to suggest that there is no error of measurement. This must be interpreted cautiously, however. The high correlations may reflect, in part, the wide range of scores intrinsic to this life-span developmental research. Further, given the size of the samples, these estimates are not overly precise.

To find an upper limit for the standard error of measurement, the highest variation was coupled with the lowest correlation. A 95% confidence interval was computed around the long-term test-retest correlation, \( r = .95 \). The S.D. of 100 was used with the lower limit of that interval, \( .9014 \). The standard error of the measure was then estimated with the following equation:

\[
\text{**} = S \times (1 - xx) = 100 \times (1 - .9041) = 30.97
\]

This results in a standard error estimate of 31 EMS points.

Chapter Thirteen
Clinical Analysis: Good Life Stages

This chapter first describes the general, theoretical nature of the good life stages of evaluative reasoning. Then, the stages themselves will be described in detail with illustrative examples. Following this description, a discussion of the post-conventional level and the philosophical justification for a normative model is presented.

The good life stages to be described represent the general characteristics of ideal evaluative reasoning, independent of the particular content domains (issues) within which such stages are manifested and scored. In the scoring manual (Appendix A), these general definitions are embedded in issue-specific descriptions. In other words, each stage is defined in the manual in terms of a particular issue (content domain), such as good life, in general, and good work, good friendship, and good person, in particular. Here, the purpose is to define the general, theoretical structure and empirical characteristics of the stages, independent of issue or philosophical orientation.

Conceptually the good life stages are organizations of ideal evaluation. They are "ideal evaluations" in that they do not concern context-specific or pragmatic evaluations, such as "Which is the best tool for this job?" Ideal evaluations involve "What is the best life for me? For other persons? In other words, the stages describe individuals' ideal value criteria for a good life. Similarly, the criteria for evaluation a good life are not the same as in those used to evaluate, for example, a good car. The main components of evaluation in the good life model involve the self and other persons, and the environment, community, or society within which the good life is to take place.

A good life stage consists both of processes and outcomes of ideal evaluation. In other words, the stage represents both the formal processes by which the individual decides what is ideal or good, and the outcome of that process, which consists of what is thought to be ideal or good. Only the former is purely structural, however. That is, only formal, evaluative processes, independent of their outcomes, can withstand a rigorous structural analysis. For the structures to
be more psychologically and empirically meaningful, the outcomes must then be connected to these processes.

For example, at Stage 2 evaluative structures consist of concretely reciprocal, instrumental operations by which the individual seeks to fulfill his or her perceived needs and interests. Thus, the criteria for evaluation are constructed around those needs and interests. All objects, states, activities, persons, etc., are part of the good life to the extent that they meet those criteria. A complete stage description, however, must include more than this skeletal framework. A description of the ideals and interests at that stage is also relevant. Hence, stage descriptions couple the operative processes of evaluative reasoning with the corresponding outcomes—that is, the prevalent values at that stage.

As described in Chapter 9, a stage structure is an organized, self-regulated system of thinking or reasoning. Its content consists of the materials, or "elements," with which the reasoning works. A good life structure consists of operations through which a person, idea, state, or activity is evaluated as ideally good or bad. The content of such a structure consists of the actual values that result from this process. Each stage, then, represents a qualitatively different system of those evaluative operations, coupled with the necessary content of those operations. The stages are most easily observed in individuals' constructions of criteria by which they evaluate. In the scoring manual (Appendix A) these criteria are operationalized as "value criteria" (VCs), which are used for stage scoring.

Good life stages are ordered hierarchically because, as with other structural-developmental stage systems (for example, Piaget, 1968; Kohlberg 1981), it is only at the highest stage that these operations are fully equilibrated, or reversible.

Although the good life stage model claims Stage 6 as the normative endpoint of the sequence, lack of data renders a sufficient description of that stage impossible. Some potentiality for attaining a fully equilibrated sixth stage has been demonstrated in two cases from this study as well as a small number of cases and theoretical projections presented in other studies (for example, Kohlberg, 1981; Van den Daele, 1968; Erikson, 1978) and various literatures. The tentative framework for a sixth stage in social perspective-taking was described in Chapter 9 (this framework is illustrated in greater detail in Chapter 15). Although the data are in-creasing, the determination of whether or not a sixth stage represents a qualitatively different structure will involve substantial development of the theory, further empirical analysis, and additional data collection (cf. Kohlberg, et al., 1983).

The availability of sufficient data for Stage 5, however, allow, with a certain level of confidence, the claim that the structure of Stage 5 manifests a substantive increase in reversibility over the structure of Stage 4, as well as all the previous stages. As Piaget (1968) demonstrates, each level in a structural stage sequence demonstrates increased equilibration (reversibility): "[Each stage is] a progressive form of compensation, assuring a gradual equilibration, resulting finally in logical reversibility" (p. 107). Therefore, even without a full description of Stage 6, the good life stage model can rely on Stage 5 for a justification of hierarchical order.

At Stage 5, good life conceptions consistently involve operations of equity, symmetry, and logical necessity. The form of autonomy present at that stage goes beyond self-control or self-governance. The criteria for value at that stage takes the form of "conscious reversibility." Value is determined through the articulated universalizability criteria of intrinsicality, generalizability, and consistency. These operations can be seen to parallel the operations of reciprocity and equality in the moral and logical domains (cf. Kohlberg & Armon, 1984).

Good Life Stages

What follows is a description of the general good life stages, illustrated with case examples from the sample described in Chapter 12.

Stage 1: Egoistic Hedonism

The good life consists of physicalistic and sensory experiences that gratify the self's desires and realize the self's fantasies. There is no conception of specific criteria for valuing. Thus, the good life is synonymous with the desired life, without consideration of the self's or others' real capacities or of behavioral consequences. Doing good is undifferentiated from having good experiences. The good life and the bad life, and any of its contents are completely dichotomized and simplistically labeled in terms of surface attributes, e.g., "nice," "pretty." "clean," etc. No distinction is made among happiness, contentment, satisfaction, and pleasure.

At this stage, the child does not possess a conscious set of value criteria. Nor is the rational distinguished from the irrational in the child's judgment of the good; realistic or possible occurrences are not distinguished from impossible ones. In addition, only ends are considered, not the means for their attainment, nor the possible consequences of those ends. What is perceived to be good are those material objects and physical activities that provide pleasure to the self. The good is synonymous with the desired: "I would have my birthday every day." "I would like to live on another planet," etc.

When asked why such a life would be good, the child at Stage 1 typically replies "I don't know." Also frequent are inversions of the previous response, for example, "cause then you wouldn't have your birthday everyday." This phenomena indicates an absence of consciously constructed evaluative criteria. Also, no distinction is made between physical pleasure, happiness, contentment, and the like.

Also absent from the conception of the good life at Stage 1 are other persons as independent selves. In fact, other people are rarely mentioned by subjects: [Are there other people in the good life?] "You know in school...I like recess and I love to play in the park." [Is it important to have other people around in the good life?] "Yes...well...only if they would be nice to you."

Stage 2: Instrumental Hedonism

The good consists of those activities, objects, and persons that serve the individual's needs and interests, both emotional and material. There is a consistent conception of the good life that includes concrete considerations both of the self's and others' motives and intentions and the contemplation of consequences of behavior. There is no distinction made, however, between the "desired" and the "desirable" (that which is worthy of being desired). There is an instrumental need for others, manifested in a conscious desire to be praised, liked, cared for, and helped. Simultaneously, a desire for independence, egocentric freedom, and power is also prevalent. Socially approved "goods" are affirmed simplistically, or evaluated in terms of their surface features. There is the beginning of a distinction between happiness and pleasure.

As its name implies, a major advance of Instrumental Hedonism over Egoistic Hedonism can be found in the individual's ability to think instrumentally about achieving the good life for him or herself. Therefore, in addition to possessing conceptions of desired consequences or ends of the good life (as at Stage 1), individuals at Stage 2 consider the means by which they can achieve them. In considering these means, individuals at this stage contemplate other
individuals' interests, motives, and intentions, as well as external physical and socio-environmental conditions. What characterizes these means, however, is their concrete and instrumental quality. Others are considered as separate persons with their own interests, but the focus at Stage 2 is on how others can serve the self's needs. Thus, in contrast to Stage 1, other people are an important aspect of the good life because they are seen as means by which the self serves its own ends: "[I]n the good life...you have to be able to get along with people, and you have to have people that you can depend on for things, somebody that can help you." In general, the evaluative criteria in judging the good life at Stage 2, then, are the self's concrete wants, needs and interests. There is no critical evaluation of these needs and interests in terms of their worth as values.

Due to the concrete quality of Stage 2 reasoning, concepts, symbols, or ideas are typically relegated to fact. Descriptions of the good life are often made up of a list of simplistic "labels," the value of which is assumed to be of an absolute or factual nature. Since the relativistic aspects of such judgments are ignored, subjects at Stage 2 see little need to qualify or justify their judgments: "The good life is having friends, being rich, and having freedom to do what you want." When asked Why is that good? individuals at Stage 2 typically answer: "What do you mean? Everyone wants friends and money and you have to be able to do what you want to do!"

When individuals at this stage do attempt to justify their judgments, such justifications tend to have a concrete or superficial quality: "If you're rich, then you are very popular." "It's good to be a doctor 'cause all doctors are rich." Thus, although the conception of the self with particular wants and needs is clear at Stage 2, the conception is egotistic. There are no formal criteria by which to judge the relative worth of different wants.

Conceptions of the good at Stage 2 are more differentiated as well as more realistic than the dream-like conceptions extant at Stage 1. Affiliation ("friends"..."someone to play with"..."parents who love me"..."people to take care of me"), material wealth ("a beautiful house"..."money") and freedom ("freedom to do what I want to do..." "Not having people supervising me or telling me what to do") constitute one's good life. Whereas at Stage 1 good was equated to physicalistic pleasure, Stage 2 individuals differentiate between physicalistic and mental experience, thus distinguishing between pleasure and happiness; that is, there appears to be an initial distinction between happiness, as an in-depth, long-term phenomenon, and pleasure, as a short-term experience. 

Stage 3: Altruistic Mutuality

Good is an affective sense of happiness or fulfillment, a result of positive, mutual interpersonal experience that is distinguished from pleasure. The good life is predominantly determined by affective experience, that is, what feels good; good is often determined by the absence of bad feelings. The good life consists of activities in accordance with stereotypical, interpersonal, and personal virtues, particularly those that help the self and/or others to feel good (be happier, more successful, etc.) and that promote mutuality between self and others in the immediate social environment.

At Stage 3, there is a dramatic shift from the good that serves the self (Stage 2) to the good that is mutually shared by the self and others. Whereas the individual who reasons at Stage 2 views others primarily as a means to fulfilling the self's wants and needs, Stage 3 reasoners see others as an integral part of the good life concept. Furthermore, individuals at Stage 3 require mutuality in relationship and consensus in valuing. The existence of consensual or conventional valuing, however, does not necessarily mean the adoption of societal norms and values, although this is often the case. Individuals reasoning at Stage 3 tend to take on the norms and values of the group with which they are most affiliated. Although the group itself may be anti-social, this is less common as affiliation to one that holds socially-approved norms and values.

The centrality of mutual affiliation and interaction in the good life is the hallmark of Stage 3. The value placed on affiliation, however, does not serve the sole purpose of fulfilling the self's needs, as at Stage 2. For the Stage 3 individual, mutuality in relationships is paramount in the good life: "It is most important to have someone that you can love and who can reciprocate that love." "The good life is...being with people...the stimulation of having people that you like and care about and enjoy...That's life to me...life is people.

Moving beyond the general distinction between happiness and pleasure apparent at Stage 2, individuals who reason at Stage 3 attend to the form of happiness itself. "Happiness" has a distinct meaning. It is defined in terms of affective contentment: "Happiness is feeling good about your life." "The good life is feeling happy and that means feeling good about yourself and your family." There is also a sense in which happiness, or the good life in general, can be defined by the absence of certain negative affective states or experiences such as loss, crisis, loneliness, fear, anxiety, worry, and stress: "The good life and happiness are the same thing: no worries...especially financial...no problems that can create stress." Moreover, there exists a distinction between the desired and the desirable. Some values that might be upheld on the criterion of simple desire are rejected as "bad values."

At Stage 3, a psychological conception of personality is also a major component. A "good personality" is part of the good life, consisting of specific, virtuous traits--for example, being happy, having a good disposition, a positive outlook, etc. Thus, whereas at Stage 2, there is a separate self that can evaluate based on wants and needs, at Stage 3, there is a consistent and complex personality structure that produces distinctive interests. The activities of the good life must be matched with these interests, thus acting to fulfill the self.

While Stage 3 reasoners are predominantly socially oriented, their responses generally lack references to the larger society--the social environment outside of their immediate social milieu.

Stage 4: Individuality

The good life consists of activities that express the individual's self-chosen, internalized interests and values (as opposed to the consensual values of Stage 3). There is the beginning of a hierarchy of values. Happiness, fulfillment, satisfaction, and pleasure are not only distinguished, but are also seen as ends that are freely chosen and prioritized. The good is found in activities that are considered personally meaningful. The society at large must be maintained and either benefited or not harmed by the individual's pursuit of the good. In the perfectionistic orientation, the good life is generalized to other persons. It is the self-fulfilled life, accomplished through developing and exercising one's full capabilities and increasing one's understanding of the self and others, to the benefit of the self and the society. In the hedonistic orientation, the good life is viewed relativistically. It is the enjoyed life, but what is to be enjoyed is defined individualistically. At the very least, it is one in which the individual can be comfortable and maintain his or her "lifestyle" without harming others.

Reasoning about the good at Stage 4 differs markedly from the comparable Stage 3 reasoning. Whereas at Stage 3 the point of origin of norms and values lies within group approval, consensus, or stereotypical virtues, at Stage 4, the point of origin of value lies within the individuated self. The central feature of Stage 4 is a concern with individualism. This is an orientation toward self-chosen values and the freedom to go against consensual norms, if
necessary, to make choices about, and to pursue, the individual's particular vision of the good life. The good life at Stage 4 is the meaningful, worthy, and valuable life, as viewed and evaluated by the self. What makes it so is the active pursuance and satisfaction of self-chosen ends, independent of others' beliefs or desires: "[The good life] is being free to do what you think might bring you happiness or awareness." "It's very important to have something that you think is worthwhile to do."

Extreme variability in individuals' values is acknowledged and tolerated. This awareness, however, is often coupled with a form of relativism in reasoning about the good, particularly in the classical hedonism orientation. Since everyone must choose his or her own good, Stage 4 reasoners often claim that "virtually anything can be of value," depending on who is evaluating it. Hence, when individuals are asked, "What is the good life?" they often spontaneously refuse to make any claim that a particular activity, virtue, object, or consequence could be good for everyone: "The good life??? I can only describe a good life for me personally." "The good life for me personally?...It is certainly a personal view...I don't think you can ever generalize 'good.'"

In the perfectionistic orientation, relativism is less prevalent. That is, the conception of the good life tends to be generalized to other persons to a larger extent. The focus remains, however, on the fulfillment and realization of the self's chosen values, but the values themselves are perceived by these subjects to be less idiosyncratic. Furthermore, the ideal of "benefiting" society comes to prevail over that of merely "maintaining" it: "It is important to generate one's own goals and to fulfill them...to function at one's fullest capacity. It would have to have some meaning for the society as well as the self." In general, however, the way in which one is to benefit society is still viewed as peculiar to each individual.

Thus, Stage 4 reasoners have a clear conception of the "desirable." Criteria for "desirability" are not found in generally accepted virtues (as at Stage 3), but in internalized values, viewed as relative to each individual.

It is in contrast to subjects at all previous stages that Stage 4 subjects refer spontaneously to the society at large. In general, there is a concern that the pursuance of one's good life at least not harm, and should probably benefit, the general society. There seems to be an inconsistency, however, in this concern. Individuals at this stage often argue spontaneously that one should pursue whatever one chooses, but also that one should do something "useful to society," without seeming to recognize that these two ends may conflict: ".good work should first be doing something that you feel is right for you, that you really want to do and enjoy doing. Second, it should be of some value to society."

Differing from the Stage 3 reasoners, who identify happiness with affective contentment, Stage 4 reasoners distinguish various forms of happiness, such as fulfillment, worthiness, satisfaction, contentment, and sensual pleasure. These concepts are not only distinguished, but are seen as ends that are freely chosen and pursued. Moreover, where individuals reasoning at Stage 3 define "security" as an absence of worry or anxiety, individuals reasoning at Stage 4 emphasize the maintenance of one's lifestyle through self-sufficiency: "It is important to know that if some crisis comes up, you can continue living your good life...you have to feel that you have control over that."

Stage 5: Autonomy

The good life is conceptualized from a rational, consistent (equilibrated), generalizable or universal framework of values. The good life is expressed through values that are constructed autonomously and considered worthy for persons in general. Values are consistent with one another in a consciously-constructed ethical system. Intrinsic and extrinsic values are differentiated and life goals focus on the former. Good work and intimate relationships are prevalent values, as is the recognition of all persons' interdependence. The good life for the self and the good life for society are either considered synonymous or dealt with equitably through general moral principles. In the perfectionistic orientation, the good life is achieved through activities that express the development of meaning and autonomy, while the individual maintains a deep connection with the society, world, or universe. In the hedonistic orientation, the good life is the life of peace and pleasure achieved through thought and knowledge.

At Stage 5 there appears a "prior-to-individual-values" perspective; that is, individuals must construct what is of value independent of social and historical norms. Thus, value is something that must be perceived and constructed by each individual. In contrast to Stage 4, individuals at Stage 5 employ generalizability, universality, and/or intrinsicality, rather than individualism, as criteria of value. Therefore, at this stage, the emphasis is placed not on the choosing of values, as at Stage 4, but rather on the perception and construction of the worth of the values themselves both for the self and others: "[ultimate value] doesn't have to be supernatural as far as I'm concerned, it can be observed in persons and in nature." As with the philosophical views presented in earlier chapters, the focus is on those traits, objects, processes, or states that possess intrinsic value, and on the obligation to uphold those values, once recognized: "I would say the good life involves a commitment to the advancement of life and man. When asked 'Why is that good?' a typical response is: Well, frankly, there are few things of ultimate value. Many other things do not appear to be of any real or essential value."

As distinct from reasoners at all previous stages, but similar to the professionals philosophers presented in Chapters 3 through 7, Stage 5 reasoners have constructed a principled ethical view of an ideal human world in which morality is a precondition for goodness: "In the good life, everyone would first have the opportunity, not just the right, to fulfill their potential." The ethical view embodies a reconstruction of their value system such that they can resolve some of the inconsistencies, or ethical dilemmas, apparent in Stage 4 reasoning. For example, the value relativism of Stage 4 is rejected. Subjects reasoning at Stage 5 tend to exhibit a spontaneous, universal perspective, identifying a minimal number values that they claim should be values for everyone, while other values might differ. These subjects acknowledge the uniqueness of individuals while, at the same time, describing those elements of the good life that they claim are appropriate for all persons: "In the ideal life, everyone would have, and take, the opportunity to participate in life to the fullest." "The good life is the progressive life...people must feel that they are moving forward..." In this way, the potential conflict between the individual's pursuit of independent, self-chosen values and the value of the society apparent at Stage 4 is resolved through the Stage 5 conception of society as a group made up of many similar selves. That is, although the individual and the society are perceived to be distinct, the society is viewed as something of which all individuals are a part. At Stage 5, the good for the self and the good for the society are considered simultaneously and kept in balance: ".people would see themselves in a context, that they are part of mankind and contributing something to it." "I feel it's a sort of a trade-off between self-satisfaction and service."

Another outcome of this reconstructed ethical view is a sense of value consistency within the self. At Stage 5, individuals have consciously constructed a rational, equilibrated value system, that is, a system of values that should be upheld by all persons, whatever else differed: "I see myself as having certain values...but it took a lot of thinking to have them. I had to decide which values to live by...and you need to question those ideas...you need to think, What
is of value, generally? Certain hedonistic or self-interest values that I once had I would now consider the "bad life." Thus, the value is placed on autonomy in the formal sense. Rather than choosing what is good on the basis of needs, interests, or desires, Stage 5 reasoners rely on general standards.

Departing from the Stage 4 notion of maintaining one's lifestyle and the social system, Stage 5 reasoners emphasize creativity and reconstruction in one's own life, as well as in society. This often manifests itself in responses about involvement with intellectual challenges and ideas: "...the good life would be the progression of knowledge and ideas...." "My happiness is found in being productive in the realm of ideas." "...the challenge of problems. This is most rewarding."

Finally, in addition to recognizing social interdependence, Stage 5 reasoners accept a general condition of human frailty and the limits involved in the recognition of "truth." They also advocate the acceptance of paradox within the self, others, and nature.

This concludes the description of the general form of good life stages. In the present work, these general, structural organizations of evaluative reasoning are thought to underlie the content-specific stages of the good life, good work, good friendship, and the good person that are presented in the good life scoring manual.

**Philosophical Justification of a Normative Model**

In Chapter 8 it was shown that various philosophical conceptions of the good life demonstrate consensus on a minimal conception of the good life. There it was claimed that this minimal conception includes both moral and non-moral values, in addition to principles of justice.

Empirically, a similar conception of the good life is found in Stage 5 protocols. Similar to the philosophers' views presented in Chapters 3 through 7, the expressed views of subjects at this stage consistently reveal autonomy, self-knowledge, courage, loyalty, self-respect, and a sense of duty to be minimal, normative requirements of the good person. In addition, they cite pleasure or self-satisfaction, knowledge of the social and natural world and, particularly, knowledge of value in general, as primary aims of the good life.

The conception of autonomy represented in Stage 5 evaluative reasoning is easily misunderstood. Indeed, psychological theory, in general, tends to overlook the distinction between ethical autonomy and "independent thinking." The claim here is that the two concepts do not represent separate points on an additive continuum, but qualitatively different perspectives.

"Independent thought" means acting on one's own beliefs--"being an active, responsible, self-disciplined, deciding agent, rather than a pawn or helplessly determined by others" (Maslow, 1964), and not being subject to unconscious motives (Freud), immature passions (Spinoza), or other-directedness (Mill). In both developmental and nondevelopmental psychological literature, this conception is often considered representative of the endpoint of development--the individual knows who she is and what it is she wants out of life, she has both the freedom and the ability to choose."

"Autonomy," on the other hand, is understood here to involve rational reconstruction (Habermas, 1984) of a belief system through critical evaluation and reflection, not of the self and its ability to choose, but of the choices themselves and their outcomes. The outcome of the reconstruction is a value system consistent within itself, one that can include other, seemingly contradictory, systems.

This interpretation fits well with the semantics of the Greek term **__ autos 'self' and nomos 'law,'** where laws are understood not as desires, but, rather, as consistent standards or principles. Thus, the individual, knowing that she can choose, must decide what and how to choose.

Dewey (1939) discusses this issue at length in respect to the distinction between the "desired" and the "desirable"--that is, what is truly worthy of value. A clear articulation of autonomy in this sense is also found in Rawls' conception of Kantian autonomy: "A person is acting autonomously when the principles of his action are chosen by him as the most adequate expression of his nature as a free and equal human being." In structural terms, the equilibrated form of autonomy is demonstrated in the construction of standards or principles that meet criteria of universality, internality, and generalizability, as described in Chapter 8.

It is unlikely that such development is a form of **decalage** at Stage 4 (cf. Gibbs, 1979). The ability to construct such standards presupposes the capacity to step outside of the self, which has been achieved at Stage 4, and to identify with all other selves, thereby assuring that the principles are universal or universalizable.

In this author's opinion, such philosophical and theoretical support is necessary, but insufficient for a normative model of development. Further research is needed to determine the actual, "real-world" quality of the life, the self, and the activity of the Stage 5 reasoner in order to support fully a normative model of development.

**Section III**

**The Empirical Study of Ideals of the Good Life**

The basic design of the study is longitudinal/cross-sectional (Baltes, Reese & Nesselroade, 1977). It was first executed as a cross-sectional study in 1977. In 1980, subjects agreed to be interviewed over a twenty-year period. They were interviewed again in 1981. Thus, the following description of the study leads to cross-sectional results from both 1977 and 1981, as well as longitudinal findings over the four-year period.

**Chapter Thirteen**

**Clinical Analysis: Good Life Stages**

This chapter first describes the general, theoretical nature of the good life stages of evaluative reasoning. Then, the stages themselves will be described in detail with illustrative examples. Following this description, a discussion of the post-conventional level and the philosophical justification for a normative model is presented.

The good life stages to be described represent the general characteristics of ideal evaluative reasoning, independent of the particular content domains (issues) within which such stages are manifested and scored. In the scoring manual (Appendix A), these general definitions are embedded in issue-specific descriptions. In other words, each stage is defined in the manual in terms of a particular issue (content domain), such as good life, in general, and good work, good friendship, and good person, in particular. Here, the purpose is to define the general, theoretical structure and empirical characteristics of the stages, independent of issue or philosophical orientation.

Conceptually the good life stages are organizations of ideal evaluation. They are "ideal evaluations" in that they do not concern context-specific or pragmatic evaluations, such as "Which is the best tool for this job?" Ideal evaluations involve "What is the best life for me? For other persons? In other words, the stages describe individuals'ideal value criteria for a good life. Similarly, the criteria for evaluating a good life are not the same as in those used to evaluate, for example, a good car. The main components of
evaluation in the good life model involve the self and other persons, and the environment, community, or society within which the good life is to take place.

A good life stage consists both of processes and outcomes of ideal evaluation. In other words, the stage represents both the formal processes by which the individual decides what is ideal or good, and the outcome of that process, which consists of what is thought to be ideal or good. Only the former is purely structural, however. That is, only formal, evaluative processes, independent of their outcomes, can withstand a rigorous structural analysis. For the structures to be more psychologically and empirically meaningful, the outcomes must then be connected to these processes.

For example, at Stage 2 evaluative structures consist of concretely reciprocal, instrumental operations by which the individual seeks to fulfill his or her perceived needs and interests. Thus, the criteria for evaluation are constructed around those needs and interests. All objects, states, activities, persons, etc., are part of the good life to the extent that they meet those criteria. A complete stage description, however, must include more than this skeletal framework. A description of the ideals and interests at that stage is also relevant. Hence, stage descriptions couple the operative processes of evaluative reasoning with the corresponding outcomes--that is, the prevalent values--at that stage.

As described in Chapter 9, a stage structure is an organized, self-regulated system of thinking or reasoning. Its content consists of the materials, or "elements," with which the reasoning works. A good life structure consists of operations through which a person, idea, state, or activity is evaluated as ideally good or bad. The content of such a structure consists of the actual values that result from this process. Each stage, then, represents a qualitatively different system of those evaluative operations, coupled with the necessary content of those operations. The stages are most easily observed in individuals' constructions of criteria by which they evaluate. In the scoring manual (Appendix A) these criteria are operationalized as "value criteria" (VCs), which are used for stage scoring.

Good life stages are ordered hierarchically because, as with other structural-developmental stage systems (for example, Piaget, 1968; Kohlberg, 1981), it is only at the highest stage that these operations are fully equilibrated, or reversible.

Although the good life stage model claims Stage 6 as the normative endpoint of the sequence, lack of data renders a sufficient description of that stage impossible. Some potentiality for attaining a fully equilibrated sixth stage has been demonstrated in two cases from this study as well as a small number of cases and theoretical projections presented in other studies (for example, Kohlberg, 1981; Van den Daele, 1968; Erikson, 1978) and various literatures. The tentative framework for a sixth stage in social perspective-taking was described in Chapter 9 (this framework is illustrated in greater detail in Chapter 15). Although the data are in-creasing, the determination of whether or not a sixth stage represents a qualitatively different structure will involve substantial development of the theory, further empirical analysis, and additional data collection (cf. Kohlberg, et al., 1983).

The availability of sufficient data for Stage 5, however, allow, with a certain level of confidence, the claim that the structure of Stage 5 manifests a substantive increase in reversibility over the structure of Stage 4, as well as all the previous stages. As Piaget (1968) demonstrates, each level in a structural stage sequence demonstrates increased equilibration (reversibility): "[Each stage is] a progressive form of compensation, assuring a gradual equilibration, resulting finally in logical reversibility" (p. 107). Therefore, even without a full description of Stage 6, the good life stage model can rely on Stage 5 for a justification of hierarchical order.

At Stage 5, good life conceptions consistently involve operations of equity, symmetry, and logical necessity. The form of autonomy present at that stage goes beyond self-control or self-governance. The criteria for value at that stage takes the form of "conscious reversibility." Value is determined through the articulated universalizable criteria of intrinsicality, generalizability, and consistency. These operations can be seen to parallel the operations of reciprocity and equality in the moral and logical domains (cf. Kohlberg & Armon, 1984).

**Good Life Stages**

What follows is a description of the general good life stages, illustrated with case examples from the sample described in Chapter 12.

**Stage 1: Egoistic Hedonism**

The good life consists of physicalistic and sensory experiences that gratify the self's desires and realize the self's fantasies. There is no conception of specific criteria for valuing. Thus, the good life is synonymous with the desired life, without consideration of the self's or others' real capacities or of behavioral consequences. Doing good is undifferentiated from having good experiences. The good life and the bad life, and any of its contents are completely dichotomized and simplistically labeled in terms of surface attributes, e.g., "nice," "pretty," "clean," etc. No distinction is made among happiness, contentment, satisfaction, and pleasure.

At this stage, the child does not possess a conscious set of value criteria. Nor is the rational distinguished from the irrational in the child's judgment of the good; realistic or possible occurrences are not distinguished from impossible ones. In addition, only ends are considered, not the means for their attainment, nor the possible consequences of those ends. What is perceived to be good are those material objects and physical activities that provide pleasure to the self. The good is synonymous with the desired: "I would have my birthday every day." "I would like to live on another planet," etc.

When asked why such a life would be good, the child at Stage 1 typically replies "I don't know." Also frequent are inversions of the previous response, for example, "cause then you wouldn't have your birthday everyday." This phenomena indicates an absence of consciously constructed evaluative criteria. Also, no distinction is made between physical pleasure, happiness, contentment, and the like.

Also absent from the conception of the good life at Stage 1 are other persons as independent selves. In fact, other people are rarely mentioned by subjects: [Are there other people in the good life?] "You know in school...I like recess and I love to play in the park." [Is it important to have other people around in the good life?] "Yes...well...only if they would be nice to you."

**Stage 2: Instrumental Hedonism**

The good consists of those activities, objects, and persons that serve the individual's needs and interests, both emotional and material. There is a consistent conception of the good life that includes concrete considerations both of the self's and others' motives and intentions and the contemplation of consequences of behavior. There is no distinction made, however, between the "desired" and the "desirable" (that which is worthy of being desired). There is an instrumental need for others, manifested in a conscious desire to be praised, liked, cared for, and helped. Simultaneously, a desire for independence, egoistic freedom, and power is also prevalent.
Socially approved "goods" are affirmed simplistically, or evaluated in terms of their surface features. There is the beginning of a distinction between happiness and pleasure.

As its name implies, a major advance of Instrumental Hedonism over Egoistic Hedonism can be found in the individual's ability to think instrumentally about achieving the good life for him or herself. Therefore, in addition to possessing conceptions of desired consequences or ends of the good life (as at Stage 1), individuals at Stage 2 consider the means by which they can achieve them. In considering these means, individuals at this stage contemplate other individuals' interests, motives, and intentions, as well as external physical and socio-environmental conditions. What characterizes these means, however, is their concrete and instrumental quality. Others are considered as separate persons with their own interests, but the focus at Stage 2 is on how others can serve the self's needs. Thus, in contrast to Stage 1, other people are an important aspect of the good life because they are seen as means by which the self serves its own ends: "[In the good life]...you have to be able to get along with people, and you have to have people that you can depend on for things, somebody that can help you." In general, the evaluative criteria in judging the good life at Stage 2, then, are the self's concrete wants, needs and interests. There is no critical evaluation of these needs and interests in terms of their worth as values.

Due to the concrete quality of Stage 2 reasoning, concepts, symbols, or ideas are typically relegated to fact. Descriptions of the good life are often made up of a list of simplistic "labels," the value of which is assumed to be of an absolute or factual nature. Since the relativistic aspects of such judgments are ignored, subjects at Stage 2 see little need to qualify or justify their judgments: "The good life is having friends, being rich, and having freedom to do what you want." When asked Why is that good? individuals at Stage 2 typically answer: "What do you mean? Everyone wants friends and money and you have to be able to do what you want to do!"

When individuals at this stage do attempt to justify their judgments, such justifications tend to have a concrete or superficial quality: "If you're rich, then you are very popular." "It's good to be a doctor 'cause all doctors are rich." Thus, although the conception of the self with particular wants and needs is clear at Stage 2, the conception is egoistic. There are no formal criteria by which to judge the relative worth of different wants.

Conceptions of the good at Stage 2 are more differentiated as well as more realistic than the dream-like conceptions extant at Stage 1. Affiliation ("friends"..."someone to play with..." "parents who love me"..."people to take care of me"), material wealth ("a beautiful house..." "money") and freedom ("freedom to do what I want to do..." "Not having people supervising me or telling me what to do") constitute one's good life. Whereas at Stage 1 good was equated to physicalistic pleasure, Stage 2 individuals differentiate between physicalistic and mental experience, thus distinguishing between pleasure and happiness; that is, there appears to be an initial distinction between happiness, as an in-depth, long-term phenomenon, and pleasure, as a short-term experience.

Stage 3: Altruistic Mutuality

Good is an affective sense of happiness or fulfillment, a result of positive, mutual interpersonal experience that is distinguished from pleasure. The good life is predominantly determined by affective experience, that is, what feels good; good is often determined by the absence of bad feelings. The good life consists of activities in accordance with stereotypical, interpersonal, and personal virtues, particularly those that help the self and/or others to feel good (be happier, more successful, etc.) and that promote mutuality between self and others in the immediate social environment.

At Stage 3, there is a dramatic shift from the good that serves the self (Stage 2) to the good that is mutually shared by the self and others. Whereas the individual who reasons at Stage 2 views others primarily as means to fulfilling the self's wants and needs, Stage 3 reasoners see others as an integral part of the good life concept. Furthermore, individuals at Stage 3 require mutuality in relationship and consensus in valuing. The existence of consensual or conventional valuing, however, does not necessarily mean the adoption of societal norms and values, although this is often the case. Individuals reasoning at Stage 3 tend to take on the norms and values of the group with which they are most affiliated. Although the group itself may be anti-social, this is less common as affiliation to one that holds socially-approved norms and values.

The centrality of mutual affiliation and interaction in the good life is the hallmark of Stage 3. The value placed on affiliation, however, does not serve the sole purpose of fulfilling the self's needs, as at Stage 2. For the Stage 3 individual, mutuality in relationships is paramount in the good life: "It is most important to have someone that you can love and who can reciprocate that love." "The good life is...being with people...the stimulation of having people that you like and care about and enjoy...That's life to me...life is people."

Moving beyond the general distinction between happiness and pleasure apparent at Stage 2, individuals who reason at Stage 3 attend to the form of happiness itself. "Happiness" has a distinct meaning. It is defined in terms of affective contentment: "Happiness is feeling good about your life." "The good life is feeling happy and that means feeling good about yourself and your family." There is also a sense in which happiness, or the good life in general, can be defined by the absence of certain negative affective states or experiences such as loss, crisis, loneliness, fear, anxiety, worry, and stress: "The good life and happiness are the same thing: no worries...especially financial...no problems that can create stress." Moreover, there exists a distinction between the desired and the desirable. Some values that might be upheld on the criterion of simple desire are rejected as "bad values."

At Stage 3, a psychological conception of personality is also a major component. A "good personality" is part of the good life, consisting of specific, virtuous traits--for example, being happy, having a good disposition, a positive outlook, etc. Thus, whereas at Stage 2, there is a separate self that can evaluate based on wants and needs, at Stage 3, there is a consistent and complex personality structure that produces distinctive interests. The activities of the good life must be matched with these interests, thus acting to fulfill the self.

While Stage 3 reasoners are predominantly socially oriented, their responses generally lack references to the larger society--the social environment outside of their immediate social milieu.

Stage 4: Individuality

The good life consists of activities that express the individual's self-chosen, internalized interests and values (as opposed to the consensual values of Stage 3). There is the beginning of a hierarchy of values. Happiness, fulfillment, satisfaction, and pleasure are not only distinguished, but are also seen as ends that are freely chosen and prioritized. The good is found in activities that are considered personally meaningful. The society at large must be maintained and either benefited or not harmed by the individual's pursuit of the good. In the perfectionistic orientation, the good life is generalized to other persons. It is the self-fulfilled life, accomplished through developing and exercising one's full capabilities and increasing one's understanding of the self and others, to the benefit of the self and the society. In the hedonistic orientation, the good life is viewed relativistically. It is the enjoyed life, but what is to be enjoyed is defined individually. At the very least, it is one in which the
individual can be comfortable and maintain his or her "lifestyle" without harming others.

Reasoning about the good at Stage 4 differs markedly from the comparable Stage 3 reasoning. Whereas at Stage 3 the point of origin of norms and values lies within group approval, consensus, or stereotypical virtues, at Stage 4, the point of origin of value lies within the individual's self. The central feature of Stage 4 is a concern with individualism. This is an orientation toward self-chosen values and the freedom to go against consensual norms, if necessary, to make choices about, and to pursue, the individual's particular vision of the good life. The good life at Stage 4 is the meaningful, worthy, and valuable life, as viewed and evaluated by the self. What makes it so is the active pursuance and satisfaction of self-chosen ends, independent of others' beliefs or desires: "[The good life] is being free to do what you think might bring you happiness or awareness." "It's very important to have something that you think is worthwhile to do."

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In the perfectionistic orientation, relativism is less prevalent. That is, the conception of the good life tends to be generalized to other persons to a larger extent. The focus remains, however, on the fulfillment and realization of the self's chosen values, but the values themselves are perceived by these subjects to be less idiosyncratic. Furthermore, the ideal of "benefiting" society comes to prevail over that of merely "maintaining" it: "It is important to generate one's own goals and to fulfill them...to function at one's fullest capacity. It would have to have some meaning for the society as well as the self." In general, however, the way in which one is to benefit society is still viewed as peculiar to each individual.

Thus, Stage 4 reasoners have a clear conception of the "desirable." Criteria for "desirability" are not found in generally accepted virtues (as at Stage 3), but in internalized values, viewed as relative to each individual.

It is in contrast to subjects at all previous stages that Stage 4 subjects refer spontaneously to the society at large. In general, there is a concern that the pursuance of one's good life at least not harm, and should probably benefit, the general society. There seems to be an inconsistency, however, in this concern. Individuals at this stage often argue simultaneously that one should pursue whatever one chooses, but also that one should do something "useful to society," without seeming to recognize that these two ends may conflict: "...good work should first be doing something that you feel is right for you, that you really want to do and enjoy doing. Second, it should be of some value to society." Differing from the Stage 3 reasoners, who identify happiness with affective contentment, Stage 4 reasoners distinguish various forms of happiness, such as fulfillment, worthiness, satisfaction, contentment, and sensual pleasure. These concepts are not only distinguished, but are seen as ends that are freely chosen and pursued. Moreover, where individuals reasoning at Stage 3 define "security" as an absence of worry or anxiety, individuals reasoning at Stage 4 emphasize the maintenance of one's lifestyle through self-sufficiency: "It is important to know that if some crisis comes up, you can continue living your good life...you have to feel that you have control over that."

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At Stage 5 there appears a "prior-to-individual-values" perspective; that is, individuals must construct what is of value independent of social and historical norms. Thus, value is something that must be perceived and constructed by each individual. In contrast to Stage 4, individuals at Stage 5 employ generalizability, universality, and/or intrinsicality, rather than individualism, as criteria of value. Therefore, at this stage, the emphasis is placed not on the choosing of values, as at Stage 4, but rather on the perception and construction of the worth of the values themselves both for the self and others: "[ultimate value] doesn't have to be supernatural as far as I'm concerned, it can be observed in persons and in nature."

As with the philosophical views presented in earlier chapters, the focus is on those traits, objects, processes, or states that possess intrinsic value, and on the obligation to uphold those values, once recognized: "I would say the good life involves a commitment to the advancement of life and man. When asked "Why is that good? a typical response is: Well, frankly, there are few things of ultimate value. Many other things do not appear to be of any real or essential value."

As distinct from reasoners at all previous stages, but similar to the professional philosophers presented in Chapters 3 through 7, Stage 5 reasoners have constructed a principled ethical view of an ideal human world in which morality is a precondition for goodness: "In the good life, everyone would first have the opportunity, not just the right, to fulfill their potential." The ethical view embodies a reconstruction of their value system such that they can resolve some of the inconsistencies, or ethical dilemmas, apparent in Stage 4 reasoning. For example, the value relativism of Stage 4 is rejected. Subjects reasoning at Stage 5 tend to exhibit a spontaneous, universal perspective, identifying a minimal number of values that they claim should be values for everyone, while other values might differ. These subjects acknowledge the uniqueness of individuals while, at the same time, describing those elements of the good life that they claim are appropriate for all persons: "In the ideal life, everyone would have, and take, the opportunity to participate in life to the fullest." "The good life is the progressive life...people must feel that they are moving forward..." In this way, the potential conflict between the individual's pursuit of independent, self-chosen values and the value of the society apparent at Stage 4 is resolved through the Stage 5 conception of society as a group made up of many similar selves. That is, although the individual and the society are perceived to be distinct, the society is viewed as something of which all individuals are a part. At Stage 5, the good for the self and the good for the society are considered simultaneously and kept in balance: "...people would see themselves in a context, that they are part of mankind and contributing something to it." "I feel it's a sort
of a trade-off between self-satisfaction and service."

Another outcome of this reconstructed ethical view is a sense of value consistency within the self. At Stage 5, individuals have consciously constructed a rational, equilibrated value system, that is, a system of values that should be upheld by all persons, whatever else differed: "I see myself as having certain values...but it took a lot of thinking to have them. I had to decide which values to live by...and you need to question those ideas...you need to think. What is value, generally? Certain hedonistic or self-interest values that I once had I would now consider the 'bad life'." Thus, the value is placed on autonomy in the formal sense. Rather than choosing what is good on the basis of needs, interests, or desires, Stage 5 reasoners rely on general standards.

Departing from the Stage 4 notion of maintaining one's lifestyle and the social system, Stage 5 reasoners emphasize creativity and reconstruction in one's own life, as well as in society. This often manifests itself in responses about involvement with intellectual challenges and ideas: "...the good life would be the progression of knowledge and ideas..." "My happiness is found in being productive in the realm of ideas." "...the challenge of problems. This is most rewarding."

Finally, in addition to recognizing social interdependence, Stage 5 reasoners accept a general condition of human frailty and the limits involved in the recognition of "truth." They also advocate the acceptance of paradox within the self, others, and nature.

This concludes the description of the general form of good life stages. In the present work, these general, structural organizations of evaluative reasoning are thought to underlie the content-specific stages of the good life, good work, good friendship, and the good person that are presented in the good life scoring manual.

Philosophical Justification of a Normative Model

In Chapter 8 it was shown that various philosophical conceptions of the good life demonstrate consensus on a minimal conception of the good life. There it was claimed that this minimal conception includes both moral and non-moral values, in addition to principles of justice.

Empirically, a similar conception of the good life is found in Stage 5 protocols. Similar to the philosophers' views presented in Chapters 3 through 7, the expressed views of subjects at this stage consistently reveal autonomy, self-knowledge, courage, loyalty, self-respect, and a sense of duty to be minimal, normative requirements of the good person. In addition, they cite pleasure or self-satisfaction, knowledge of the social and natural world and, particularly, knowledge of value in general, as primary aims of the good life.

The conception of autonomy represented in Stage 5 evaluative reasoning is easily misunderstood. Indeed, psychological theory, in general, tends to overlook the distinction between ethical autonomy and "independent thinking." The claim here is that the two concepts do not represent separate points on an additive continuum, but qualitatively different perspectives.

"Independent thought" means acting on one's own beliefs--"being an active, responsible, self-disciplined, deciding agent, rather than a pawn or helplessly determined by others" (Maslow, 1964), and not being subject to unconscious motives (Freud), immature passions (Spinoza), or other-directedness (Mill). In both developmental and nondevelopmental psychological literature, this conception is often considered representative of the endpoint of development--the individual knows who she is and what it is she wants out of life, she has both the freedom and the ability to choose.

"Autonomy," on the other hand, is understood here to involve rational reconstruction (Habermas, 1984) of a belief system through critical evaluation and reflection, not of the self and its ability to choose, but of the choices themselves and their outcomes. The outcome of the reconstruction is a value system consistent within itself, one that can include other, seemingly contradictory, systems.

This interpretation fits well with the semantics of the Greek term ___, autos 'self' and nomos 'law,' where laws are understood not as desires, but, rather, as consistent standards or principles. Thus, the individual, knowing that she can choose, must decide what and how to choose.

Dewey (1939) discusses this issue at length in respect to the distinction between the "desired" and the "desirable"--that is, what is truly worthy of value. A clear articulation of autonomy in this sense is also found in Rawls' conception of Kantian autonomy: "A person is acting autonomously when the principles of his action are chosen by him as the most adequate expression of his nature as a free and equal human being." In structural terms, the equilibrated form of autonomy is demonstrated in the construction of standards or principles that meet criteria of universality, internality, and generalizability, as described in Chapter 8.

It is unlikely that such development is a form of deca
alage at Stage 4 (cf. Gibbs, 1979). The ability to construct such standards presupposes the capacity to step outside of the self, which has been achieved at Stage 4, and to identify with all other selves, thereby assuring that the principles are universal or universalizable.

In this author's opinion, such philosophical and theoretical support is necessary, but insufficient for a normative model of development. Further research is needed to determine the actual, "real-world" quality of the life, the self, and the activity of the Stage 5 reasoner in order to support fully a normative model of development.

Another result of the clinical analysis of good life data was the construction of philosophical orientations. In the scoring manual, philosophical orientations are assessed with the same data used for stage scoring. The assessment of individuals' philosophical orientation has three major purposes. First, it provides a way to classify content, making the identification of structures of reasoning more plausible. In turn, this identification of philosophical orientations allows for the investigation of individual differences in valuing within a given stage. Finally, identifying the philosophical orientations that subjects use provides the data to test the hypothesis that adult subjects construct ethical philosophies similar in form and content to those of traditional ethical philosophers.

A philosophical orientation is a consistent framework of end-values or value elements that individuals refer to when supporting good life choices. A philosophical orientation is both normative-ethical and metaethical. An orientation is normative-ethical in the sense that it defines particular values as intrinsic, terminal, or "end-values," as opposed to instrumental, or "means-values," it is metaethical in that it can also identify supportive arguments, such as a theory of human nature, in the justification of these end-values.

From a structural-developmental perspective, philosophical orientations consist of a combination of content and structure. (For a discussion of the distinction between structure and content distinction, see Chapter 9.) They are ways of thinking that are considered to be more substantive than mere surface content, but that retain an aspect of individual value reasoning that the structural good
life stages do not. For this reason, the same philosophical orientation can be found at various stages.

It has been claimed in this work that ethical conceptions of the good life are ultimately supported or justified by metaethical ideas and beliefs about the ultimate aims of persons, which results in metaethical theories\(^{37}\) (implicit or explicit) of human nature. The good life stages described in Chapter 13 do not themselves represent these theories. The clusters of value elements that represent a philosophical orientation will not allow one to predict a particular stage. Rather, these theories are constructed through stage structures and are manifested in orientations. Thus, the stage provides the necessary foundation upon which both the normative ethical and the metaethical aspects of philosophical orientations are constructed. Just as certain forms of physical or natural phenomena represent the content of cognitive structures in a Piagetian model, so too do value elements represent the content of good life structures.

Hence, philosophical orientations represent different ways of organizing content end-values, independent of stage.

Two or more orientations are thought to be able to exist at a given stage. As stated above, philosophical orientations differ most in the underlying value elements concerning the ultimate ends of persons. Therefore, in preliminary surface responses, different individuals using different orientations may rely on similar norms in making ethical judgments, but when probed for the values that underlie these ethical judgments, individuals give further responses that may reveal different end-values. For example, note a preliminary response that consists of the idea that the good life involves mainly those activities or experiences that are chosen by the self (demonstrating the "Choice" norm) and provide happiness. Such a response, when elaborated, may reveal the belief that humans, in general, are basically pleasure-seeking and that choosing one's own activity results in the most happiness or enjoyment. This justification uses the "Happiness/Enjoyment" element. In contrast, the same preliminary surface response from a different respondent, when probed, may be elaborated until the statement is expressed that the ultimate human goal is autonomy of choice and that activities that work toward or actualize this are good in and of themselves. This response also demonstrates the "Choice" norm but with the "Upholding Autonomy" element. For this respondent, autonomy may not bring an individual pleasure per se. Nevertheless, autonomy is an essential component of the good life. This is a partial example of the general distinction between the hedonistic and the perfectionistic orientations. The particular value elements, or end-values, that make up the orientations are presented in Table 11.

The first two categories of value elements, Classical Hedonism (egoistic) and Social Hedonism, comprise two philosophical orientations. They are similar in that they both emphasize the pleasurable consequences for the self or for others of any particular action, object, or choice. However, the classical egoistic form of hedonism focuses on the pleasure consequences of one or another particular individual. Moreover, the classical egoistic form emphasizes sensory pleasure and happiness in terms of enjoyment, stimulation, and the like. The social form focuses on the pleasure consequences to a group, institution, society, culture, etc., and tends to emphasize happiness in terms of contentment and satisfaction.

The second category of value elements comprises the perfectionistic orientation. Perfectionism is concerned with the expression or realization of the self and the perfection of that self and other selves, or the perfection or realization of a particular community, society, or world, as an end in itself.

There are also subgroups within perfectionism. Functionalism emphasizes the fully-functioning individual or the fully-lived life, often drawing attention to the perfection of talents and capacities. Progressivism advocates the continuous development of individuals or general progress toward no fixed end. Unitarianism upholds perfecting the awareness of the human connection to God, Nature, and/or the cosmos.

The subgroups of perfectionism are not always easily discernible as are classical and social hedonism. They are identified by particular norm/element combinations used repeatedly throughout a protocol. These norm/element combinations are identified through

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**Table 11**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE ELEMENTS (Modal Elements—Normative Order)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. (Obeying/Consulting)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Blaming/Approving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. (Retributing/Exonerating)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Having a right</td>
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matching procedures provided in the scoring manual.

The third category of value elements represents the fairness orientation and is almost identical to Colby & Kohlberg's (in press; Kohlberg, 1979) deontological grouping. These deontological value elements form justifications of morally right action. However, some subjects rely partly on these value elements in their discussion of the good life.

In sum, the philosophical orientations found in this study can be broadly classified under either hedonism or perfection. Within these two categories, the following distinctions are made:

**HEDONISM:**
- Classical (egoistic)
- Social

**PERFECTIONISM:**
- Progressivism
- Functionalism
- Unitarianism

The theoretical and the empirical constructions of the orientations have both relied on the thinking of the various philosophical schools that were presented in Chapters 3 through 7 and discussed as a whole in Chapter 8. This work was then coupled with other, contemporary values research, such as Maslow's (1964) and Rokeach's (1973) as well as the norm and value element model of value classification in Colby & Kohlberg (in press).

### Chapter Fifteen
Relation of Good Life Stages to Moral Judgment and Social Perspective-Taking Stages

**Good Life Stages and Moral Judgment**

In Chapter 2, the philosophical distinction between the good and the right was described. In the present chapter, the theoretical relationship between the good life and moral judgment developmental stage models will be discussed. It was described in Chapter 9 how moral judgment stages represent a minimalistic model of justice operations. The moral judgment stage model represents increasingly reversible operations of justice. Each stage is a formal representation of operations of fairness—that is, how individuals rationally construct what is the just or fair action to take in a situation of moral conflict. At the highest stage, this construction relies on universal principles as criteria for a just solution. At every stage qualitatively different sets of criteria are used to determine what is just. For example, at Stage 4, the criteria do not consist of universal principles, but rather of societal criteria of welfare and system maintenance.

The psychological/theoretical distinction between the good life and moral judgment stage models follows from the philosophical distinction between the good and the right that was put forth in Chapter 1. Briefly, judgments of the right concern moral action in accordance with duty or obligation. Judgments of the good involve morality only in the limited area of the "morally good," and then only in relation to good character or good motives. Such judgments involve neither obligation nor immediate action.

The occurrence of certain psychological phenomena demonstrates that the two models are not mutually exclusive. Since the structures of good life stages consist of operations of evaluation, there are some cases in which the criteria involved in a particular moral judgment could be almost identical to the criteria representative of a good life judgment. This is most evident in the domain of the "morally good," as stated above.

A few examples of this overlap appear in the Colby & Kohlberg Standard Issue Scoring Manual (in press). These are cases in which individuals respond to a hypothetical moral dilemma of competing rights or claims in terms of what the morally-good person would do in the given situation, rather than in terms of what a moral agent is obligated to do, or what the just solution may be. For the most part, this is limited to lower stage responses in which "the good" is not distinguished from "the right." These overlaps, generally infrequent at any stage, reflect confounding elements in subjects' responses more than overlaps between the two models. Occasionally, subjects will also respond to good life questions with a deontic moral judgment (e.g., any life would be a good life as long as it took place in a just society).

The distinction between the concept "morally good," which involves judgments of character and motives, and that of "morally right", which involves deontic judgments of fairness and obligation, appears to be supported empirically as well as philosophically. It is apparent, however, that the degree to which this distinction is made increases with stage development, both in the good life and in the moral judgment stage models.

Collapsing the distinction between the good and the right is not only theoretically dissatisfying; it is also empirically confounding. This is so because the domain of the good life is broad, including not only moral good, but also good work, family, community, and the like. It would be irrational to claim that "good work" and "right work" or "a good family" and "a right family" mean the same thing. Indeed, in most cases, to call something "right" that is actually "good" demonstrates a misunderstanding of concepts, not a special theoretical perspective.

If the instances in which the good and right are confounded are excluded, it can be the case that justice is, indeed, one of the good life values. The good life model considers conceptions of justice, however, only to the extent that they enter into an individual's conception of the good life. It is to that very extent that conceptions of justice become necessary parts of a much larger scheme of the good life.

Philosophically, it is assumed here that a just society is a precondition for any good life (Rawls, 1971). Empirically, at Stage 5 a just social context is presupposed in any ideal conception of the good life. Although the empirical relationship between good life and moral judgment stages does not strictly adhere to the necessary, but insufficient form across all of the stages (see Chapter 16), the individuals who receive post-conventional good life stage scores tend to score at least as high in moral judgment. Thus, it may not only be the case that, at the higher stages at least, the good and the right are fully distinguished, but also that the two domains maintain a formal, philosophical relationship. The following excerpt from a Stage 5 protocol illustrates this relationship:

The good life would include the ability to empower yourself and others to do the kind of re-creating I was talking about earlier. These activities would involve the recognition of the true value inherent in one's actions and a commitment to reject activities which do not hold intrinsic worth.

[Would everyone be doing this in the good life?] Well, I'm not sure to what extent everyone would actually do this, or want to do it. We must, however, assume a just society that would protect the freedoms, rights, and so on, of persons...
so that they could do this. It could not be something I could do, while others could not. (Case 043-1)

This respondent goes on to explain in detail the various conditions of and activities involved in living the good life. He explicitly states, however, that in order to realize his conception of the good life, a just social system would be assumed a priori.

Similarly, the following except illustrates a Stage 5 subject's ability and the need to separate and retain conceptions of deontic morality and moral and non-moral good.

[What is a good person?]

There are some central, or minimal requirements that I would want in any good person....First, they would reason and act from a conception of justice. In situations where there is a conflict of goods, the good person would consistently act on judgments made from the position of the ideal spectator, which is only to say that she would be impartial.

[Why would that be good?]

I think that to be consistent with the principle of respect for personality, the good person will only judge the value of another's claim based on the content of that claim. But a good person must be more than just...that's a right person. A good person must in some sense have psychological health. She must have a true sense of herself and be able to have a true sense of others. In so doing, one becomes good. She must acknowledge the paradoxical parts of herself and others and recognize that that is part of what it is to be human. In a way, it is dependent on being just because she must be both willing and able to view the world and herself from the eyes of others. (Case 206-2)

In summary, from both psychological and philosophical theories, justice reasoning, is considered necessary, but insufficient for good life reasoning. Empirically, however, this relationship is only supported at the higher stages.

Social-Perspective-Taking (S-P) Stage 1: Differentiated. The child (or adult) clearly differentiates physical and psychological characteristics of persons. The subjective perspectives of self and other are clearly differentiated and recognized as potentially different. Relating of perspectives is conceived of in one-way unilateral terms, in terms of the perspective of, and impact on, one actor. (Paraphrased from Selman, 1980).

Children at Stage 1 rarely mention other people in their description of good work. When they do, relations between these others and themselves are conceived of in unilateral terms, involving only the means and consequences of one person, usually the self. The following examples illustrate this one-way perspective:

[What do you think would be good work?]

I think when I grow up, I'm going to get a job...I'm going to be on a crew in a submarine. I've been wanting that since I was three years old.

[What would be good about that?]

All the fish you'd see...and you might see a whale, do you know that?! (Case 044-1)

In addition, the work presented here does not limit social perspective-taking to literal "self-other" relations, particularly not after Stage 3. Instead, these stages are considered to represent the relations individuals construct between "me" and "not me" (stated in the most general form). The elements of these relations may include the society, community, a given institution, nature, or even the cosmos, as they are seen to relate to the person.

What follows is a descriptive empirical account of each social perspective-taking stage as it is manifested in the parallel good life stage, beginning at Stage 1. Data from the present study consisting of responses to the "good work" question are used. This demonstration illustrates how social perspective-taking stages, from childhood through adulthood, provide the framework and context from which good life evaluations are constructed.

Good Life Stages and Social Perspective-Taking Stages

A description of social perspective-taking stages and the general, theoretical form of their relation to good life stages was provided in Chapter 9, where it was claimed that social perspective-taking levels are necessary, but insufficient for the development of parallel good life stages. In fact, the good life model is particularly dependent on social perspective-taking relations in the good life Stages 1 and 2, especially Stage 1. Due to the general nature of reasoning at that stage, it has been difficult to discriminate evaluative reasoning from social perspective. Evaluation processes are, in this model, identified by means of the criteria with which one evaluates. In the youngest children studied (those five to seven years of age), the capacity to generate evaluative criteria appears to be almost completely absent. This can be seen in the illustration of Stage 1 following.
As can be seen in the above examples, at Stage 1 there is no differentiation between real and fantasized activities (crew on a submarine = seeing a lot of fish), nor between objective evaluation of good and good-feeling experiences (good job = seeing a lot of fish, maybe even a whale). This is, in part, a result of the lack of the ability to "mentally step outside the self" in order to make such differentiations. It is inherently difficult to identify evaluative reasoning in the absence of this ability.

S-P Stage 2: Self-Reflective/Reciprocal. The child or adult is able to mentally step outside of herself and take a self-reflective or second-person perspective on her own thoughts and feelings and recognizes that others can do the same. Differences among perspectives are viewed relativistically. This two-way reciprocality, however, is concrete. Each individual views herself and the other in relative isolation, without awareness of the relational system between them. (Paraphrased from Selman, 1980).

The second social perspective-taking stage makes major advances over the first in that the one-way relation is replaced with a concrete reciprocal one based on the development of a second-person perspective. The child now steps outside of herself and makes evaluations based on nonsubjective criteria: the quality of, concern for, or consequences of the work one does, as in the first example below; or the judgment of others, as in the second example.

[What is good work?]
Work that takes effort...and work that feels good when you complete it...and work that helps you in your life.

[Why is it important to put effort into work?]
Because it would be sloppy if you didn't put effort into it...and need into it. That's what it takes to do good work. (Case 044-2)

[What is good work?] Good work is when someone really likes what I am doing and says I'm doing a good job...especially if it's hard work.

In these two examples, the criteria of good work vary. However, what is of import here is that such criteria, however variant, would not be possible without the second-person perspective of Stage 2 social perspective-taking. In other words, to be able to come up with a conception of "what it takes" to do good work, the child must see his or her own activity as differentiated from "good work."

S-P Stage 3: Third-Person/Mutuality. The individual can not only step outside her own immediate perspective, but also outside the self as a totality, or system ("observing ego"). The third-person perspective simultaneously includes and coordinates the perspectives of self and other(s). Thus, the situation or system, which includes the self, is viewed from a "generalized other" perspective. This "system," however, is made up of those persons and experiences with which the individual has direct, face-to-face relations, it does not include a system such as "society." (Adapted from Selman, 1980)

At Stage 3, reasoning about good work requires a third person perspective. Relations between self and other are identified and defined by means of elements within a system that can be viewed from a "generalized other" perspective. The individual perceives the "system" as the self and the immediate group, such as family, office personnel, or peer group. The needs, interests, and goals of others provide the necessary elements of the system. However, there is an absence of an external social system independent of the self's immediate experience.

[What is good work?]
I think any work that deals with people is good work. I'm sure that dealing with machines must be very unrewarding. Helping people is very worthwhile because of the human interaction. (Case 40-1)

[What is good work?]
Working with people...helping people...feeling like I'm able to do things for them or to help them feel good.

[Why is that good?] I think it is important to get positive feedback and to feel some progress with the people I'm working with. (Case 31-1)

These two subjects recognize and identify relations between the self and other individuals (Stage 3), but they do not yet recognize and identify relations between self and society (Stage 4). The good, or value, of work is defined at this stage in terms of mutual relations within the immediate group to which the self reacts.

S-P Stage 4: Multiple Systems. The individual can apply the "generalized other" perspective to distinct, multiple abstract systems such as the societal perspective, the moral perspective, or Nature's perspective, which are differentiated from the interpersonal system perspective of Stage 3. Although there is recognition of multiple, separate systems, the individual is not yet able to coordinate them. There is an absence of attempting to reconcile potential conflicting relations between systems. That is, the individual can take the perspective of each of the systems independently, but cannot take multiple system perspectives simultaneously.

The recognition of the separateness and the independence of two systems--the self and the society--is apparent at Stage 4. However, the individual at this stage is not yet concerned with the need to coordinate them, which is apparent in the following example.

[What is good work?] Any work is good work as long as it's productive of something useful, something that you can appreciate, and that someone else can appreciate. Something that you love doing. Something that you can construe as useful to society by almost any terminology you can imagine. (Case 041-I)

In this example, the notion of social utility is evident, as is the notion of self-satisfaction. Yet, these two notions are not coordinated with one another. Below is another example.

[What is good work?] In the first place, it should be something useful. In the second place, it should be something you enjoy doing. It should be of some value to yourself and to society at large. Virtually
anything can be of value. (Case 038-l)

The reasoning in the above two examples goes beyond Stage 3 by not only recognizing the effect of one's work on another system—the society at large—but also by acknowledging the self's need to pursue its own satisfactions independent of the reactions of, or to, the immediate group. However, there is an absence of an attempt to reconcile potential conflicting systems, as well as of an awareness that there might be a need to. In other words, there is often no recognition of the fact that if the two systems of good that the subject described were to come into being, they would be in conflict. Thus, the individual takes the perspective of each of them independently, but does not take the perspectives of multiple systems simultaneously, even when pressed to do so by the interviewer.

Stage 5: Second-Order Reciprocity. With the awareness of the need for the reconciliation of potentially conflicting or contradictory systems comes the construction of reciprocal relations between abstract systems. Systems are identified, analyzed, and coordinated through formal and consistent mechanisms (theories) of checks and balances. Individual systems or sets of systems remain discrete entities to be dealt with in multiple intrapair relations.

At Stage 5, however, second order reciprocal relations allow for the coordination of multiple systems. In the following example, the individual acknowledges potential contradiction between the self and societal systems and sees the need for "balance" between them. He goes even further by attempting to integrate them within a larger framework.

[What is good work?]
First, I think the work must have upward mobility...the work becomes more stimulating. But, at the same time, I feel that as you move up, the work has to be a trade-off...between self-satisfaction and service. I think that the ultimate work is when you get self-satisfaction out of service. (Case 017-l)

This individual stresses the need for the self and the society to advance one another's interests mutually. In terms of social perspective-taking, the systems of self and society are kept in balance through the relations of second-order reciprocity. This notion is succinctly expressed in the following excerpt:

[What is good work?]
For one thing, there must be a balance. To the extent that you take from society, you must give to society. (Case 207-l)

At Stage 5, there are many suggestions of a broader, more nearly exhaustive and inclusive system, all foreshadowing development to the sixth stage. This is well illustrated in the following example:

[What is good work?]
I think good work allows a person to participate in something greater than the person. You have to be willing to take on conflicts and hardships in the name of something larger than yourself. And you have to be able to see that the products are indeed useful by standards beyond your own.

I think it is really glorious when you can throw yourself into the system and participate in it and you do not view the system as the other. So, in my ideal world, you do what you do and it is well coordinated with everything else. (Case 212-l)

The ability to identify, analyze, and attempt to coordinate two distinct systems within a theory and, therefore, incorporating elements of both systems, is indicative of the second-order reciprocity framework of Stage 5.

S-P Stage 6: Second-Order Mutuality. The individual coordinates all distinct systems by reconceptualizing them as subsystems, or elements, of a coordinated, fully equilibrated metasystem (metamutuality). Whereas at Stage 5, systems were coordinated through reciprocal relations between each set, Stage 6 individuals construct a metasystem that maintains its own equilibrium and the operations of which affect all elements, elements that were discrete systems at Stage 5.

At Stage 6, the external social system and the internal self system are fully coordinated as sub-systems of a greater mutual system. The greater system is often identified as "mankind" or "nature" and the multiple systems of Stage 5 become its elements. The following excerpt illustrates the integration of these elements:

[What is good work?]
I think good work is self-producing work. That kind of activity or involvement where we are able to produce ourselves.

[How does self-producing work affect others?]
The self is social. We don't have a self if we don't have a society. I would think that if it is self-producing work, then you are working with a part of yourself. You would be working with what you might call the social side and if it isn't beneficent, you're hurting yourself... you wouldn't be self-creating. (Case 043-l)

Here there is a conception of the person that includes both the self and the society. Whether the system is conceived of as man, nature, or something else, it maintains its equilibration through reciprocal relations that affect all elements—elements that were only discrete systems at Stages 4 and 5. The scope of such reasoning is far-reaching, as shown in the following excerpt:

[What is good work?]
Good work has to take place in a context, so if we are talking about the ideal work, the context would be humanity or, better, the entire universe. Within that context, good work would be realizing your potential or "self-actualization." This is not necessarily an egoistic activity. Since you are part of the whole, to actualize yourself is to actualize the world, for better or worse. I believe persons to be potentially good. So, if each person were to realize their own potential, they would be realizing a better world simultaneously. In terms of the specific work, this would vary. The constant would be that, whatever the work was, it would be completely consonant with the true nature of the self as that relates to the whole. (Case 206)

At Stage 6, a fully coordinated system is formed that incorporates the two or more previously discrete systems that were "balanced" at Stage 6.

5. Such systems are reconceptualized as subsystems, or elements of a coordinated metasystem (metamutuality).

This concludes the detailed discussion of social perspective-taking stages and how they are manifested in good life data. Social perspective-taking is an integral part of the construction of the good life stages, as it is in other structural-developmental models that attempt to identify phenomena of social interaction. (For other examples of this interdependence, see Kohlberg, 1979; Fowler, 1981.)

Chapter Sixteen
Results

Before describing the results of the more detailed analyses, the basic theoretical assumptions that underlie the present model and the findings concerning these assumptions are discussed.

Invariant Sequence

According to the theoretical assumptions of structural developmental theory, the developmental sequence of good life stages should be identical in every individual studied. There should be no deviations from perfect sequentiality—no stage skipping and no downward movement (Colby et al., 1983). In the present sample, sequentiality cannot be fully tested since the study only spans a four-year interval with two test times. Within those parameters, however, it is expected that any individual whose score is different at time 2 will only show that difference in the direction toward the next stage in the sequence.

Since the measure is not error-free (as discussed in the reliability section), empirical deviations from the theory can be expected. In the longitudinal sample, 8% of the subjects showed negative change. This percentage represents three individuals with negative change scores of 3, 7, and 21 EMS points. Given the standard error of measurement discussed in Chapter 12, these scores are within the bounds of measurement error.

In addition to the analysis of negative change, the model holds that positive change will be to the next ordered stage. Since there were four years between interview times, it could have been impossible to assess this hypothesis since, theoretically, subjects could have developed through more than one stage. As it was, however, no subject changed more than a full stage; of those who changed it was a change toward the next adjacent stage in the sequence.

Internal Consistency

The model posits that the logic of each good life stage forms a structured whole. Thus, a high degree of consistency in stage scores assigned to different issues would be expected. One indication of internal consistency in good life reasoning is provided by the proportion of reasoning exhibited at each stage by a single individual. Analysis was limited to the 15 cases that exhibited the highest number of scorable units. On average, 72.4% of these subjects' reasoning was at a single stage, the "modal" stage. The mean percentage of the next "most used" stage, always adjacent to the modal stage, was 26%. The mean percent of the third "most used" stage, also adjacent to the modal stage, was 1.6%.

Another test of internal consistency investigates the stability of stage scores in the different issues and in the global score at each time point. The correlations, ranging from .79 to .94, found between the four issues and the EMS scores at each test time are presented in the matrix in Table 12 below. Both of these sets of findings support the hypothesis that good life stages represent a general structure of evaluative reasoning.

Table 12
Correlation Matrices Across Issue and EMS Scores in 1977, 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LIFE</th>
<th>WORK</th>
<th>FRIEND</th>
<th>PERSON</th>
<th>EMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIFE</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.9313</td>
<td>.9110</td>
<td>.9765</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORK</td>
<td>.9449</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.9313</td>
<td>.9110</td>
<td>.9765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRIEND</td>
<td>.9313</td>
<td>.9313</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.9409</td>
<td>.9783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSON</td>
<td>.9110</td>
<td>.9081</td>
<td>.9409</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.9721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>.9765</td>
<td>.9763</td>
<td>.9783</td>
<td>.9721</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LIFE</th>
<th>WORK</th>
<th>FRIEND</th>
<th>PERSON</th>
<th>EMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIFE</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.9329</td>
<td>.9014</td>
<td>.8871</td>
<td>.9755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORK</td>
<td>.9329</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.9230</td>
<td>.8480</td>
<td>.9691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRIEND</td>
<td>.9014</td>
<td>.9230</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.8292</td>
<td>.9523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSON</td>
<td>.8871</td>
<td>.8480</td>
<td>.8298</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>.9345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>.9755</td>
<td>.9691</td>
<td>.9523</td>
<td>.9345</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next set of results concerns the occurrence and distribution of the good life and moral judgment stages. Table 13, below, lists the frequencies of these stages.

Table 13
Frequency of Good Life and Moral Judgment Stages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages</th>
<th>Good Life</th>
<th>Moral Judgment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--1--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--1/2--</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--2--</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--2/3--</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--3--</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--3/4--</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--4--</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--4/5--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--5--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concerning change scores in good life and moral judgment stages over the four-year interval, t-tests revealed significant differences between the two test times for both the whole sample and for adults:

Table 13
Frequency of Good Life and Moral Judgment Stages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Good Life</th>
<th>Moral Judgment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stages</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--1--</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--1/2--</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concerning change scores in good life and moral judgment stages over the four-year interval, t-tests revealed significant differences between the two test times for both the whole sample and for adults:
These figures show a clear linear relationship between the two sets of scores.

Paired t-tests revealed no significant differences in change scores between good life and moral judgment development over the four years. The difference scores on the two measures were correlated .74. Thus, in general, although the two measures are conceptually distinct, it appears that whatever affects attainment and change in one construct also does so in the other.

**Age Variables**

**Stage Attainment**

Using age as an independent variable is problematic, particularly when studying a sample that includes ages representative of the entire life-span (Baltes, Reese & Nesselroade, 1977). When including the entire sample, age and good life stage scores were correlated .67 (p = .000) in 1977 and .68 (p = .000) in 1981; age and moral judgment stage scores were correlated .63 and .47 in 1977 and 1981, respectively. Stage attainment in both good life and moral judgment stages increased as a linear function of the natural log of age.21 Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the relationship between stage attainment and age in the good life and moral judgment in 1977 and 1981. The strength of this relationship decreases as age increases and comes close to but never below zero over the life-span.

While, in general, increased age is associated with higher stages of reasoning, the strength of the relationship attenuates as one moves through the life cycle. Only in the youngest age group (5-13 years in 1977) was there a relatively stable relation between age and stage in all subjects (age and stage attainment correlated approximately .82 in good life and moral judgment at both test times).

**Figure 6**

**Good Life and Moral Judgment Stage Attained with Age in 1977**

**Figure 7**

**Good Life and Moral Judgment Stage Attained with Age in 1981**

But, even in that group, the variation in stage attainment was high as can be seen in Figures 6 and 7, above.

When examined separately, the adult group (20+ years, N = 31)22 showed nonsignificant correlations between age and stage on both measures at both test times. When broken down further, however, the age range of 20 to 50 years (n ~ 23) showed significant correlations between age and good life stage of .63 (1977, p = .001) and .57 (1981, p = .007). With moral judgment stage, the correlations with age were .56 in both 1977 and 1981. In the "over-fifty" age group (n=8) stage and age were non significantly correlated at both interview times. Indeed, in 1981, age and moral judgment stage were negatively correlated (-.1593).

**Stage Change**

Change scores demonstrate even more dramatically the insufficiency of age as a causal variable. The correlations between age and stage change in both good life and moral judgment stages are consistently negative, even in the youngest age group. The amount of change decreased as a linear function of the natural log of age.

As noted earlier, paired t-tests indicated statistically significant positive differences between EMS77 and EMS81, MMS77 and MMS81 (p = .000 for both tests) using both the entire sample and the adult group separately (20+ years). Including the entire sample, the mean difference scores were 43 (approximately 1/2 stage) in good life and 40 (approximately 1/2 stage) in moral judgment. In

---

**Table 15 Comparative Relation of the <, =, and the > relations of EMS to MMS Scores in 1977, 1981**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whole Sample</th>
<th>Adults (20+ years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMS77-EMS77:</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMS77-MMS77:</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14 presents the raw scores in good life stage, EMS, moral judgment stage, MMS, and the age of all subjects.

**Table 14**

**Raw Scores for the Entire Sample**

**Relationship Between Good Life Stages and Moral Judgment Stages**

Good life stages and moral judgment stages were found to be highly correlated with one another. Across the entire sample, the correlations were .95 in 1977 and .92 in 1981. In the adult sample (20+ years), the correlations were somewhat lower, .87 in 1977 and .86 in 1981. Nonparametric correlations on the stages themselves using the whole sample were slightly lower overall at .88 in both 1977 and 1981.

Paired t-tests, however, indicated significant differences between EMS77 and MMS77 (p = .005), as well as between EMS81 and MMS81 (p = .03). It was initially hypothesized that the relationship between the two stage sequences would take the form of moral judgment stages being necessary, but insufficient, for good life stages; that is, it was expected that individuals would score consistently higher in moral judgment. This hypothesis, however, was not supported, although the mean MMS score is slightly higher that the mean EMS score at both test times (15 and 13 points). Table 15, below, shows the distribution of "less than" and "greater than" EMS scores.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whole Sample</th>
<th>Adults (20+ years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EMS77-EMS77:</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMS77-MMS77:</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Stage Variables**

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While, in general, increased age is associated with higher stages of reasoning, the strength of the relationship attenuates as one moves through the life cycle. Only in the youngest age group (5-13 years in 1977) was there a relatively stable relation between age and stage in all subjects (age and stage attainment correlated approximately .82 in good life and moral judgment at both test times).

---

**Stage Change**

Change scores demonstrate even more dramatically the insufficiency of age as a causal variable. The correlations between age and stage change in both good life and moral judgment stages are consistently negative, even in the youngest age group. The amount of change decreased as a linear function of the natural log of age.

As noted earlier, paired t-tests indicated statistically significant positive differences between EMS77 and EMS81, MMS77 and MMS81 (p = .000 for both tests) using both the entire sample and the adult group separately (20+ years). Including the entire sample, the mean difference scores were 43 (approximately 1/2 stage) in good life and 40 (approximately 1/2 stage) in moral judgment. In
the children's group, the mean difference scores were 75
(approximately 3/4 stage) in good life and 87 (approximately 3/4
stage) in moral judgment. The average difference scores in the adult
group (20+ years, n=31) were 30 points (approximately 1/4 stage) in
good life and 25 points (approximately 1/4 stage) in moral judgment.
In addition to mean scores, however, the range of individual change
should be considered. The children's group, which is the most
homogeneous, had change scores that ranged from -3 to 125 in both
measures. In the adult group, the difference scores ranged from -21
to 80 on both measures. In the adult group, 17 out of 26 changed
a minimum of 1/4 stage in good life; 12 out of 26 changed a minimum
of 1/4 stage in moral judgment. Even in the "over fifty" group (n =
8), 4 subjects showed stage change of at least 1/4 stage in good life
and 2 individuals increased 1/2 stage in moral judgment. Figure 8,
below, illustrates the relationship between age and stage change with
the entire sample in both good life and moral judgment.

Thus, the fact that age and stage change are negatively
correlated, coupled with the finding that, over a four-year period,
some individuals develop while others do not leads to the conclusion
that age, considered alone, is not a micro-causal variable; development
on both variables is something more than the simple
passage or time or biological maturation.

Finally, previous stage and stage change were negatively
correlated on both measures, but nonsignificantly.

**Figure 8**
Relation of Stage Change to Age

**Adult Development**

Two approaches were used to investigate development beyond
adolescence. The first is longitudinal and concerns the data
described above. Briefly, 65% of the individuals ranging in age from
20 to 64 years and 46% of the individuals ranging in age from 20
to 55 years showed meaningful stage change (¼ stage+) in good life
and moral judgment, respectively. Beyond the question of the
existence of stage change in adulthood, however, is the question of
whether adult development proceeds through stages that are unique
to adulthood.

The hypothesis that post-conventional stages in both the good
life and moral judgment are restricted to adulthood was supported
by both the cross-sectional and longitudinal data. Looking first to
the cross-sectional data, the youngest subject to demonstrate a good
life score beyond Stage 4 in 1977 was 31 years old—in moral
judgment, 28 years old. In the longitudinal data, the youngest
subject to change from a conventional to a post-conventional stage
was 35 in good life and 34 in moral judgment.

These findings combined demonstrate two forms of support for
"adult development." The first form concerns evidence that adults
do develop, that is, they change from previous to successive stages.
But in many cases, they change to a stage that, in other individuals,
may occur before adulthood. The second and more restrictive form
concerns development that only occurs in adulthood. Both of these
forms of adult development are illustrated in Figures 6 and 7 on page
195.

**Philosophical Orientations**

Considering the entire sample in 1977, the distribution of the
different philosophical orientations was as follows:

- Egoistic Hedonism: 23.3%
- Social Hedonism: 46.5%
- Functional Perfectionism: 14%
- Progressive Perfectionism: 14%

In 1981:
- Egoistic Hedonism: 14%
- Social Hedonism: 48.8%
- Functional Perfectionism: 14%
- Progressive Perfectionism: 9.3%
- Perfectionism-Unity: 2.3%

Philosophical orientations were found to be stable over the four-year
period with high percent agreement rates, as reported in Chapter 12.

Since almost all the children demonstrated only egoistic
hedonism, the focus of the analysis was on subjects over twenty years
old. In the adult group, as in the sample as a whole, the majority of
individuals were scored at the social hedonism orientation (61% in

Statistically significant differences in some outcome variables
were found with t-tests when orientations were dichotomously
collapsed into hedonism (n=18) and perfectionism (n=12) in the
adult group. In 1977, statistically significant differences in favor
of perfectionism were found in MMS scores (mean difference = 50
MMS points, p = .03). Without statistical significance, EMS scores
followed the same trend with a mean difference in favor of
perfectionism of 36 EMS points (p = .07).

Holding constant in 1981, perfectionists scored significantly
higher in MMS (mean difference = 50 MMS point, p = .03) and
EMS followed nonsignificantly with a mean difference of 30 points.
Examining both correlational and t-test data on orientation with
adults, no differences were found on education, age, or change scores
on either measure.

As was the case with the t-tests on EMS and MMS, when the
adults' good life and moral judgment stages were collapsed into
conventional and post-conventional levels (there were no pre-
conventional adults), chi squares indicated that philosophical
orientation was more significantly related to moral judgment level
than to good life Level. Table 16 shows the distribution of
philosophical orientation with good life and moral judgment levels.

Moral judgment scores and orientation in 1981 provide the
strongest case. Fifteen out of nineteen (79%) of the hedonists are
at the conventional level, whereas only one out of seven (14%) of
the perfectionists are at that level (Fisher's Exact Probability = .005).
The general tendency for the hedonistic orientation to be most
associated with conventional levels and the perfectionistic
orientation with the post-conventional levels is consistent in the four
tables.

It was initially thought that the progressive perfectionism
orientation would be positively related to stage change over the four-
year period due to its emphasis on development and change as an
terminal value. No orientation, however, was found to be
significantly related to change scores in either good life or moral
judgment stage sequences.

**Table 16**
Distribution of Philosophical Orientation
with Conventional and Post-Conventional Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Good Life 1977</th>
<th>Moral Judgement 1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perfectionism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conventional</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-conventional</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egoistic Hedonism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Hedonism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfectionism-Unity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55
In 1977, the entire sample demonstrated a split between heteronomous and autonomous moral types (22, 21). By 1981, however, 30 individuals were scored autonomous and only seven heteronomous. This difference can be explained in part by the development of the youngest subjects who all scored heteronomous in 1977 and in part by the fact that three of the five adults who were not interviewed the second time were scored type A in 1977.

Whatever the cause of this distribution in 1981, due to the low number of heteronomous types in the adult group, analyses concerning that group will be restricted to the cross-sectional results from 1977 moral type scoring.

An occurrence of the autonomous type was not found in subjects below Stage 2 in either good life or moral judgment. Moreover, although there were some heteronomous types at Stages 1 through 4, the heteronomous type occurred with decreasing frequency through the stage sequence. For example, in the good life, no subject who was scored heteronomous was at the post-conventional level. Similarly, of the seven subjects who demonstrated post-conventional moral judgment stages in 1977, only one was scored heteronomous. When 1977 good life and moral judgment levels were compared to moral types (see Table 17), significant chi squares were obtained.

Table 17
Moral Types by Good Life and Moral Judgment Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good Life</th>
<th>Moral Judgment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Conventional</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from these tables, moral types fall into two skewed distributions—toward the preconventional level for type A and toward the post-conventional level for type B—with the majority of both types at the conventional level.

Using t-tests, a significant difference was found in good life and moral judgment attainment over the whole sample in favor of the autonomous type in both 1977 and 1981. With all subjects in 1977, the mean EMS score for autonomous types was 366 compared to 253 for heteronomous types ($p = .000$); the mean score of individuals scored autonomous in 1981 was 373, compared to 229 for those scored heteronomous ($p = .000$). In moral judgment, 1977, the mean score for autonomous types was 382 compared to 268 for heteronomous types ($p = .000$). In 1981, the two scores were 378 and 273 ($p = .001$).

In the adult group in 1977, the differences followed the same trend. The mean EMS score for those who scored autonomous was 370; for those who scored heteronomous, 326 ($p = .001$). The mean MMS score for autonomous was 383, and for heteronomous, 339 ($p = .000$).

Moral types were also found to be significantly associated with philosophical orientation. Since both the perfectionistic orientation and the autonomous type were significantly related to higher stages, it was expected that the autonomous moral type would be associated with the perfectionistic orientation. Table 18 below illustrates this association in the whole sample in 1977 and 1981.

Table 18
Association Between Philosophical Orientation and Moral Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral Types</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n = 42)</td>
<td>(n = 37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfectionism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher's Exact Probability</td>
<td>.0428</td>
<td>.032</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in Table 18 the hedonistic orientation contain a relatively even distribution of the two moral types. The perfectionistic orientation, however, is significantly associated with the autonomous type.

Moral types showed no relationship to differences in sex, education, age, or change scores.

Education

Across the entire sample, years of education were found to be a significant independent variable with all outcome variables. The correlations for the whole sample, all statistically significant at the .000 level, were as follows:

$r_{EMS77} = .82$  $r_{EMS81} = .82$

$r_{MMS77} = .80$  $r_{MMS81} = .78$

Chi square indicated a significant relationship between education and philosophical orientation ($p = .000$); furthermore, t-tests revealed a significant difference in education when subjects were grouped by moral types ($p = .000$, 1977 & 1981).

Since age and education are almost synonymous with children, further analyses concerning education were restricted to the adult sample. For this group, education remained significantly correlated with good life and moral judgment stages. The parametric correlations were as follows:

$r_{EMS77} = .37$ ($p = .02$)  $r_{EMS81} = .46$ ($p = .009$)

$r_{MMS77} = .38$ ($p = .018$)  $r_{MMS81} = .48$ ($p = .002$)

Figure 9, below, illustrates the relationship between years of education and stage attainment in both good life and moral judgment stages in 1981.

As can be seen in Figure 9, the level of education in the adult sample, evenly distributed between men and women, was quite high. The mean educational level attained in 1977 was college completion; in 1981, it was one year of graduate school.

Figure 9

Relation Between Education and Stage Attainment in Good Life and Moral Judgment Stage Scores in 1981

Of notable interest was the difference in education over the four-year period. t-tests showed a significant difference in education attained in 1981 compared to 1977 ($p = .012$). Twenty-four percent of the adults either went back to school or continued in school during
that time. This difference in education was evenly distributed between men and women. Difference in education over the four years was highly correlated with difference scores in both good life and moral judgment stage scores. The Pearson correlations were .53 (p = .002) and .57 (p = .001), respectively. The mean change scores for those subjects who continued their education was 54 points (approximately 1/2 stage) in EMS and 49 points (approximately 1/2 stage) in MMS, compared to 21 and 11 for those subjects whose educational level remained constant over the four years. These mean differences were statistically significant at the .002 and .000 level, respectively. Figure 10 shows the relationship between differences in EMS and MMS scores with differences in education over the four-year period.

Figure 10
Relation Between Difference in Education and Stage Change

Sex Differences

In t-test analyses with the total sample, there were no statistically significant sex differences on stage related variables in either the good life or moral judgment scores, although overall, males scores were higher. The children's group showed no sex differences on any variable when examined separately. The adults (20+ years) were also examined as a group. There were statistically significant sex differences in stage attainment in both good life and moral judgment scores in favor of males in 1977 and 1981. The differences were constant at both time points with an average difference between males and females of 56 points. Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the relations among stage attainment, age, and gender for the good life and the moral judgment stage models, across the entire sample.

Figure 11
Good Life Stage Attainment with Age and Gender

Figure 12
Moral Judgment Stage Attainment with Age and Gender

t-tests showed no statistically significant sex differences in age or level of education, however, at either test time, or change in education over the four-year period.

But when the adults were separated into smaller age groups, the results varied. In 1977 and 1981, the only statistically significant sex difference in the 23-39 age group (n = 22) was in EMS change scores in favor of males (mean difference, 18 MMS points, p = .05). There were no significant differences in education. When there were differences in good life or moral judgment stage scores, however, the trend was stable, always favoring the male groups. But in the 50-76 age group (n=9), there were significant sex differences in favor of males in good life and moral judgment scores in 1977 and 1981. Like the younger adults, this age group showed no sex differences in level of education and, in their case, there was no change in education over the four-year period. Although this older age group showed significant differences in the same direction as the trend demonstrated in the younger adults, the fact that there were only two males in this age groups makes these results speculative. It is very possible that these two men's scores are idiosyncratic compared to the general population, or even the rest to the sample in this study.

Although there were no significant differences in level of education for men and women, there were highly significant correlations between years of education and good life and moral judgment stage scores for both men and women. Regression analyses were then performed with the adult data investigating sex differences while controlling for education. An interaction between sex and education was first suspected. However, the interaction term added less than 1% in explaining the variation between the two groups. Since the interaction term was insignificant, using education as a covariate was justified. After controlling for education attainment, the adjusted mean difference between men and women was 41.2 points in EMS77, 31 points in EMS81; for MMS, the mean difference was 39 points in 1977, 35 points in 1981. All mean differences were significant.

ANOVA were then performed to investigate sex differences in change scores over the four-year interval for all the adults. Since differences in education over the four years were highly correlated in both men and women with change scores on both measures, difference in education was used as a covariate. When differences in education were controlled, there were no sex differences in change scores, although the covariate was highly significant (p = .003). In fact, as with the 23-39 age group, the women's change scores were somewhat higher than the men's.

There were no sex differences in philosophical orientation or moral type.

Chapter Seventeen
Discussion and Conclusions of Section III

Reliability

The results presented support the good life stage model and scoring system as both reliable and valid for the study and measurement of evaluative reasoning in children and adults. Compared to the reliability estimates of the Standard Issue Moral Judgment Scoring System (Colby & Kohlberg, in press; Kohlberg, 1979), after which it is modelled, the reliability estimates of the present model appear acceptable. With respect to the justice reasoning measure, Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs and Lieberman (1983) report similar interrater reliability correlations in the high nineties with the same nine-interval scale as used here.

The qualitative analyses that characterize research on structural development, however, require more than high correlations. Accordingly, percent agreement results have been reported. The 90% complete agreement and the 100% agreement within a half stage are similar to that reported by Colby et al. (1983) for moral judgment scoring. They report 88-100% agreement within a third stage and 75-88% complete agreement on the nine-interval scale. The 90% complete agreement rate on global stage reported here is also commensurate with their findings.

As reported by Colby et al., these interrater reliability results exceed those of other systems that attempt to assess developmental stages. For example, Loevinger and Wessler (1970) report interrater correlations of .80 for the Sentence Completion Test of ego stage. Loevinger and Wessler also report perfect agreement rates of 0.50-80% (median, 62%) using a ten-point scale. Similarly, Rest (1979) reports interrater correlations of .68-.92 for the Defining Issues Test of moral development.

The test-retest correlations reported for both the test-retest sample and the longitudinal sample are high (.99 and .95, respectively). In particular, the long-term test-retest correlations of the longitudinal sample scores (N = 37) over four years suggest a high degree of test-retest stability. The test-retest reliability correlations reported by Colby et al. are also in the high nineties for a sample of 42 individuals, tested 3-6 weeks apart. They do not report long-term test-retest correlations.

Finally, change in the short-term test-retest findings were as likely to be positive as negative, which assures the absence of a practice effect from the good life interview itself.
The standard error of measure reported, at 31 EMS points, is somewhat larger than would be desirable. Although traditionally the standard error of measurement should remain constant across all populations for which the measure was designed to test (because it is a property of the measure and not of the population), a more reasonable standard error could be considered for the adult population. The standard deviation (SD) was far lower for that group than for the sample as a whole (55 compared to 100). An argument can be made here that, although from a purely general, structural point of view, the measure works the same for children and adults, it does not appear to detect, in more fine-grain analyses, peculiar, subtle aspects of children's evaluative reasoning. This may be due to the measure's deficiencies or to the nature of children's evaluative reasoning. That is, the children themselves may not yet possess the forms of distinction and differentiation that adults demonstrate in evaluative reasoning. As it stands, however, the standard error of measurement reported is conservative so as to allow for the use of the measure's with a life-span age range.

Colby et al. report a standard error of 15.62 MMS points for the standard issue system. The SD for their sample is 69.87. This difference in SD is probably due to the limited age range used in Kohlberg's sample. (The age range at any one interview time is 10-18, for the whole study period, 10-36.)

**Validity**

Because of the nature of structural stage models, construct validity demands high generalizability in test-retest reliability. The high reliability demonstrated in both short- and long-term test-retest comparisons meets this criterion. What is unknown from these analyses, however, is the generalizability of good life stages of evaluative reasoning to real life behavior. But the appropriate question for construct validity is whether the interview and scoring scheme provide a valid assessment of evaluative reasoning, or good life stage, rather than a valid assessment individuals' behavior or actual "good lives" (Colby, et al., 1983). Further research is nevertheless needed both on discriminant and on construct validity. The longitudinal study must be carried out so as to measure individuals' development through all of the stages. The measure must also be tested on different populations.

To the extent possible, the invariant sequence criterion has been met by the good life stage model. The positive results of the longitudinal analyses support not only theoretical assumptions about the order and development of the stages, but also the validity of the measure in capturing structural development (Colby, et al., 1983). A longitudinal study that measures the development of individuals through the entire sequence will still be required, however, to meet this criterion fully.

The findings used to confirm the internal consistency of the model appear strong. The mean proportion of reasoning at the "modal stage" reported here is paralleled in the standard issue moral judgment measure where the mean percent of reasoning at a single stage is reported at 68 (72% has been reported here). In the moral judgment model, a 10% error boundary is established, which eliminates frequencies of second- or third-stage usage that consist of 10% or less of the total proportion of reasoning exhibited (Colby, et al., 1983). If the same boundary rule were used with the good life data, all third-stage use would be eliminated. (It was 1.6%).

**Good Life and Moral Judgment Stages**

The distribution of the good life and moral judgment stages, in general, and the mean stage of the adult group, in particular, was somewhat unexpected. All studies that include education as a variable report it as a highly salient factor in development to higher stages (Walker, 1982). Although the present sample contains a much higher mean level of adult educational attainment (one year of graduate school) than the mean for the general population, the mean stage of 3/4 for adults is only slightly, if at all, higher than is typically reported.

As was noted, however, the range and distribution of scores must be taken into account. The 31 adults in this study demonstrated good life and moral judgment stages ranging from 2/3 to 5. The distribution of stages in both measures represents not only a wide range, but also a higher proportion of postconventional reasoning than that typically reported. In Kohlberg's longitudinal sample, for instance, only 10% of the moral reasoning demonstrated is post-conventional even when the sample has reached the age of 36. In the present study, with its smaller sample, 23% of the adults have demonstrated good life stage scores at the postconventional level; 27% demonstrated post-conventional moral judgment stage scores.

It has been described how the relationship between good life and moral judgment stages is a linear one, but is not strictly of the necessary, yet insufficient form as elsewhere hypothesized (Armon, 1984). At the higher stages (4/5 and 5), however, this relationship becomes more prevalent. These findings support the hypothesis that evaluative reasoning about the good generally parallels prescriptive justice reasoning. The good life stages, however, do not appear to represent metaethical or metamoral theories that complement and go beyond moral judgment stages by providing meanings for morality, as has been implied by Kohlberg (1981). It is more likely that they represent problem-solving structural organizations that are related to moral and nonmoral values, and are distinct from justice structures. That is, they appear to represent structures similar to justice structures but ones residing in a different domain. This is supported, in particular, by the longitudinal data that show that the development of individuals in one sequence indicates development in the other, even though their respective scores on the two measures are significantly distinct.

Further research on this relationship is needed. A factor analysis, of the moral dilemma issue scores and the good life issue scores would be useful for the possible identification of an underlying factor that would account for the greatest variance in the two measures. In addition, a dilemma instrument for good life evaluative reasoning would not only make the two models more compatible, but it would also allow for further investigation of the structural nature of good life reasoning. (See Kohlberg & Armon, 1984, for a discussion of the relationship between an instrument and the identification of structure.)

**Age Variables**

Although age variables are useful in providing evidence the developmental hypotheses of the good life stage model, they provide only indirect evidence. All studies with structural-developmental outcome variables show very high correlations between stage and age in children, particularly in middle-class samples (see, for example, Selman, 1980; Colby, et al., 1983; Fowler, 1981; Kegan, 1982). Indeed, in these studies, age alone, or the mere passage of time, appears to be a significant factor in individuals' development, at least to Stage 3.

The degree of correspondence between stage and age, however, was observed to decrease through the life span in this study. If age alone were a truly determinative factor in development, the relationship to stage scores should remain relatively constant, if one controls for ceiling effects, such as innate capacity, for instance. One would then expect to find age and stage highly correlated until, say, age twenty-five, at which time not only the relationship, but also development would cease, similar to, but somewhat later than, physical maturation.
When adults were studied, however, age and stage were not found to be significantly correlated, but only older adults were found to have reached higher stages. Simply stated, some adults continued to develop, while others did not. Hence, although advancement in age is not a sure indicator of development to higher stages, it nonetheless is a necessary, but insufficient condition for such development.

Reviewing the reanalysis of the Kohlberg longitudinal data, Colby et al. (1983) report a .78 correlation between age and stage and a "monotonic increase" in stage development from age ten to 36. Since preadolescent and adolescent age groups were included, this correlation does not necessarily enhance our understanding of the relation between age and stage in adulthood. They show that, in the groups ranging from 20 to 36 years of age, (1) the proportion of reasoning at Stage 3/4 remains relatively constant, (2) stage 4 use increases from ages 20 to 36, and (3) Stage 4/5 use decreases from 20 to 36. Stage 5 is not represented in this group of findings (Table 20, Colby, et al., 1983). They also show in Figure 1 that, at age 36, 65% of the moral reasoning present in the sample occurs in individuals who are at Stage 4, 35% in those at Stage 3, and 8% in those at Stage 5. Finally, they report that consolidated Stage 4 reasoning is not present before age 20 and 4/5 is not present before age 24.

It therefore seems clear from these other findings that age advancement is not a significant predictor of stages in adulthood above Stage 3, despite the claims of high stage-age correlations made by Colby, et al. On the contrary, these findings can be interpreted in such a way to corroborate the findings presented here. It appears that some individuals in the Kohlberg sample, after the age of 20, have continued to develop while others have not, and that higher stages are indeed associated with older ages.

This interpretation has been strongly supported by the longitudinal good life stage change data. Since stage change and age were negatively correlated in all age groups sampled, including five to seven-year-olds, it can be concluded that age advancement alone is not a particularly determinative factor in stage change research.

One is drawn to speculate, then, on the identity of the micro-causal variables in structural development, particularly beyond Stage 3. It has been shown that education is a highly significant factor in both good life stage attainment and stage change. This finding is paralleled in a number of studies. A particularly useful set of analyses has been performed by De Vos (1983) on Kohlberg's longitudinal sample. He first reports a .68 correlation between education and MMS, which is lower than, but consistent with, what has been reported here. He then reports results of regression analyses of justice reasoning stage and a number of socio-economic variables in which education had more affect on moral reasoning stage scores than did a subject's occupation, even when occupation was measured in terms of substantive complexity, rather than earnings. He further states that the affects of education on moral judgment development remain significant over and above all other traditional socioeconomic variables.

In a more speculative analysis of growth trajectories, De Vos reports an estimated relationship between moral judgment stage development and education such that each additional year of education is associated with an increase in rate of development by more than a half stage per 10 years, after adjustment has been made for IQ, initial moral reasoning, the original design factor, and the substantive complexity of the subject's father's job. This finding is of particular interest, given the direct relationship found in the present study between changes in good life and moral judgment stage scores and continued education.

Similarly, Colby et al. (1983) demonstrate that educational experience is related to moral judgment development beyond the association of education with IQ and SES (r = .26, with IQ and SES partialled out). They also report in their Table 23 the association between moral judgment stage attainment and levels of formal education for both working-class and middle-class adult groups. In either SES group, no subject has attained Stage 4 without some college education, nor Stage 4/5 without having completed college. Only 14% of the middle-class subjects and no working-class subjects have attained Stage 4/5 after completing college. Of those who completed a graduate degree, 33% of the working-class subjects and 50% of the middle-class subjects have attained Stage 4/5.

All of these findings point to a clear relationship between formal education and structural stage development. It appears that certain forms of structured intellectual stimulation are key factors in development. Further research is needed to investigate the relationship of various forms of education to structural-developmental change.

Adult Development

It was reported earlier that postconventional stages in both the good life and moral judgment stage model can be considered adulthood stages, since they do not appear in childhood or adolescence. Evidence of progressive development in adulthood is making increasingly frequent appearances in the literature (see, for example, Richards & Commons, 1984; Fischer, Hand, & Russell, 1984; Pascual-Leone, 1984). It has been argued by some, however, that such adulthood stages are not of the same structural form as earlier stages.

For example, Gibbs (1979) argues that postconventional reasoning is a theorist's construct rather than a naturally occurring phenomenon. He claims that these stages consist of existential reflections on the self or the world and, therefore, cannot be considered "structural" in the same sense as Stages 1 through 4. It can certainly be argued that many stage sequences that chart development in adulthood do not meet the strict Piagetian criteria for a structural stage model (cf. Kohlberg & Armon, 1984). However, it would be incorrect to assume, as Piaget (1958) did, that all adult development is nonstructural. Evidence is mounting for a radically different view.

Philosophical Orientations

Philosophical orientations appear to be stable constructs. Percent agreement across the short- and long-term test-retest data support their consistency, and interrater reliability estimates were acceptable. The relationships between philosophical orientations and other outcome variables, however, are somewhat unclear.

The moderate associations between orientations and both the good life and the moral judgment stages are interesting but inconclusive. The distribution of the orientations was also bothersome. The low numbers of subjects in the perfectionistic subgroups made many of the planned analyses unfeasible.

It is possible that, to the extent that philosophical orientations are related to good life and moral judgment stages, they are possessed of some of the same features as those measured by these two other constructs. Indeed, since philosophical orientations are made up of some of the same value elements as those used in scoring both moral judgment and good life interviews, the association may reflect these commonalities.

Because of their theoretical construction, it was not expected that philosophical orientations would be highly correlated with stage attainment. Philosophical orientations represent metaethical
justifications and "philosophies," while the good life and moral judgment stage models attempt to capture normative and prescriptive judgments. If philosophical orientations and stage attainment were very highly associated, then Gibbs' argument (mentioned above) would be supported. That is, the existence of such an association would indicate that part of the stage construct itself included metaethical reflections on, for example, the meaning and aim of life or the nature of good and morality.

The lack of high association, however, demonstrates that subjects' metaethical theories are not what is being measured by either the good life or moral judgment stage models.

Moral Types

The reported findings reported concerning the association of moral types to moral judgment stages follow the same trend as the current work with Kohlberg's longitudinal sample (Tappan, Kohlberg, Poley, & Higgins, in press). Further analysis is required to test change in moral type over the four years of the study and the association of that change with good life and moral judgment stages.

The autonomous moral type construct consists both of structure and content of justice reasoning. This type is considered more equilibrated, more reversible and, particularly, more self-governing than the heteronomous type. As such, its association with higher stages is straightforward. Its association with the perfectionistic orientation, however, is less so.

Since, as mentioned above, the philosophical orientations are made up of some of the same value elements as those used in scoring moral judgments, one might argue that the judgments used to score the autonomous moral type contain value elements the same as or similar to those contained in the perfectionistic orientation. To disconfirm this hypothesis, a micro-analysis would have to be done in which those value elements found in the judgments used to score moral type (scorable units) would be compared to the value elements used to construct the perfectionistic orientation.

A straightforward interpretation is more plausible, however. The perfectionistic orientation focuses on the perfection and enlightenment of the individual. A major component of this perfection is often moral character, in general, and autonomy, in particular. Thus, with the normative value placed on these components, one would expect this orientation to be associated with the autonomous moral type.

Sex Differences

The most disturbing finding is that of sex differences in both good life and moral judgment stage scores in adults, after education had been controlled for. Sex-difference findings resulting from the Kohlberg's justice reasoning measure have been controversial. Most notably, Gilligan (1982) has claimed that, since the moral judgment model and assessment methodology was constructed from an all-male sample, it is biased in favor of scoring men's moral reasoning higher than women's.

Theoretically, there should be no difference between men's and women's moral judgment or good life reasoning. Both models claim to identify structures of human reasoning that would not be expected to be affected by gender. Moreover, the good life stage model and assessment methodology was empirically constructed with a sample of equal numbers of men and women.

A recent extensive review of sex differences resulting from the Kohlberg model has been done by Walker (1982). He reviewed and reanalyzed numerous studies of moral development that used this measure, many of which had reported sex differences. The main finding that he reported was that sex did not account for a significant amount of the variance in moral judgment stage scores once education had been controlled for.

A similar claim cannot be made about the findings reported here, however. Significant sex differences have been found in the adult group, even though education was controlled for. The finding, as previously described, varied when different age groups were studied separately. Although the trend of men's scores on both measures being higher than women's was constant throughout the adult age range, the differences were significant only in the oldest adults. Barring for the moment that these findings were idiosyncratic, the argument could be made that a cohort effect is in operation. The older women, although they had attained college degrees, they had attained them in the 1930's and 1940's. Formal education for women in that era may have had a decidedly different effect than it has now. Furthermore, and more importantly, although these women had formal educations equal to the men's, and although they have all worked for most of their adult years, their cohort group may have received a very different form of socialization and sex-role identification than that of the women who were in college in the nineteen sixties.

The Walker review, as well as other studies reporting sex differences, does not include individuals in this older age range. Therefore, the interpretations of these results must be considered speculative.

Studies using both the good life and moral judgment stage models need to be done that identify sex differences as a primary focus. It is only through more specific research designs, and more fine-grained analyses, that the controversy over sex differences in structural development can be met and defused.

Chapter Eighteen

Discussion, Limitations, and Future Research

This study has investigated the plausibility of a normative structural stage model of evaluative reasoning about ideals of the good life. It was claimed first that the model meets general Piagetian psychological criteria for a structural model and, second, that the highest stage of evaluative reasoning has philosophical support in that the minimal requirements of the good life at Stage 5 are agreed upon by differing philosophical schools of thought. It was also claimed that the content of evaluative reasoning can be more clearly captured in categories derived from traditional and contemporary metaethical theories than from frequency categories.

The present model does not claim to have identified a unique phenomenon. On the contrary, many other studies and theoretical models have reported similar findings. This model is, in part, a theoretical integration of the evaluative aspects that are only implied in other models. One purpose of clarifying the construct of evaluative reasoning--differentiating it from other constructs and providing philosophical specification for it--is to understand more comprehensively the evaluative component that is prevalent in many studies of social development and human reasoning.

The other purpose is to show both the conceptual consistency and empirical centrality of evaluative reasoning as a domain of psychological study unto itself. It has been shown that reasoning about value with respect to the good life can be specified both philosophically and psychologically and need not be embedded in other domains, such as social cognition or metaethics, nor rejected as a psychological construct based on claims of subjectivism.

Structural Development

It has been shown by means of the present model that evaluative
reasoning contains structural characteristics. There is, however, still much work to be done. Given all the requirements, as well as the present lack of knowledge and understanding of the true nature of "structural" development, it is still not known whether stages of evaluative reasoning are truly structural in the formal sense.

Piaget's initial conceptions of "structures" have been illuminating as a way to identify and describe forms of human reasoning and development. The notion of general, invariant sequences of "thought organizations" was a major step forward in Western psychology—a field that was once limited to individual-, group-, or culture-specific theories of development. The internal validity of these theories has often been difficult to ascertain.

Since the 1960's, numerous "stage theories" have been postulated that, to varying degrees, claim to be working within a Piagetian structural paradigm. Indeed, at the present time, developmental theory and research has intruded into almost every domain of human experience. Stage sequences are reported in domains as disparate as the quality of sexual experience (Érdynast, 1983) and reactions to alcoholism (Koplowitz, 1984). An examination of this relatively new research leads one to question the methodology by which these stage sequences are shown to conform to a structural model. Structural-developmental research, in and of itself, is overwhelmingly complex. Even the rigorous explanations and specifications of the model provided by Piaget himself are sometimes mystifying and always difficult. This is particularly true of problems concerning the (1) actual nature of equilibration, (2) the nature of disequilibration, which is said to occur in stage change, (3) the way in which stages are integrated into proceeding stages, or (4) the nature of a structure itself, with its characteristics of wholeness, specifiable transformational laws, and self-regulation.

In response to these issues, Piaget attempted a structural analysis of each cognitive stage, defining the specific transformational laws governing both the equilibration of operations and their transition from one structure to the next.

Piaget has remarked that structures "are in no way observable to the researcher nor conscious to the subject" (1970, p. 138). What persons know, say, or do is the outcome of structure, and not the structure itself. Piaget claims that actual conscious thoughts constitute the elements of structures. These elements must be specified as operations and studied in terms of their relations within a system with the aim of defining the structure.

Kohlberg's theory of justice-reasoning development is generally considered, after Piaget's, the most nearly complete structural-developmental model. Although involved in continuous reanalysis and reconceptualization of the justice reasoning stages and their sequence, Kohlberg himself readily admits that he has hardly begun to tackle the structural analysis prescribed by Piaget (personal communication, 1982).

In fact, most structural-developmental researchers tend to define stages completely in terms of subjects' conceptions of the construct under study (e.g., the self), while little attempt is made to identify the structures of which these conceptions are an outcome.

If the identification of structures is primarily dependent on the specification of them in terms of their operations and transformational laws (Piaget, 1970), it seems clear that most developmental models, including the present model, work with a more general notion of structuralism than Piaget originally intended. This recalls Piaget's distinction between "global" and "analytic" structuralism (Chapter 9). Analytic structuralism centers on the "laws of composition." It seeks to identify and define the details of transformational interaction—that is, to make a detailed account of the transformational laws within a structure. Whereas global structuralism holds to a system of observable relations and interactions, which are regarded as sufficient unto themselves, analytic structuralism seeks to explain such empirical systems by postulating "deep structures" from which the observable relations can be derived.

The general lack of clarity and rigor about the definition of structure found in structural developmental models, coupled with the proliferation of stage theories, leads one to question the extent to which these varying stage models are distinct from one another. Many theorists claim that their structural models are completely distinct from one another. It is easily observed, however, that different developmental models are strikingly similar, as discussed in Chapter 11. Is it plausible that there are a number of structural organizations within human reasoning?

For example, one can conclude from Table 8 (p.128) that an individual at a given time could be at the same stage or level in cognitive development, justice reasoning, social perspective-taking, ego-ideal, ego development, faith development, care, friendship, motivation, and evaluative reasoning, to mention only a few.

However, the grounding of structural-developmental theory in interactionism does not support such a conclusion. Kohlberg (1969) argues, "development of cognitive structures is a result of processes of interaction between the structure of the organism and the structure of the environment" (p. 6). It has been postulated by Piaget (1952) that the processes of interaction that result in transformation are specifiable. For Piaget (1968), they are primarily a means to an end. Cognitive structures are transformed over time to meet the problem-solving needs of the individual. In other words, if the problems present in the child's physical world can be adequately resolved with habitual structures, there is no need for change. Moreover, these processes entail active construction. Through both inner (reflection) and outer (actions) "active experimentation," the individual constructs new meanings, or "elements." This active process of constructing elements is thought by Piaget to underlie transformation.

It seems humanly impossible for any individual to be actively experimenting and constructing new meanings in all the domains reported above at the same time and at the same rate. One is therefore led to the hypothesis that such interactional processes lead to transformations in central or "mother structures" (Werner, 1948) that then manifest themselves empirically in a variety of domains. But what, then, are these central structures?

Elsewhere, Kohlberg & Armon (1984) postulate the notion of "hard" and "soft" stages to distinguish what have been categorized in the present study as structural and neo-structural models. We claimed that, although soft stage sequences appear to represent sequential and qualitatively different stages, they are not structural in the formal Piagetian sense for the following reasons: (1) they do not represent Piagetian structural forms as sets of operations, understood as interiorized forms of action; (2) they do not distinguish content from structure, nor competence from performance; (3) they do not articulate the "inner logic" of the stages or their sequence, which results in an ambiguity as to how they meet the "hierarchical transformations" criterion; (4) they do not elicit predefined operations; (5) they are not normative in the sense of offering a philosophical, as well as a psychological, account of the highest stage; and, finally, (6) they do not represent responses to universal activity, such as intelligence or morality. We then claimed that the only models that appear to demonstrate true structural criteria are Piagetian cognitive structures and moral and perspective-taking structures.

A more radical argument is offered by Commons & Richards (1984). They postulate a very general structural cognitive stage...
model that has the potential to explain the structural aspects of development in all other sequential stage models. This model implies that development in domains other than cognition is not structural in the formal sense, but rather some form of decalage that originates in cognitive structures. Such an explanation, however, is so abstract as to be uninterpretable in terms of individuals' judgments or actions in a particular domain.

It appears unlikely that structural-developmental theorists have the inclination or the capacity to perform formal Piagetian structural analyses on each of the stages they identify. At the same time, abstract, mathematical models leave something to be desired in the understanding of human reasoning and development.

A step toward the solution to the problem of "multiple stage theories" appears to rest in the adequate specification and justification of a developmental construct. It was argued in Chapter 11 that both philosophical and psychological specification is required of a structural-developmental construct. There, a philosophically supported model for the classification of developmental constructs (adapted from Snarey, et al., 1983) was postulated. This classification has the purpose of categorizing potentially distinct subdomains of reasoning thought to be included within the larger "ego development" domain. The model distinguishes three types of reasoning that correspond to three basic realms of philosophy: epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics. This model may not represent the ideal classification. It is useful, however, since each of these forms of reasoning implies issues with philosophically specifiable content and boundaries. Such distinctions could help sort out the complex and increasing findings about multiple developmental sequences. The model of philosophical categories is presented in Table 19.

Table 19
Philosophical Categories of Human Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Epistemology</th>
<th>Ethics</th>
<th>Metaphysics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>study of human knowledge: the self, physics, social cognition</td>
<td>study of human valuing: the god, religion, faith, right and the cosmos</td>
<td>study of meanings: good mathematics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evaluative reasoning would fall into the category of ethics, which can be divided between "the good" and "the right," as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Categorizing evaluative reasoning about the good separately from social, cognitive, and other constructs, pulls together the evaluative aspects of reasoning found in a variety of stage theories.

Evaluative reasoning, conceived of as a separate subdomain, is particularly appropriate for structural-developmental investigation for three main reasons. The first reason is its centrality to human experience. There is little doubt that the activity of evaluation of the self, other persons, objects, and states of affairs is a universal human activity. Second, in general, the focus of the structural-developmental paradigm on generalities and consistencies in human development is easily coupled with attempts made in philosophy to discover the common essences in human nature, in general, and human valuing, in particular. Finally, evaluative reasoning is particularly suited to philosophical specification. Unlike the constructs "ego" or "needs," the construct "evaluative reasoning" has a wealth of philosophical models and analyses, both ancient and contemporary, upon which to draw. In addition, as has been shown, there is relative consistency in both philosophy and psychology on many aspects of evaluation.

Implications for Education

In general, the ways in which people evaluate and what they value is of central importance to education. In the last few decades, interest in moral education has increased. New emphasis is being placed on the role of the school in the formation of character. For example, Kohlberg's model of justice-reasoning development has been employed in a number of educational and penal institutions and continues to gain acceptance. However, interest in "character development" goes beyond issues of justice. Kohlberg (in press), among others, has stated that the aims of moral education must go beyond both critical thinking and justice-reasoning structures to include judgments of responsibility, general concern for others, and self-respect. These judgments consist, in part, of evaluative reasoning. In particular, evaluative reasoning in the moral domain identifies the moral good of responsibility, of persons, and of the self. A principle of benevolence (Frankena, 1973), for example, falls within the domain of the good rather than in the realm of deontic justice. In general, many "real life" judgments concern neither physics nor justice; rather, they are evaluative judgments of the good--of values, aims, and ideals. Developmental processes of evaluation can inform a philosophy of education that goes beyond "values clarification" to identify reasonable and justifiable aims for character development.

This is particularly relevant for adult education. A major finding of this study is that not only do persons develop, or change stage, throughout the lifespan, but also that post-conventional stages of development are restricted to adulthood. Increasing evidence supports these findings (Commons, Richards, & Armon, 1984; Colby, et al., 1983; Fowler, 1981). Moreover, it has been shown that development to these stages appears to be highly influenced by adult educational experience.

Traditionally, adult education programs--whether they be programs for continuing education or those of prestigious graduate schools--are based on no philosophy of character development. Apparently it is assumed that the character of the students is already set: therefore, the focus of these programs is restricted to the advancement of critical thinking, or merely to the accumulation of knowledge. Findings of this study, as well as those of others, demonstrate that nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, it appears that educational experience in adulthood is central to the development of autonomy and principled ethical reasoning. Philosophers of education, psychologists, and educators themselves need to include adulthood as a most important era for character development. "Development as the aim of education" (Dewey, 1914; Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972) should not be restricted to childhood and adolescence.

Limitations of the Study

Beyond the general limitations discussed above and throughout this work, there are specific, practical limitations to this study. First, the sample is not only small, but also "hand-picked." Selection was based on the aim of identifying adult development. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize beyond this group.

Second, the longitudinal aspect of the study is limited to a four-year interval, during which only incremental steps in development could be observed, rather than development through the entire stage sequence. A study of adequate length is required so that the potential development of subjects through all of the stages can be realized.

Finally, the relationship between evaluative-reasoning stages and real-life evaluation is still uncharted. The present work is based on the assumption that individuals rely heavily on their evaluative judgments in the construction of life plans, aims, and activities. Counterarguments, however, are also plausible, particularly ones
derived from social learning theory.

**Plans for Future Research**

What has been presented here are the results from continuing research. Many of the findings described and the issues raised will continue to be reanalyzed, reconceptualized, and reconstructed. Participants of the present sample have committed to a twenty-year study. This will allow for observation of development through the sequence. However, only the development of the children, of whom there are few, can provide adequate support for the stage sequence. To supplement the initial study, another randomly selected adult sample (n = 20) will be added to the longitudinal group in 1985.

Data on real-life events that occurred between 1977 and 1981 was collected in 1981. An analysis of those data for two groups of adults, those who demonstrated stage change, and those that did not, is planned for the near future in an attempt to identify possible stimuli for development.

The 1985 study will include an interview on life choices, both past and present, in an attempt to gain insight into the relationship between abstract evaluative judgments about ideals and actual life choices.

In general, future research on structural development, particularly during adulthood, must maintain a rigorous theoretical and methodological approach. Moreover, the ethical component in social development research needs to be more clearly acknowledged. Without clearly specified constructs and a rigorous methodology to distinguish, for example, content from structure, or evaluation from cognition, specific issues in human development will remain elusive. This is particularly true of the task of identifying the processes and causes of transition or development from one stage to another, which has barely begun.

Moreover, the antecedents of adult development are almost completely unknown, as are the forms of adult development. In the current literature, even if the notion of structural development in adulthood is accepted, it is conceived of as either hierarchical or absent. Such a dichotomy, however, is unlikely. Other forms such as *decalage* or consolidation need to be investigated and distinguished from one another.

Elsewhere, Kohlberg & Armon (1984) have argued that the formal, Piagetian structural approach may not be the ideal model for the study of adulthood, and so it may not. This author believes, however, that ultimately it will only be through the theoretical and methodological rigor of the structural-developmental paradigm that even the appropriateness of the model itself can be ascertained.

Rather than viewing the structural-developmental model as "ready-made" and attempting to fit domains of experience to it, and, in the process, bending the model in different directions without specifying such modifications, it seems more appropriate for theorists first to go back to the enigmatic theory and methodology that was Piaget's legacy and to advance it.

Finally, this study has attempted to show the potential for the integration of psychological and philosophical models in the study of evaluative reasoning. It has asserted the general necessity for philosophical theory and analyses in theories of human development, in general, and the necessity of their presence in a theory of evaluative reasoning about the good life, in particular. This necessity has been recognized by philosophers and psychologists alike. In response to Kohlberg's (1969) theory of moral development, Peters (1971) remarks:

Kohlberg's findings are of unquestionable importance, but there is a grave danger that they may become exalted into a general theory of moral development. Any such general theory presupposes a general ethical theory..." (p. 264).

Similarly, Kohlberg (1981) contends:

An ultimately adequate psychological theory as to why a child does move from stage to stage, and an ultimately adequate philosophical explanation as to why a higher stage is more adequate than a lower stage are one and the same theory extended in different directions (p. 104).

Augmenting developmental psychological models with philosophical theory began with the works of Baldwin (1895) and James (1890), was carried on in the work of Piaget, and is currently a major focus in the works of Kohlberg (e.g., 1981), Habermas (e.g., 1984), and Broughton (e.g., 1982).

Conversely it is claimed in the present study that philosophical and socio-political theories of the just state and the good life require a psychological model to support empirical claims about human nature and behavior. In attempting to identify the common essences of persons, philosophers often rely on their own casual observations, and/or other philosophers' non-empirical models of, for example, moral psychology. Even modern normative ethical theories, such as Rawls' (1971, 1980), lack an empirical, psychological model to support their claims about persons—their motivations, capacities, and aspirations. For instance, what is central to Rawls' conception of the person—his notion of the "two moral powers"—have been shown to be, for the most part, normative endpoints of development, rather than general capacities that all persons possess. Similarly, Hawes (1984) has constructed a philosophical model of autonomy, built upon the works of Dewey, Kant, and Rawls, and speculates about the potential of this form of autonomy as an aim of elementary and secondary education. In this case as well, developmental studies have observed that the capacity for autonomy (as Hawes has defined it) occurs only in highly developed individuals, usually those beyond the age of thirty.

In addition to providing empirical evidence with respect to the presence or absence of particular human capacities, developmental psychology identifies human processes that occur in the development of such capacities. This can provide an understanding of how persons obtain these capacities as well as insights into the forms of social, political, and material environments that foster such development.

An integrative model of philosophy and psychology, such as the one attempted in this dissertation, is more than an intellectually aesthetic construction. It will be by means of such a model that future investigators in each discipline will be enabled to come closer to producing genuinely substantive psychological models of human reasoning and truly adequate philosophical theories of justice and the good life.
Appendix A

EVALUATIVE REASONING SCORING MANUAL FOR IDEALS OF THE GOOD LIFE

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This scoring manual is written for the scorer of Good Life interview data. Such scoring has two major purposes. The first is to identify structural Stages in evaluative reasoning about the Good Life. The second is to assess Philosophical Orientations in the same data. The focus of stage identification is on the underlying, structural organization of evaluative reasoning that is inferred from subjects' Good Life judgments. The focus of Philosophical Orientation assessment is not on the underlying structures of reasoning, but on the value content that structural reasoning organizes in different ways.

The first section introduces the scorer to the general theoretical tenets of the structural-developmental approach to stage construction and definition. The second section explains the use of Issues, Norms, and Value Elements in the formation of Good Life Judgments. The Issues, Norms, and Value Elements provide both a conceptual framework for identifying and categorizing different aspects of Good Life judgments and an analytic perspective on the nature of the judgments themselves. In addition, it is explained there how Norms and Elements are also used to construct Philosophical Orientations. The next section contains a detailed description, illustrated with examples, of the general, structural stages of reasoning about the Good. Section four presents a more detailed description and discussion of the meaning and use of Philosophical Orientations and how they are manifested in interview data. Section five presents a brief overview of the procedures used in the construction of this manual. There, both issues of stage definition and stage scoring criteria construction are discussed, as well as the construction of categories for Philosophical Orientations. Section six is the first procedural section of the Good Life Scoring Manual. This section includes procedures and scoring rules for Good Life stage assessment and Philosophical Orientation identification. Sections 7, 8, 9, and 10 are the scoring manuals for Good Life, Good Work, Good Friendship, and Good Person, respectively.

The construction of this manual (see Section V) has closely followed the model of the Colby & Kohlberg (in press) Standard Form Scoring Manual for the assessment of moral judgment. This is because that manual provided the most sophisticated approach and methodology to date for assessing Piagetian structural forms within content-laden protocols. Indeed, since the conception of the present project in 1976, the general Kohlbergian forms of data collection, protocol analysis, and manual construction has been followed.

Section I: STRUCTURAL-DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES
To support the general value with a terminal value statement.

In scoring Good Life judgments, the Issue is merely the topic under discussion, usual identified by the question that the subject is asked (e.g., "What is Good Work?") or sometimes by the spontaneous response of the subject. The Issue categorizes the content that the subject is expressing an evaluation about. Issues correspond to number one in the judgment model, above. The Norm categorizes the general value that the subject assigns to the Issue and corresponds to number 2, above.

### NORMS

In general, Norms define kinds or types of values or concerns with respect to the Issue. Table 1 presents the combined Issues and Norms used in scoring Good Life judgments.

<table>
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<td>2. Property</td>
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### ISSUES AND NORMS

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Section **ISSUES, NORMS, AND VALUE ELEMENTS**

In this manual, the unit of analysis is a Good Life judgment. There are three steps in scoring Good Life judgments: (1) identifying a good life judgment; (2) scoring such a judgment by stage; and (3) assessing the judgment's Philosophical Orientation. To aid in these steps, different parts of Good Life judgments are conceptually categorized by Issue, Norm, and Value Element. The conceptual categories are equivalent to a theoretical guide and are not strictly identified during the scoring procedures. The distinctions between these three categories are based on the following judgment model:

- To say something is good or bad (to make a judgment of value) is to do three things:
  1. To express a pro or con evaluative statement about something;
  2. To support the evaluation with a general value statement; (3)
  3. To support the general value with terminal value criteria.
As shown in Table 1, the Norms can be roughly categorized into three groups: Moral, Social, and Aretaic. Moral Norms refer to kinds of moral actions, rights, or claims. The represent values that are subject to social sanction and punishment and are objects of social institutions (Colby & Kohlberg, 1984). Social Norms refer to non-moral social values that are also subject to social sanction. Aretaic Norms generally refer to traits of character.

A Norm is a general value (concern) that gives value support to the Issue judgment. Since a Norm is a general value (concern), it's choice is somewhat affected by the specific Issue under discussion. Some Norms tend to cluster around particular Issues. Table 2 presents the Elements, organized by general Philosophical Orientation. This list is not meant to be exhaustive but rather summative of the end-values discussed by subjects in this study. Modal Elements (1-9) simply express a type of judgment. They express the "mood" or modality of ethical language. For example, the Modal Elements, "Having a duty," defines a type of moral judgment, a judgment of obligation. Similarly, "Needs/Motives" refers to a psychologically based ethical judgment.

A fully elaborated judgment contains both a Modal Elements and a Value Element. If a Value Element is present, then a Modal Element is too, at least in an implied form. At times, especially at lower stages, only a Modal Element is present in a judgment. When a Value Element is present, Modal Elements only express the "mood" of the judgment and are not scored.

The Value Elements provide the final aspect of the judgment. They are terminal or end-values for which the Norm serves as object. Thus, the Norms are justified further by Value Elements. "Elements are the(ultimate) reasons why a subject endows a particular norm with value" (Colby & Kohlberg, 1984). As such, Value Elements come closest to what could be referred to as intrinsic values. As the final justification of a judgment, they represent what the subject considers to be final ends. This is to be contrasted with values considered valuable as means to other things. As final ends, Value Elements provide the information necessary for the identification of the subject's Philosophical Orientation. Each Philosophical Orientation (as discussed in the initial chapters of this work and to be discussed in detail in section five) consists of a cluster of end-values, or intrinsic values. These are the values that are thought to comprise the ultimate human Good.

Value Elements, then, represent the final justification of a particular Good Life judgment. They are ultimate reasons or ends; all Value Elements are intrinsic, irreducible values.

To summarize this section on Issues, Norms, and Value Elements we can say that Issues identify content domain. Norms are general values that refer to types of actions or concepts. Some Norms overlap to a certain extent. Value Elements, in contrast, are more mutually exclusive. Both Modal Elements and Value Elements are used to give Norms value. A fully elaborated Good Life judgment, then, is of the following form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE</th>
<th>NORM</th>
<th>[MODAL ELEMENT]</th>
<th>VALUE ELEMENT</th>
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Unfortunately, not all judgments are, in fact, fully elaborated, nor do they always follow the prescribed form. For example, a subject may make a Good Life judgment by responding to a particular Issue with only a Value Element [e.g., "Work is good when it provides individuals with self respect"]. In such cases, the Issue and Norm are considered identical. Similarly, and more commonly, a subject may provide little more than a single Norm without a Value Element [e.g., "Work is good when it provides a good income to allow individuals to do other things"]. It is not
impossible to assess material of imperfect form. An Issue and Norm, or an Issue, Norm, and Modal Element, can be sufficient for stage assessment. Value Elements, however, are required for the identification of Philosophical Orientation (see Section IV).

Section I: GENERAL STAGES OF THE GOOD LIFE

This section introduces the scorer to the structural-developmental stage of evaluative reasoning about the Good Life. The essential characteristics of the general form of Good Life stages as they are manifested in Good Life judgments are described. The stages are considered to represent developmental characteristics of evaluative reasoning about The Good, independent of the particular content domains (Issues) within which such stages are manifested and scored. In the actual scoring section of this manual, these general definitions are embedded in Issue-specific descriptions. In other words, there, each stage is defined in terms of a particular Issue (content domain), such as Good Life, Good Work, Good Friendship, etc. Here, the purpose is merely to introduce the scorer to the general characteristics of the stages, independent of Issue or Philosophical Orientation. For reference, table 3 presents formal definitions of these stages.

Table 3
General Stages of the Good Life

Stage One: Egoistic Hedonism

The Good Life consists of physicalistic and sensory experiences that gratify the self's desires and realize the self's fantasies. There is no conception of specific criteria for valuing. Thus, the Good Life is synonymous with the desired life, without consideration of the self's or others' real capacities or of behavioral consequences. Doing good is undifferentiated from having good experiences. The Good Life and the Bad Life, and any of its contents are completely dichotomized and simplistically labeled in terms of surface attributes, e.g., "nice," "pretty," "clean," etc. There is no distinction between happiness, contentment, satisfaction, and pleasure.

Stage Two: Instrumental Hedonism

The Good consists of those activities, objects, and persons that serve the individual's needs and interests, both emotional and material. There is a consistent conception of the Good Life that includes concrete considerations of both the self's and others' motives and intentions and the contemplation of consequences of behavior. There is no distinction made, however, between the "desired" and the "desirable" (that which is worthy of being desired). There is an instrumental need for others. This is manifested in a strong desire to be praised, liked, cared for, and helped. Simultaneously, a desire for independence, egoistic freedom, and power is also prevalent. Socially approved "goods" are affirmed simplistically, or evaluated in terms of their surface features. There is a beginning distinction between happiness and pleasure.

Stage Three: Altruistic Mutuality

Good is an affective sense of happiness or fulfillment, a result of positive, mutual interpersonal experience that is distinguished from pleasure. The Good Life is predominantly determined by affective experience, that is, what feels good; good is often determined by the absence of bad feelings. The Good Life consists of activities in accordance with stereotypical, interpersonal and personal virtues. A major theme of which is helping the self and/or others to feel good (be happier, more successful, etc.) and promotes mutuality between self and others in the immediate social environment.

Stage Four: Individuality

The Good Life consists of activities that express the individual's self-chosen, internalized interests and values (as opposed to the consensual values of stage three). There is the beginning of a hierarchy of values. Happiness, fulfillment, satisfaction, and pleasure are not only distinguished, but are also seen as ends that are freely chosen and prioritized. The Good is found in activities that are considered personally meaningful. The society at large must be maintained and either benefited or not harmed by the individual's pursuit of the good. In the Perfectionistic Orientation, the Good Life is generalized to other persons. It is the self-fulfilled life, accomplished through developing and exercising one full capabilities and increasing one's understanding of the self and others, to the benefit of the self and the society. In the Hedonistic Orientation, the Good Life is viewed relativistically. It is the enjoyed life, but what is to be enjoyed is defined individualistically. Minimally, it is one in which the individual can be comfortable and maintain his or her "life style" without harming others.

Stage Five: Autonomy

The Good Life is conceptualized from a rational, consistent (equilibrated), generalizable or universal framework of values. The Good Life is expressed through values that are constructed autonomously, considered worthy for persons in general, and are judged so by universal or generalizable standards. Values are consistent with one another in a consciously constructed ethical system. Intrinsic and extrinsic values are differentiated and life goals focus on the former. Good Work and intimate relationships are prevalent values and the interdependence of all persons is acknowledged. The Good Life for the self and the Good Life for society are either considered synonymous or dealt equitably with general moral principles. In the Perfectionistic Orientation, The Good Life is achieved through activities that express the development of meaning and autonomy, while maintaining a deep connection with the society, world, or universe. In the Hedonistic Orientation, the Good Life is the life of peace and pleasure achieved through thought and knowledge.

STAGE ONE

At this stage, the child does not have an articulated set of value criteria nor is the rational distinguished from the irrational in his or her judgment of the Good; realistic or possible occurrences are not distinguished from logically impossible ones. In addition, only ends are considered, not the means for their attainment, nor the possible ensuing consequences of those ends. What is Good are those material objects and physical activities perceived to provide pleasure to the self. The Good is synonymous with the desired. ["I would have my birthday every day." "I would like to live on another planet," etc.]

When asked why such a life would be good, the typical response at stage one is "I don't know." Also frequent are inversions of the previous response, e.g., "cause then you wouldn't have your birthday everyday." This phenomena indicates a lack of consciously constructed evaluative criteria.

There are also no distinctions made between ideas of physical pleasure, happiness, contentment, and the like.

The Good Life at stage one is unpopulated with other persons as independent selves and, in general, other people are rarely mentioned. [Are there other people in the Good Life?] "You know in school...I like recess and I love to play in the park." [Is it important to have other people?] "Yes...well...only if they would
be nice to you."]

STAGE TWO

As its name implies, a major advance of stage two over stage one can be found in the individual's ability to think instrumentally about achieving his or her Good Life. Therefore, in addition to conceptions of desired consequences or ends for the Good Life (as at stage one), individuals at stage two consider the means by which they can achieve them. To do so, individuals at this stage contemplate other individuals' interests, motives, and intentions, as well as external physical and socio-environmental conditions. What characterizes these means, however, is their concrete and instrumental quality. Others are considered as separate persons with their own interests, but the focus at stage two is on how others can serve the self's needs. Thus, in contrast to stage one, other people are an important aspect of the Good Life because they are seen as means by which the self serves his or her ends. [ "(In the Good Life)...you have to be able to get along with people, and you have to have people that you can depend on for things, somebody that can help you."] In general, the evaluative criteria in judging the Good Life at stage two, then, are the self's concrete wants, needs and interests. There is no critical evaluation of these needs and interests in terms of their worth as values. To be pursued.

Due to the concrete quality of stage two reasoning, concepts, symbols, or ideas are typically relegated to fact. Descriptions of the Good Life are often made up of a list of simplistic "labels," the value of which is assumed to be of an absolute or factual nature. Since the relative aspects of such judgments are ignored, subjects at stage two see little need to qualify or justify their judgments. ["The Good Life is having friends, being rich, and having freedom to do what you want." ] [Why is that Good?] "What do you mean? Everyone wants friends and money and you have to be able to do what you want to do!"

When they do attempt to justify them, such justifications have a concrete or superficial quality. ["If you're rich, then you are very popular." "It's good to be a doctor 'cause all doctors are rich."] Thus, although the conception of a self with particular wants and needs is clear at stage two, the conception is egoistic. There are no formal criteria with which to judge the relative worth of different wants.

Conceptions of The Good at stage two are more differentiated as well as more realistic than stage one's dream-like conceptions. Affiliation ["friends"..."someone to play with", "parents who love me","...people to take care of me."], material wealth ["a beautiful house..." ..."money"], and freedom ["freedom to do what I want to do...." "...Not having people supervising me or telling me what to do"] constitute one's Good Life. Where at stage one Good was equated to physicalistic pleasure, stage two individuals differentiate between physicalistic and mental experience, thus distinguishing between pleasure and happiness; that is, there appears to be an initial distinction between happiness, as an in-depth, long-term phenomenon and pleasure, as a short-term experience.

STAGE THREE

At stage three, there is a dramatic shift from the Good that serves the self (stage 2) to the Good that is mutually shared by the self and others. Where the individual reasoning at stage two views others primarily as a means to fulfilling the self's wants and needs, stage three reasoners see others as an integral part of the Good Life concept. Further, individuals at stage three require mutuality in relationship and consensus in valuing. Consensual or conventional valuing, however, does not necessarily mean the adoption of societal norms and values, although this is often the case. Individuals reasoning at stage three tend to take on the norms and values of the group with whom they are affiliated; the group itself could be anti-social as easily (though less commonly) as one that holds socially approved norms and values.

The centrality of mutual affiliation and interaction in the Good Life is the hallmark of stage three. The value placed on affiliation, however, is not for the sole purpose of fulfilling the self's needs (as at stage two). For the stage three individual, mutuality in relationships is paramount in the Good Life. ["It is most important to have someone that you can love and who can reciprocate that love." "The Good Life is...being with people...the stimulation of having people that you like and care about and enjoy...That's life to me...life is people."]

Moving beyond the general distinction between happiness and pleasure apparent at stage two, individuals who reason at stage three attend to the form of happiness itself. "Happiness" has a distinct meaning. It is defined in terms of affective contentment. ["Happiness is feeling good about your life." "The Good Life is feeling happy and that means feeling good about yourself and your family."] There is also a sense in which happiness, or the Good Life in general, can be defined by the absence of certain negative affective states or experiences such as loss, crisis, loneliness, fear, anxiety, worry, and stress. ["The Good Life and happiness are the same thing: no worries...especially financial...no problems that can create stress."] Further, there is now a distinction between the desired and the desirable. Some values that might be upheld on the criterion of simple desire are rejected as "bad values."

At stage three, personality is also a major component. A "good personality" is part of the Good Life, consisting of specific, virtuous traits, e.g., being happy, having a good disposition, a positive outlook, etc. Thus, where at stage two, there is a separate self that can evaluate, based on wants and needs, at stage three, there is a consistent and complex personality structure that produces unique interests. The activities of the Good Life must be matched with these interests, acting to fulfill the self.

While stage three reasoners are predominantly socially oriented, their responses generally lack references to the larger society--the social environment outside of their immediate social milieu.

STAGE FOUR

Reasoning about the Good at stage four differs markedly from that at stage three. Where at stage three the origin of norms and values is in group approval, consensus, or stereotypical virtues, at stage four, the origin of value is the individuated self. The central feature of stage four is a concern with individualism. This is an orientation toward self-chosen values and the freedom to go against consensual norms, if necessary, to make choices about, and to pursue, the individual's vision of the Good Life. The Good Life at stage four is the meaningful, worthy, or valuable life, as viewed and evaluated by the self. What makes it so is the active pursuance and satisfaction of self-chosen ends, independent of others' beliefs or desires. ["The Good Life]...is being free to do what you think might bring you happiness...or awareness." "...It's very important to have something that you think is worthwhile to do."]

Extreme variability in individuals' values is affirmed. This awareness, however, is often coupled with a form of relativism in reasoning about the Good, particularly in the Hedonistic Orientation. Since everyone must choose their own Good, stage four reasoners often claim that "virtually anything can be of value," depending on who is evaluating it. Hence, when individuals are asked, "what is the Good Life?" they often spontaneously refuse to make any claim that a particular virtue, object, or consequence could be good for everyone. ["The Good Life?? I can only describe a Good Life for me personally." "The Good Life for me personally?...It is certainly a personal view...I don't think you can ever generalize 'good'."]
In the Perfectionistic Orientation, relativism is less prevalent. That is, the conception of the Good Life tends to be generalized to other persons to a larger extent. The focus remains, however, on the fulfilment and realization self’s chosen values, but the values themselves are considered to be less idiosyncratic. Further, there is an increased prevalence of “benefiting” rather than “maintaining” society. ["It is important to generate one’s own goals and to fulfill them...to function at one's fullest capacity. It would have to have some meaning for the society as well as the self."

In general, however, the way in which one is to benefit society is still viewed as relative to the individual.

Thus, stage four reasoners have a clear conception of the "desireable." Criteria for "desireability" are not found in generally accepted virtues (as at stage three), but in internalized values, viewed as relative to each individual.

It is in contrast to subjects at all previous stages that stage four subjects refer spontaneously to the society at large. In general, there is a concern that the pursuance of one’s good life at least not harm, and should probably benefit, the general society. There seems to be an inconsistency, however, in this concern. Individuals at this stage often argue simultaneously that one should pursue whatever they chose to pursue and that one should do something "useful to society," without recognizing that these two ends might conflict. ["...Good work should first be doing something that you feel is right for you, that you really want to do and enjoy doing. Second, it should be of some value to society."

Differing from the stage three identification of happiness with affective contentment, stage four reasoners distinguish between various forms of happiness, such as fulfillment, worthiness, satisfaction, contentment, and sensual pleasure. These experiences are not only distinguished, but are seen as ends that are freely chosen and pursued. Moreover, where individuals reasoning at stage three emphasize "security" as absence of worry or anxiety, individuals reasoning at stage four emphasize the maintenance of one’s lifestyle through self-sufficiency. ["It is important to know that if some crisis comes up, you can continue living your Good Life...you have to feel that you have control over that."]

STAGE FIVE

At stage five there appears a "prior-to-individual-values" perspective, that is, individuals must construct what is of value independent of social, historical, and personal norms. Thus, value is something that must be perceived and constructed by each individual but, in contrast to stage four, individuals at stage five employ generalizability, universality, and/or intrinsicality, rather than individualism, as criteria of value. Thus, at this stage, the salience is not placed in the choosing of values, as at stage four, but rather in the construction and perception of the worth of the values themselves as judged by standards. ["(ultimate value) doesn’t have to be supernatural as far as I’m concerned, it can be observed in persons and in nature."] The focus is on those traits, objects, processes, or states that hold objective or intrinsic value, and on the obligation to uphold those values once recognized. ["I would say the Good Life involves a commitment to the advancement of life and man." "Why is that good?" Well, frankly, there are few things of ultimate value. Many other things do not appear to be of any real or essential value."

Distinct from subjects at all previous stages, stage five reasoners have constructed a principled ethical view of an ideal human world, in which morality is a precondition for goodness. ["In the Good Life, everyone would first have the opportunity, not just the right, to fulfill their potential."]

The ethical view embodies a reconstruction of their value system such that they can resolve some of the inconsistencies, or ethical dilemmas, apparent in stage four reasoning. For example, the value relativism of stage four is rejected. Subjects reasoning at stage five tend to exhibit a spontaneous, universal perspective, identifying certain minimal values that they claim should be values for everyone, while others might differ. These subjects acknowledge the uniqueness of individuals while, at the same time, describe those elements of the Good Life that they claim are appropriate for all persons. ["In the ideal life, everyone would have, and take, the opportunity to participate in life to the fullest." "The Good Life is the progressive life...people must feel that they are moving forward..."] Thus, the potential conflict between the individual's pursuit of independent self-chosen values and the value of the society apparent at stage four is resolved through the stage five conception of society as a group made up of many similar selves. That is, although the individual and the society are clearly perceived to be distinct, the society is viewed as something of which all individuals are a part. Thus, at stage five, the good for the self and the good for the society are considered simultaneously and kept in balance. ["...people would see themselves in a context, that they are part of mankind and contributing something to it." "I feel it's a sort of a trade-off between self-satisfaction and service."

Another outcome of this reconstructed ethical view is a sense of value consistency within the self. At stage five, individuals have consciously constructed a rational, equilibrated value system, that is, a system of values that would be upheld by all persons, whatever else differed. ["I see myself as having certain values...but it took a lot thinking to have them. I had to decide which values to live by...and you need to question those ideas...you need to think...what is of value, generally. Certain hedonistic or self-interest values that I once had I would now consider the 'bad life'."]

Differing from the stage four notion of maintaining one's lifestyle and the social system, stage five reasoners emphasize creativity and reconstruction in one's own life, as well as in society. This often manifests itself in responses concerning involvement with intellectual challenges and ideas, and the general [progression of knowledge. ["...the Good life would be the progression of knowledge and ideas...." "My happiness is found in being productive in the realm of ideas." "...the challenge of problems. This is most rewarding."]

Finally, in addition to the recognition of social interdependence, stage five reasoners accept a general condition of human frailty and the limits involved in the recognition of "truth". They also advocate the acceptance of paradox within the self, others, and nature.

This concludes the description of the general form of Good Life stages. In the present work, these general, structural organizations of reasoning about the Good are thought to underly the content specific stages of The Good Life, Good Work, Good Friendship, and The Good Person that are presented in the actual Good Life Scoring Manual (Sections VII-X).

Section: IV PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATIONS

This section introduces the scorer to Philosophical Orientations. In the actual scoring procedures, Philosophical Orientations are assessed in the same data used for stage scoring. The assessment of individuals' Philosophical Orientation has three major purposes. First, it provides a way to classify content, making the identification of structures of reasoning more plausible. Second, the identification of Philosophical Orientations allows for the investigation of individual differences in valuing within stage. Finally, identifying the Philosophical Orientations that subjects use provides the data to test the hypothesis that adult subjects construct ethical philosophies similar in form and content to those of traditional
ethical philosophers.

A Philosophical Orientation is a consistent framework of end-values or Value Elements that individuals refer to when supporting Good Life choices. A Philosophical Orientation is both normative ethical and metaethical. It is normative ethical in the sense that it defines particular values as intrinsic, terminal, or "end-values," as opposed to instrumental, or "means-values." It is metaethical in the sense that it can also identify supportive arguments, such as a theory of human nature, in the justification of these end-values.

From a structural-developmental perspective, Philosophical Orientations are thought to consist of a combination of content and structure. They are ways of thinking that are considered somewhat beyond the superficiality of surface content, but that still retain an aspect of individual value reasoning that the Good Life Stages do not. Thus, the same Philosophical Orientation can be found at various stages.

It has been claimed in this work that ethical conceptions of the Good Life can be ultimately supported or justified by metaethical ideas and beliefs concerning the ultimate aims of persons, which results in metaethical theories\(^\text{37}\) (implicit or explicit) of human nature. The Good Life stages described in section four do not themselves represent these theories. The clusters of Value Elements that represent a Philosophical Orientation do not determine a particular stage. Rather, these theories are constructed through stage structures and are manifested in Orientations. Thus, the stage provides the necessary foundation upon which both the normative ethical and the metaethical aspects of Philosophical Orientations are constructed. As certain forms of physical or natural phenomena represent the content of cognitive structures in a Piagetian model, Value Elements represent the content of Good Life structures.

Since all of these Value Elements represent content, more than one set of them (a Philosophical Orientation) can be constructed with the structure of a Good Life stage. Hence, Philosophical Orientations represent different ways of organizing end-values, independent of stage.

Two or more Orientations are thought to be possible at a given stage. As stated above, Philosophical Orientations differ most by their underlying Value Elements concerning the ultimate ends of persons. In a preliminary, spontaneous response, different individuals using different Orientations could rely on similar Norms in making ethical judgments. When probed as to the values that underly such ethical judgments, however, such responses can reveal different end-values. For example, note a preliminary response that consists of the idea that the Good Life mainly consists of those activities or experiences that are chosen by the self [Issue: Good Life; Norm: Choice] and provide happiness. Such a response, when probed could reveal the belief that humans, in general, are basically pleasure-seeking; choosing one’s own activity results in the most happiness or enjoyment [Issue: Good Life; Norm: Choice; Element: Happiness/Enjoyment]. Thus, one can infer that such a response reveals the belief that individual pleasure is the ultimate human good.

In contrast, the same preliminary response, when probed, could be supported by the notion that the ultimate human good is autonomy in choice and that activities that work toward or actualize this are good in themselves [Issue: Good Life; Norm: Choice; Element: Upholding Autonomy. Human autonomy might not bring an individual pleasure per se but, nevertheless, it is the essential component of the Good Life. This is a partial example of the general distinction between the Hedonistic and Perfectionistic Orientation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modal Elements--Normative Order</th>
<th>Perfectionism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. (Obeying/Consulting)</td>
<td>20. (10) Upholding Character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Blaming/Approving</td>
<td>21. (11) Upholding Selfrespect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. (Retributing/Exonerating)</td>
<td>22. (12) Serving Social Ideal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Having a right</td>
<td>23. (13) Serving Human Dignity/5. Having a Duty Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Character</td>
<td>25. Upholding Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Efficiency/Probability</td>
<td>27. Upholding Intrinsic Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Good reputation</td>
<td>28. Fully Functioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Seeking reward/avoiding punishment</td>
<td>29. Inner Harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Seeking pleasure</td>
<td>30. Meaningfulness/Worthiness</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Excitement/stimulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Personal Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. (8) Good/Bad Individual Consequences</td>
<td>34. (10) Role-taking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Happiness/Enjoyment</td>
<td>35. (11) Reciprocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. (9) Good/bad group consequences</td>
<td>36. (12) Maintaining Equity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Happiness/Contentment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Happiness/Satisfaction</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The particular Value Elements, or end-values that make up an Orientation are duplicated here in Table 5 from Section II. The first two categories of Value Elements, Classical Hedonism (egoistic) and Hedonism (social), comprise two Philosophical Orientations. They are similar in that they both emphasize the pleasureable consequences to the self or to others of any particular action, object, or choice. However, the Egoistic form of Classical Hedonism focuses on the pleasure consequences of one or another particular individual. Moreover, the egoistic form emphasizes sensory pleasure and happiness in terms of enjoyment, stimulation, and the like. The social form focuses on the pleasure consequences to a group, institution, society, culture, etc. The social form tends to emphasize happiness in terms of contentment and satisfaction.

The second category of Value Elements comprises the Perfectionism Orientation. Perfectionism is concerned with the expression or realization of the self and the perfection of that self and other selves, or the perfection or realization of a particular community, society, or world as an end in itself.

There are subgroups within Perfectionism as well. Functionalism emphasizes the fully functioning individual or the fully lived life, often drawing attention to the perfection of talents and capacities. Progressivism advocates the continuous development of individuals or general progress toward no fixed end. Unitarianism upholds perfecting the awareness of the human connection to God, Nature, and/or the Cosmos.

The sub-groups of Perfectionism are not always easily discernible as are social and egoistic Hedonism. They are identified by particular Norm/Element combinations used repeatedly throughout a protocol. These Norm/Element combinations are identified through matches procedures in the scoring manual.

The third category of Value Elements represents the Fairness
Orientation and is almost identical to Colby & Kohlberg's (1984) deontological grouping. These deontological Value Elements form justifications of morally right action. However, some subjects rely partly on these Value Elements in their discussion of the Good Life.

In sum, the Philosophical Orientations found in this study can be broadly classified by either Hedonism or Perfection. Within these two categories, the following distinctions are made:

**HEDONISM:**
- Classical (egoistic)
- Social

**PERFECTIONISM:**
- Functionalism
- Unitarianism
- Progressivism

The empirical construction of the Orientations relied on the philosophical schools of thought in the initial chapters of this work and the Norm and Value Element model of value classification discussed in the section two.

### SCORING MANUAL CONSTRUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The Good Life, Good Work, and Good Friendship scoring manuals that follow this section were constructed from the longitudinal data of 16 construction cases, each of which contain two interviews conducted four years apart. The Good Person scoring manual was constructed from cross-sectional data collected in the second interview round. To construct the structural stage descriptions, responses were first categorized by Issue, Norm, and Value Element. This procedure has the major purpose of holding content constant in order to better identify structure. This procedure was attempted most stringently in the construction of the general stages of reasoning about The Good. In the process of constructing those stages, the goal was to strip the stages of content to the highest degree possible. Once general structures were identified, they were tested by the four criteria of a structural-developmental stage (Piaget, 1960).

In the construction of the Content Domain stages (Good Life, Good Work, Good Friendship, and Good Person), the same construction cases and the same procedures were attempted, but less stringently. The process was less strict in order to allow for the value content of the Issue to be apparent. For these stages, a bootstrapping, or back and forth process was used between the general, more structural, stages of The Good and the value content associated with those structures in Issue-specific interview data.

The general stages of The Good focus on the structures of evaluative reasoning, that is, processes of evaluation, without providing much in the way of what people actually value. The Issue-specific stages focus on the criteria individuals use in evaluating the specific Issue under consideration.

From the Issue specific stage descriptions, Value Criteria were developed for each stage. The Value Criteria (VCs) represent distinct criteria of value. A criterion of value is a positive standard or condition that must be met for the individual to consider something valuable or Good. Whenever possible, "absence of" type criteria were avoided. The Focus of the VCs is on value, that is, what the subject thinks is valuable. Stage scoring is accomplished by matching value criteria found in interview material to the VCs at each stage.

Often, as the Issue-specific stage descriptions increase in length through the stages, the number of VCs also increase. At the higher stages, individuals' evaluation processes are not only more complex, but also include a wider range of aspects to which such processes are applied. In addition, higher stage interviews simply contain more material. Indeed, there are very few VCs at the lowest stage. At that stage, there was difficulty extracting the value reasoning from other aspects of reasoning, particularly social cognition and social perspective-taking. This can be explained theoretically by examining the nature of valuing at the lower stages in general and, particularly, at stage one. There is an absence at that stage of a conception or idea of good, or value, that has absolute (non-reducible) qualities. Much of the source of value is perceived to be external to the self and given. Thus, there is little questioning of other's values particularly those of authorities. There appears no need to evaluate in the strict sense within the self.

In general, the individual's evaluative processes develop through the stages, becoming more complex themselves, more differentiated from other processes and, thus, more autonomous.

The philosophical Orientations were constructed through an analysis of the clusters of Norms/Element combinations first generated by the construction sample and later complemented by the experimental sample. These sets of values were analyzed and compared to sets found in traditional ethical theories. The clusters were found to be consistent with these theories and, thus, represent major schools of thought in ethical philosophy.

What follows is a detailed explanation of the scoring procedures for both stage and Philosophical Orientation assessment.

### Section VI SCORING PROCEDURES AND RULES

Scoring for Good Life stage is a standardized procedure for assigning stage scores to value judgments in response to Good Life questions. This chapter describes the procedures and rules for scoring Good Life Protocols. The first section introduces Good Life stage scoring. The second section describes scoring for Philosophical Orientation.

#### STAGE SCORING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Scorable Material</th>
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Before embarking on specific Good Life stage scoring procedures, it is helpful to first map out the territory to be scored. A description of the general nature of data to be considered clarifies the scoring process.

First it is useful to distinguish between scorable and non-scorable material. In scoring Good Life judgments, that is, subjects' reasoning about the Good Life--social cognition, moral character, or "ego development" is not being assessed, nor is some degree of philosophical sophistication. Material that is scorable must meet the following three criteria:

1. **The judgment must be normative.** It must assert that some value is ethically salient, i.e., good/bad, right/wrong, etc. This excludes discussions of what one would like in certain circumstances, and sociological, theoretical, or political analyses that do not refer directly to the subject's value judgments.

2. **The judgment must have reasons.** It must offer a reason or justification for the value upheld. For example, the statement, "materialism is bad" offers no reason and cannot be stage scored.

3. **The judgment must be accepted as valid to the subject.** It must be, in fact, his or her judgment of value. This would exclude statements describing what the subject takes to be
the socially acceptable value or norm, e.g., "I guess most people would value a good marriage." This criterion also excludes discussions of the values of persons admired by the subject unless they are taken as his or her own and justified as in criterion #2.

II. Content Domains

There are four content domains to be scored. Each content domain is represented by an Issue (as discussed in section two). They are Good Life, Good Work, Good Friendship, and Good Person. Each Issue is scored independently, in this order. The first step is to separate the material for each content domain by reading over the entire protocol and marking Issue-specific material. Although most of this task is accomplished by simply locating the interviewer's question concerning the particular Issue, sometimes Issue material is found that does not correspond to the initial interview question. The following example illustrates the procedure for such ambiguous cases:

**Question:** [What is the Good Life?]

The Good Life would have to involve Good Work.

[Why is that Good?]

Good Work is important because it allows you to feel productive.

In this example, the subject spontaneously brings up the Issue of Good Work in response to the Good Life question. The interviewer probes the response and the subject gives her justification of a Work Issue value. Thus, this material would be placed under the Work Issue. Contrast this with the following example:

**Question:** [What is the Good Life?]

The Good Life would have to involve Good Work.

[Why is that Good?]

Because, in the Good Life, I would want to be active... Even in the Good Life, I wouldn't want to sit around.

Similar to the previous example, this subject spontaneously brings up the Issue of Good Work. However, when probed by the interviewer, the subject gives her justification of a Good Life Issue value, that of activity. In the second example, Good Work is seen as a means (probably among many) that would support the Good Life value. This material would remain under the Good Life Issue. This can be an ambiguous distinction. But in most cases, Issue material corresponds to Issue questions.

III. Identifying Scorable Interview Judgments

Within the Issue material that has been identified, scorable Interview Judgments (IJs) are now identified. Each interview judgment follows the form outlined in Section II, and meets the criteria stated above for scorable material. An interview judgment consists of a normative ethical judgment about the Issue. It contains a Norm and at least a Modal Element, if not a Value Element.

IV. Matching procedures

Each stage, within an Issue, contains a general structural definition of reasoning about The Good at that stage, an Issue-specific definition of reasoning at that stage, Value Criteria (VCs) that are manifested at that stage, and examples of the ways in which the VCs are manifested in responses. Probably the most difficult task in scoring is matching Issue-specific interview judgments to the Value Criteria (VC) at each stage. Assuming that all Issue-specific IJs have been identified in a protocol, the first step in actual stage scoring is to make a tentative stage assessment of the material within an Issue. This is accomplished in two ways. The first is through a familiarity with the general stage descriptions and discussion in Section III of this manual and then by reading the general and Issue-specific stage descriptions at each stage until a tentative assessment appears reasonable. The second step is to identify matches between the interview judgment (IJ) and the specific VCs at a particular stage. In attempting to locate matches between IJs and VCs, the scorer is aided by examples that show some ways in which the VCs are typically manifested in protocol data.

The careful evaluation of proposed IJ-VC correspondences is not only most crucial, but is also the point at which most unreliability arises. There are two sorts of problems that a scoring scheme of this nature is vulnerable to. The first was already mentioned above, that of defining the appropriate unit of analysis. The second is the inherent subjectivity and unreliability of purely structural stage assessment. The VCs attempt to minimize subjectivity by defining criteria concretely and by demonstrating in examples some of the surface features that are required of a response in order to consider it a match for any particular stage. This is to be contrasted with a system in which only a formal structural definition of a stage is offered and the scorer must infer that structure directly from interview material.

Unfortunately, too great a reliance on matching of concretely defined surface features would result in another problem. This is the structural invalidity that can occur when scores are based only on surface similarities. In an attempt to minimize such invalidity, a description of the general, underlying stage structure is included at each stage in the manual. Interview material is not considered a match for any stage unless it manifests both a concrete and specific similarity and a deeper structural consistency with the structural stage description. The three phases of evaluation of IJ-VC correspondences are summarized below.

1. **Tentative Assessment.** Using the general stage descriptions provided in Section III, and those provided within each Issue, the scorer makes a tentative estimate of the stage of the interview material.

2. **Surface Evaluation.** For each IJ-VC correspondence, an evaluation is made as to whether the material manifests VCs for that stage (i.e., clearly present, ambiguously present, absent).

3. **Structural Evaluation.** The scorer evaluates whether the structural significance of the judgment corresponds to the structural definition for that stage.

V. Stage Scoring

As IJ-VC correspondences are identified, tick marks (III) are placed in the appropriate VC squares on the score sheet. All possible IJ-VC matches are noted on the score sheet. It is necessary to score all scorable material under an Issue in order to insure against assigning a single stage score to a subject whose reasoning may be transitional or "mixed" between two or more stages. If the same VC is manifested repeatedly, this is also noted on the score sheet. However, a VC only counts for 1 in terms of Stage Scoring, no matter how many times it is manifested within an Issue.
VI. Guess Scores

Sometimes, a IJ within an Issue is not fully elaborated and the IJ-VC match is somewhat ambiguous. It is also possible that the judgment itself is clear, but there is no VC available for a good match. If either of these cases occurs a Guess score (e.g., GI) for that VC is entered in the appropriate VC square on the score sheet. A VC identification is not required on every Issue, however. If there is value judgment material present, but there is ambiguity as to its capacity for even a single, marginal IJ-VC match, a Guess stage score is entered in the stage score square for that Issue (e.g., G3).

Guess scoring is particularly reliant on a familiarity with stage structures. In Guessing, the Structural Evaluation phase of scoring (page 70) becomes essential. Whether a IJ-VC correspondence is ambiguous or if there are no IJ-VC matches at all, Guess scores are used only when the scorer is confident that the IJ corresponds to the stage structure description for that stage. If there is no tenable IJ-VC correspondence, that is merely noted on the score sheet.

VII. Within-Issue Stage Scores

After IJ-VC matches are attained within an Issue, a stage score is calculated. If the VCs within an Issue are at the same stage, no calculation is necessary. The stage is merely noted in the within-Issue stage square on the score sheet. If the VCs are at different stages, the stage score for that Issue is assigned as follows: The stage with the largest proportion of VCs (not counting repeated matches of the same VC) is the major stage. If a second stage has received at least 25% of the total VCs, it is entered as a minor stage in parentheses (e.g., 4(3)). If two remaining stages exceed 25% of the total VCs, two minor stages are listed in parentheses in order of the proportion of VCs assigned to the stages (e.g., 4(3)(5)).

If two (or more) stages are assigned an exactly equal number of VCs, they are listed as transitional (e.g., 3/4).

VIII. Total and Global Scores

Total and Global stage scores are calculated in an identical fashion, with one exception. The total score combines the stage scores from the Issues Work, Friendship, and Person. The global score combines all four Issues. These scores are calculated as follows: Each within-Issue full stage score is given 3 points. A Guess score is given 1 point. In a mixed stage score, each of the stages receives 1.5 points (e.g., 4/5: 4 = 1.5, 5 = 1.5). Similar to the within-Issue scores, the stage with the largest proportion of points is the major stage. If a second stage has received at least 25% of the total points, it is entered as a minor stage in parentheses (e.g., 4(3)). If two stages exceed 25% of the total points, two minor stages are listed in parentheses in order of the proportion of points assigned to the stages (e.g., 4(3)(5)). If two (or more) stages are assigned an exactly equal number of points, they are listed as transitional (e.g., 3/4).

IX. Ethical Maturity (EMS) and Total Quantitative Scores

To calculate quantitative scores, the stage number is multiplied by the number of points that stage has received. These products are summed, divided by the total number of assigned points, and then multiplied by 100.

X. Spontaneous Issues (Good Life Issue only)

Spontaneous Issues refer to specific content Issues that are spontaneously brought up by the subject in response to the Good Life question only. They are not used for stage scoring purposes. During stage scoring, the scorer is simply to list on the score sheet which of the content Issues (i.e., Friendship, Work, Person) are mentioned by the subject while responding to the Good Life question.

PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATIONS

Philosophical Orientations are assessed independently of a subject's particular stage. The theoretical components of Philosophical Orientations were described in detail in section four. There it was described how Philosophical Orientations are operationalized through categories of Value Elements, or by specific Norm/Element combinations. Table 5 is presented below as a reference table for the scorer.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE ELEMENTS FOR ASSESSING PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism (egoistic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Good Reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Seeking Pleasure</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. (10) Upholding Character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. (13) Serving Human Dignity/Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. (12) Upholding Harmony/Unity {U}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To assess Philosophical Orientation, the scorer identifies the end-values, or Value Elements in IJ units. Philosophical Orientation is assessed primarily in the Good Life and Good Work content domains. The scorer identifies Value Elements in the VCs that were matched to IJs and finds correspondences with the Philosophical Orientation categories in Table 5. The first step is to generally distinguish between the Hedonistic and Perfectionistic Orientations. Referring to Table 5, the Hedonistic Value elements focus on individual or social pleasure and the Perfectionistic Value Elements focus on perfecting or on the progression of other values as ends in themselves. As can be seen in Table 5, Egoistic Hedonism focuses on the pleasures of the self or the individual, whereas Social Hedonism focuses on the pleasures of the group or society. Similarly, Perfectionism can be divided into sub-categories. As discussed in section IV, these sub-categories as not as easily discernable as those of Hedonism. Perfection {progressivism} centers on development or progression, toward no fixed end. In contrast, Perfectionism {functionalism} emphasizes the perfecting of persons' talents and capacities. Finally, Perfectionism {unity} focuses on humans' realization of their place in the order of nature or in relation to God.
The Perfectionism sub-categories are only partially identified Table 5 because in many cases the same Value Elements can be used in different sub-categories depending on the way they are used, that is, different Norm/Element combinations. When possible, these sub-groups Norm/Element combinations are identified in the VCs themselves. If there is a match on a VC that has an identified Orientation, then the Orientation for that judgment is known. Otherwise the scorer has to rely on the identified Value Elements on Table 5.

The fairness Value Elements are rarely used alone in justifying Good Life judgments, but some are often used in higher stage responses. To be used as a sufficient orientation would be to say that any life is the Good Life as long as it is just. Typically, if used at all, justice is only one component, or a pre-condition of the Good Life. Other values, from the Hedonistic or Perfectionistic Orientation are typically used in conjunction with fairness values.

In the sample from which this manual was constructed, Philosophical Orientations could only be clearly determined in stages four and five. All stage one and two protocols were Hedonistic and most stage three's appeared to have ambiguous or mixed Orientations. This is not a definitive statement, however.

In addition to the Elements table itself and the Orientations identified in some VCs, the stage three, four, and five descriptions within Good Life, Good Work, and Good Person include general distinctions between Hedonistic and Perfectionistic Orientations and the examples demonstrate the way Orientation can be identified.

Assessing Philosophical Orientation clearly involves more clinical procedures than does stage scoring. Subjects do use Value Elements from more than one orientation. Thus, no hard and fast rule can be applied. However, the scorer is to assess the major orientation, discernable by the subject's greater use of a particular category of Value Elements. Within-Issue Orientations (when possible) and Global Orientations are to be noted in the appropriate space on the score sheet.

**Good Life**

The good life consists of physicalistic and sensory experiences that gratify the self's desires and realize the self's fantasies. There is no conception of specific criteria for valuing. Thus, the good life is synonymous with the desired life, without consideration of the self's or others' real capacities or of behavioral consequences. Doing good is undifferentiated from having good experiences. The good life and the bad life, and any of its contents are completely dichotomized and simplistically labeled in terms of surface attributes, e.g., "nice," "pretty," "clean," etc. No distinction is made among happiness, contentment, satisfaction, and pleasure.

At this stage, the child does not possess a conscious set of value criteria. Nor is the rational distinguished from the irrational in the child's judgment of the good; realistic or possible occurrences are not distinguished from impossible ones. In addition, only ends are considered, not the means for their attainment, nor the possible consequences of those ends. What is perceived to be good are those material objects and physical activities that provide pleasure to the self. The good is synonymous with the desired: "I would have my birthday every day." "I would like to live on another planet," etc.

When asked why such a life would be good, the child at Stage 1 typically replies "I don't know." Also frequent are inversions of the previous response, for example, "cause then you wouldn't have your birthday everyday." This phenomena indicates an absence of consciously constructed evaluative criteria. Also, no distinction is made between physical pleasure, happiness, contentment, and the like.

Also absent from the conception of the good life at Stage 1 are other persons as independent selves. In fact, other people are rarely mentioned by subjects: [Are there other people in the good life?] "You know in school...I like recess and I love to play in the park." [Is it important to have other people around in the good life?] "Yes...well...only if they would be nice to you."

**Stage 2: Instrumental Hedonism**

The good consists of those activities, objects, and persons that serve the individual's needs and interests, both emotional and material. There is a consistent conception of the good life that includes concrete considerations both of the self's and others' motives and intentions and the contemplation of consequences of behavior. There is no distinction made, however, between the "desired" and the "desirable" (that which is worthy of being desired). There is an instrumental need for others, manifested in a conscious desire to be praised, liked, cared for, and helped. Simultaneously, a desire for independence, egoistic freedom, and power is also prevalent. Socially approved "goods" are affirmed simplistically, or evaluated in terms of their surface features. There is the beginning of a distinction between happiness and pleasure.

As its name implies, a major advance of Instrumental Hedonism over Egoistic Hedonism can be found in the individual's ability to think instrumentally about achieving the good life for him or herself. Therefore, in addition to possessing conceptions of desired consequences or ends of the good life (as at Stage 1), individuals at Stage 2 consider the means by which they can achieve them. In considering these means, individuals at this stage contemplate other individuals' interests, motives, and intentions, as well as external physical and socio-environmental conditions. What characterizes these means, however, is their concrete and instrumental quality. Others are considered as separate persons with their own interests, but the focus at Stage 2 is on how others can serve the self's needs. Thus, in contrast to Stage 1, other people are an important aspect of the good life because they are seen as means by which the self serves its own ends: "[In the good life]...you have to be able to get along with people, and you have to have people that you can depend on for things, somebody that can help you." In general, the evaluative criteria in judging the good life at Stage 2, then, are the self's concrete wants, needs and interests. There is no critical evaluation of these needs and interests in terms of their worth as values.

Due to the concrete quality of Stage 2 reasoning, concepts, symbols, or ideas are typically relegated to fact. Descriptions of the good life are often made up of a list of simplistic "labels," the value of which is assumed to be of an absolute or factual nature. Since the relativistic aspects of such judgments are ignored, subjects at Stage 2 see little need to qualify or justify their judgments: "The good life is having friends, being rich, and having freedom to do what you want." When asked Why is that good? individuals at Stage 2 typically answer: "What do you mean? Everyone wants friends and money and you have to be able to do what you want to do!"

When individuals at this stage attempt to justify their judgments, such justifications tend to have a concrete or superficial quality: "If you're rich, then you are very popular." "It's good to be
a doctor 'cause all doctors are rich.' Thus, although the conception of the self with particular wants and needs is clear at Stage 2, the conception is egoistic. There are no formal criteria by which to judge the relative worth of different wants.

Conceptions of the good at Stage 2 are more differentiated as well as more realistic than the dream-like conceptions extant at Stage 1. Affiliation ("friends," "someone to play with," "parents who love me," "people to take care of me"); material wealth ("a beautiful house," "money"); and freedom ("freedom to do what I want to do..." "Not having people supervising me or telling me what to do") constitute one's good life. Whereas at Stage 1 good was equated to physicalistic pleasure, Stage 2 individuals differentiate between physicalistic and mental experience, thus distinguishing between pleasure and happiness; that is, there appears to be an initial distinction between happiness, as an in-depth, long-term phenomenon, and pleasure, as a short-term experience.

Stage 3: Altruistic Mutuality
Good is an affective sense of happiness or fulfillment, a result of positive, mutual interpersonal experience that is distinguished from pleasure. The good life is predominantly determined by affective experience, that is, what feels good; good is often determined by the absence of bad feelings. The good life consists of activities in accordance with stereotypical, interpersonal, and personal virtues, particularly those that help the self and/or others to feel good (be happier, more successful, etc.) and that promote mutuality between self and others in the immediate social environment.

At Stage 3, there is a dramatic shift from the good that serves the self (Stage 2) to the good that is mutually shared by the self and others. Whereas the individual who reasons at Stage 2 views others primarily as a means to fulfilling the self's wants and needs, Stage 3 reasoners see others as an integral part of the good life concept. Furthermore, individuals at Stage 3 require mutuality in relationships and consensus in valuing. The existence of consensual or conventional valuing, however, does not necessarily mean the adoption of societal norms and values, although this is often the case. Individuals reasoning at Stage 3 tend to take on the norms and values of the group with which they are most affiliated. Although the group itself may be anti-social, this is less common as affiliation to one that holds socially-approved norms and values.

The centrality of mutual affiliation and interaction in the good life is the hallmark of Stage 3. The value placed on affiliation, however, does not serve the sole purpose of fulfilling the self's needs, as at Stage 2. For the Stage 3 individual, mutuality in relationships is paramount in the good life: "It is most important to have someone that you can love and who can reciprocate that love." "The good life is...being with people...the stimulation of having people that you like and care about and enjoy...That's life to me...life is people."

Moving beyond the general distinction between happiness and pleasure apparent at Stage 2, individuals who reason at Stage 3 attend to the form of happiness itself. "Happiness" has a distinct meaning. It is defined in terms of affective contentment: "Happiness is feeling good about your life." "The good life is feeling happy and that means feeling good about yourself and your family." There is also a sense in which happiness, or the good life in general, can be defined by the absence of certain negative affective states or experiences such as loss, crisis, loneliness, fear, anxiety, worry, and stress: "The good life and happiness are the same thing: no worries...especially financial...no problems that can create stress." Moreover, there exists a distinction between the desired and the desirable. Some values that might be upheld on the criterion of simple desire are rejected as "bad values."

At Stage 3, a psychological conception of personality is a also a major component. A "good personality" is part of the good life, consisting of specific, virtuous traits—for example, being happy, having a good disposition, a positive outlook, etc. Thus, whereas at Stage 2, there is a separate self that can evaluate based on wants and needs, at Stage 3, there is a consistent and complex personality structure that produces distinctive interests. The activities of the good life must be matched with these interests, thus acting to fulfill the self.

While Stage 3 reasoners are predominantly socially oriented, their responses generally lack references to the larger society—the social environment outside of their immediate social milieu.

Relationship Between Good Life Stages and Moral Judgment Stages
Good life stages and moral judgment stages were found to be highly correlated with one another. Across the entire sample, the correlations were .95 in 1977 and .92 in 1981. In the adult sample (20+ years), the correlations were somewhat lower, .87 in 1977 and .86 in 1981. Nonparametric correlations on the stages themselves using the whole sample were slightly lower overall at .88 in both 1977 and 1981.

Table 15
Comparative Relation of the <, =, and the > relations of EMS to MMS Scores in 1977, 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>MMS &gt; EMS</th>
<th>EMS &gt; MMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>23(56%)</td>
<td>5(12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13(32%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>23(62%)</td>
<td>5(14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9(24%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in Table 15, it is a consistent trend for MMS to be higher than EMS, but this trend is inconclusive support for the hypothesis of a structural relationship. For this hypothesis to be supported, all scores with the exception of measurement error would fall in the the predicted relationship. The joint distribution of EMS and MMS scores at both test times is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.

Figure 4
Joint Distribution of EMS and MMS in 1977

Figure 5
Joint Distribution of EMS and MMS in 1981

These figures show a clear linear relationship between the two sets of scores.

Paired t-test revealed no significant differences in change scores between good life and moral judgment development over the four years. The difference scores on the two measures were correlated .74. Thus, in general, although the two measures are conceptually distinct, it appears that whatever affects attainment and change in one construct also does so in the other.

Age Variables
Stage Attainment

Using age as an independent variable is problematic, particularly when studying a sample that includes ages representative of the entire life-span (Baltes, Reese & Nesselroade, 1977). When including the entire sample, age and good life stage scores were correlated .67 (p = .000) in 1977 and .68 (P = .000) in 1981; age and moral judgment stage scores were correlated .63 and .47 in 1977 and 1981, respectively. Stage attainment in both good life and moral judgment stages increased as a linear function of the natural log of age. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the relationship between stage attainment and age in the good life and moral judgment in 1977 and 1981. The strength of this relationship decreases as age increases and comes close to but never below zero over the life-span.

While, in general, increased age is associated with higher stages of reasoning, the strength of the relationship attenuates as one moves through the life cycle. Only in the youngest age group (5-13 years in

Figure 6
Good Life and Moral Judgment Stage Attainment with Age in 1977

Figure 7
Good Life and Moral Judgment Stage Attainment with Age in 1981

1977) was there a relatively stable relation between age and stage in all subjects (age and stage attainment correlated approximately .82 in good life and moral judgment at both test times). But, even in that group, the variation in stage attainment was high as can be seen in Figures 6 and 7, above.

Good Life and Moral Judgment Stages

The distribution of the good life and moral judgment stages, in general, and the mean stage of the adult group, in particular, was somewhat unexpected. All studies that include education as a variable report it as a highly salient factor in development to higher stages (Walker, 1982). Although the present sample contains a much higher mean level of adult educational attainment (one year of graduate school) than the mean for the general population, the mean stage of 3/4 for adults is only slightly, if at all, higher than is typically reported.

As was noted, however, the range and distribution of scores must be taken into account. The 31 adults in this study demonstrated good life and moral judgment stages ranging from 2/3 to 5. The distribution of stages in both measures represents not only a wide range, but also a higher proportion of postconventional reasoning than that typically reported. In Kohlberg's longitudinal sample, for instance, only 10% of the moral reasoning demonstrated is postconventional even when the sample has reached the age of 36. In the present study, with its smaller sample, 23% of the adults have demonstrated good life stage scores at the postconventional level;

27% demonstrated post-conventional moral judgment stage scores.

It has been described how the relationship between good life and moral judgment stages is a linear one, but is not strictly of the necessary, yet insufficient form as elsewhere hypothesized (Armon, 1984). At the higher stages (4/5 and 5), however, this relationship becomes more prevalent. These findings support the hypothesis that evaluative reasoning about the good generally parallels prescriptive justice reasoning. The good life stages, however, do not appear to represent metaethical or metamoral theories that complement and go beyond moral judgment stages by providing meanings for morality, as has been implied by Kohlberg (1981). It is more likely that they represent problem-solving structural organizations that are related to moral and nonmoral values, and are distinct from justice structures. That is, they appear to represent structures similar to justice structures but ones residing in a different domain. This is supported, in particular, by the longitudinal data that show that the development of individuals in one sequence indicates development in the other, even though their respective scores on the two measures are significantly distinct.

Further research on this relationship is needed. A factor analysis, of the moral dilemma issue scores and the good life issue scores would be useful for the possible identification of an underlying factor that would account for the greatest variance in the two measures. In addition, a dilemma instrument for good life evaluative reasoning would not only make the two models more compatible, but it would also allow for further investigation of the structural nature of good life reasoning. (See Kohlberg & Armon, 1984, for a discussion of the relationship between an instrument and the identification of structure.)

Age Variables

Although age variables are useful in providing evidence the developmental hypotheses of the good life stage model, they provide only indirect evidence. All studies with structural-developmental outcome variables show very high correlations between stage and age in children, particularly in middle-class samples (see, for example, Selman, 1980; Colby, et al., 1983; Fowler, 1981; Kegan, 1982). Indeed, in these studies, age alone, or the mere passage of time, appears to be a significant factor in individuals' development, at least to Stage 3.

The degree of correspondence between stage and age, however, was observed to decrease through the life span in this study. If age alone were a truly determinative factor in development, the relationship to stage scores should remain relatively constant, if one controls for ceiling effects, such as innate capacity, for instance. One would then expect to find age and stage highly correlated until, say, age twenty-five, at which time not only the relationship, but also development would cease, similar to, but somewhat later than, physical maturation.

When adults were studied, however, age and stage were not found to be significantly correlated, but only older adults were found to have reached higher stages. Simply stated, some adults continued to develop, while others did not. Hence, although advancement in age is not a sure indicator of development to higher stages, it nonetheless is a necessary, but insufficient condition for such development.

Reviewing the reanalysis of the Kohlberg longitudinal data, Colby et al., (1983) report a .78 correlation between age and stage and a "monotonic increase" in stage development from age ten to 36. Since preadolescent and adolescent age groups were included,
This correlation does not necessarily enhance our understanding of the relationship between age and stage in adulthood. They show that, in the groups ranging from 20 to 36 years of age, (1) the proportion of reasoning at Stage 3/4 remains relatively constant, (2) stage 4 use increases from ages 20 to 36, and (3) Stage 4/5 use decreases from 20 to 36. Stage 5 is not represented in this group of findings (Table 20, Colby, et al., 1983). They also show in Figure 1 that, at age 36, 65% of the moral reasoning present in the sample occurs in individuals who are at Stage 4, 35% in those at Stage 3, and 8% in those at Stage 5. Finally, they report that consolidated Stage 4 reasoning is not present before age 20 and 4/5 is not present before age 24.

It therefore seems clear from these other findings that age advancement is not a significant predictor of stages in adulthood above Stage 3, despite the claims of high stage-age correlations made by Colby, et al. On the contrary, these findings can be interpreted in such a way to corroborate the findings presented here. It appears that some individuals in the Kohlberg sample, after the age of 20, have continued to develop while others have not, and that higher stages are indeed associated with older ages.

This interpretation has been strongly supported by the longitudinal good life stage change data. Since stage change and age were negatively correlated in all age groups sampled, including five to seven-year-olds, it can be concluded that age advancement alone is not a particularly determinative factor in stage change research.

One is drawn to speculate, then, on the identity of the microcausal variables in structural development, particularly beyond Stage 3. It has been shown that education is a highly significant factor in both good life stage attainment and stage change. This finding is paralleled in a number of studies. A particularly useful set of analyses has been performed by De Vos (1983) on Kohlberg's longitudinal sample. He first reports a .68 correlation between education and MMS, which is lower than, but consistent with, what has been reported here. He then reports results of regression analyses of justice reasoning stage and a number of socio-economic variables in which education had more affect on moral reasoning stage scores than did a subject's occupation, even when occupation was measured in terms of substantive complexity, rather than earnings. He further states that the affects of education on moral judgment development remain significant over and above all other traditional socioeconomic variables.

In a more speculative analysis of growth trajectories, De Vos reports an estimated relationship between moral judgment stage development and education such that each additional year of education is associated with an increase in rate of development by more than a half stage per 10 years, after adjustment has been made for IQ, initial moral reasoning, the original design factor, and the substantive complexity of the subject's father's job. This finding is of particular interest, given the direct relationship found in the present study between changes in good life and moral judgment stage scores and continued education.

Similarly, Colby et al. (1983) demonstrate that educational experience is related to moral judgment development beyond the association of education with IQ and SES (r = .26, with IQ and SES partialled out). They also report in their Table 23 the association between moral judgment stage attainment and levels of formal education for both working-class and middle-class adult groups. In either SES group, no subject has attained Stage 4 without some college education, nor Stage 4/5 without having completed college. Only 14% of the middle-class subjects and no working-class subjects have attained Stage 4/5 after completing college. Of those who completed a graduate degree, 33% of the working-class subjects and 50% of the middle-class subjects have attained Stage 4/5.

All of these findings point to a clear relationship between formal education and structural stage development. It appears that certain forms of structured intellectual stimulation are key factors in development. Further research is needed to investigate the relationship of various forms of education to structural-developmental change.

Section VII: GOOD LIFE MANUAL

STAGE ONE

THE GOOD LIFE: Egoistic Hedonism

The Good life consists of physicalistic and sensory experiences that gratify the self's desires and realize the self's fantasies. There is no conception of "desirable." Thus, the Good Life is synonymous with the desired life, without consideration of the self's or others' real capacities or behavioral consequences. Doing good is undifferentiated from having a good experience. The Good Life and The Bad Life can be determined by evaluations external to the self (parents, the law, etc). Good and Bad are completely dichotomized, i.e., they are considered mutually exclusive and are simplistically labeled in terms of "nice," "pretty," "clean," etc. There is no distinction between happiness, contentment, satisfaction, and pleasure.

Value Criteria for Good Life:

(1) Implicit or explicit reference to concrete wants as sole criterion. [Experience; Seeking Pleasure]

(2) Reference to simplistic, surface features of physical, environmental, sensory, materialistic, or experiential benefits for the self. [Experience; Seeking Reward]

(3) Reference to surface attributes as constituting good. [Life; Blaming/Approving]

Example 1: [What is the good life?]

There would be real green grass and nice houses everywhere and trees and pretty flowers and nice people.

[Why would nice people be part of the Good Life?] Because they would be nice to you.

[What is the bad life?] It would be all smoggy and dirty everywhere and people wouldn't be nice.

[What would that be like?] {The people} would be real mean.

Example 1 demonstrates VCs 1, 2 & 3. In this example, the idea that the self's desires are the sole criteria for value is implicit. This is due to the absence of any notion as to why one would want these things in the Good Life (VC 1). The idea that "nice people" would be important because "they would be nice to you" indicates experiential benefits to the self (VC 2). That the Good Life would include a concrete, physical environment of "real green grass," "nice houses," "trees," and "pretty flowers" coupled with the idea that the Good Life would be clean, pretty, and "nice," and the Bad Life would be "all
smoggy and dirty everywhere and people wouldn't be nice* demonstrates the stage one simplistic valuing and devaluing of surface attributes (VC 3).

Example 2: [What is the good life?]

I'm thinking real hard.....going on the revolution {roller coaster}.

[Would you do that all the time?]  
No, not all the time. I would like to have my birthday every day.

[Why would that be good?]  
Because you get presents every day.

[Do you think you would get tired of getting presents every day?]  
No.

[You might not have any space left in your room]  
That's o.k., I could sleep with mom.

The second example manifests VCs 1 & 2. Similar to the previous example, the self's desires appear to be the only reason to attach value to objects and experiences (VC 1). The notion that the Good Life consists of exciting physical or sensory experiences, "going on the Revolution" and would include getting "presents every day" focuses on physical and materialistic benefits to the self (VC 2).

STAGE TWO

THE GOOD LIFE: Instrumental Hedonism

The Good consists of those activities, objects, and persons that serve the individual's needs and interests, both emotional and material. There is a consistent conception of the Good Life that includes concrete considerations of both the self's and others' motives and intentions and the contemplation of consequences of behavior. There is no distinction made, however, between the "desired" and the "desirable" (that which is worthy of being desired). There is an instrumental need for others. This is manifested in a strong desire to be praised, liked, cared for, and helped. Simultaneously, a desire for independence, egoistic freedom, and power is also prevalent. Socially approved "goods" are affirmed simplistically, or evaluated in terms of their surface features. There is a beginning distinction between happiness and pleasure.

Value Criteria for Good Life:

(1) Reference to others in the context of serving self's needs and interests. [Affiliation; Good Individual Consequences]

(2) Reference to simplistic conceptions or attributes of social roles, relations, objects, or situations as good/bad (e.g., being rich, famous, a doctor, etc.), with no elaboration. [Role/Identity; Blaming/Approving]

(3) References to egoistic freedom (complete lack of restraints/restrictions), independence, or power (e.g., freedom to do what you want to do, etc.). [Freedom/Independence; Seeking Pleasure]

(4) Reference to activities that the self likes or prefers as sufficient justification for goodness. [Experience; Good Individual Consequences]

Example 1: [What is the Good Life?]

My life right here...I like being a middle-class family. Rich people are more known, more popular. If you're poor, hardly anyone knows you. But I wouldn't want to be rich because I think rich families get broken up because of striving for money, I like the way I am...that I have parents that love me, privacy, and friends. Also, I would like to do things that are independent. I don't like people telling me what to do, you know, "do this, do that."

[What is the bad life?]  
Not having any friends. Having separated parents. Having to share your room...not having anyone to play with.

This example manifests VCs 1, 2, & 3. The social context of the Good Life is made up of "parents that Love me" and "friends" and the Bad Life is "not having any friends," "sharing your room," and "not having anyone to play with." Both positive and negative evaluations demonstrate references to others as serving the self's needs (VC 1). The ideas, "if you're poor, hardly anyone knows you," "rich families get broken up because of striving for money," and "being a middle-class family" indicate evaluation of superficial attributes of social conceptions (VC 2). The conception of independence, as in "I don't like people telling me what to do" is an egoistic idea of independence and freedom that focuses on complete lack of restraint (VC 3). Finally, the references such as, "I like," I wouldn't want," and "I would like," etc., demonstrate the stage two ability to recognize personal likes and preferences (VC 4).

Example 2: [What is the Good Life?]

A good life is being happy, having lots of friends and lots of money.

[Why are those things good?]  
You need friends to do things with, to care for you and to help you...if you need help...and it's important to have the money and the freedom to do what you want to do.

[What is the bad life?]  
Having no freedom, no friends, and no money.

This example manifests VCs 1 & 3. The idea that the Good Life would consist of friends that "care for you" and "help you" indicates a conception of others that serves the self's needs (VC 1). The idea that you need "money and freedom to do what you want to do" indicates an egoistic conception of freedom and power (VC 3).

STAGE THREE

THE GOOD LIFE: AltruisticMutuality

Good is an affective sense of happiness or fulfillment, a result of positive, mutual interpersonal experience that is distinguished from pleasure. The Good Life is predominantly determined by affective experience, that is, what feels good; good is often determined by the absence of bad feelings. The Good Life consists of activities in accordance with stereotypical, interpersonal and personal virtues. A major theme of which is helping the self and/or others to feel good (be happier, more successful, etc.) and promotes mutuality between self and others in the immediate social environment.

Value Criteria for Good Life:

(1) Reference to altruistic virtues (honesty, caring, loving, self-
GOOD LIFE MANUAL

Example 1: [What is the Good Life?]

Being happy with yourself, being contented...and being with people...the stimulation of having people that you like and care about and enjoy.

[Why is that good?] That's life to me...life is people.

[What is the good of being with people?] In interaction with people, I learn more about myself and about them.

[What is the bad life?] Not being able to talk or communicate--not to have that ability or opportunity.

[Why is that bad?] Because that's what I think we're all here for. The bad life for me would be not having those people that I could share {with}, that I could enjoy around me. {Case 211-1}

Example 1 manifests VCs 1, 2, & 3. The idea that the Good Life includes "being happy with yourself, being contented" demonstrates a positive, affective sense of the self in The Good Life (VC 2). The idea that the Good Life is "being with people," "the stimulation of people that you like...", that the Bad Life would be "not having those people that I could share with, that I could enjoy around me," and that "life is people are all clear references to interpersonal relationships as the major source of happiness (VC 3). Similarly, the notion that "in interaction with people, I learn more about myself and about them" demonstrates the idea of positive, reciprocal interaction in one's immediate environment (VC 1).

Example 2: [What is the Good Life?]

I'd say the good life is good health, no pressing financial worries, and having someone that loves you, and feeling that you have other people to love.

[Why is that good?] Because you need good health to enjoy what is there to enjoy, and I feel that it's important to have no stress, which financial worries would bring me. And I think it is very important to have someone that you can love and that can reciprocate that love.

[What do you think happiness is?] Happiness is a kind of contentment...an inner security. It's the same as contentment...it's feeling good about yourself and your relationships with the people around you. {Case 21-2}

Example 2 demonstrates VCs 2 & 3. The idea that in the Good Life one has "someone that loves you and feeling that you have other people to love," that it is "very important to have someone that you can love and can reciprocate that love" and that happiness is "feeling good about your relationships with people around you" indicates the value primacy of interpersonal relationships (VC 3). The notion that the Good Life exists in the absence of "pressing financial worries," and that it is important to "have no stress" indicates value placed on the absence of negative affect within the self (VC 2). Similarly, the idea that "happiness is a kind of contentment," which is defined as a "feeling good about yourself and your relationships..." demonstrates a conception of happiness based on positive affect, also VC 2.

STAGE FOUR

THE GOOD LIFE: Individuality

The Good Life consists of activities that express the individual's self-chosen, internalized interests and values (as opposed to the consensual values of stage three). There is the beginning of a hierarchy of values. Happiness, fulfillment, satisfaction, and pleasure are not only distinguished, but are also seen as ends that are freely chosen and prioritized. The Good is found in activities that are considered personally meaningful. The society at large must be maintained and either benefited or not harmed by the individual's pursuit of the good. In the Perfectionistic Orientation, the Good Life is generalized to other persons. It is the self-fulfilled life, accomplished through developing and exercising one full capabilities and increasing one's understanding of the self and others, to the benefit of the self and the society. In the Hedonistic Orientation, the Good Life is viewed relativistically. It is the enjoyed life, but what is to be enjoyed is defined individualistically. Minimal, it is one in which the individual can be comfortable and maintain his or her "life style" without harming others.

Value Criteria for the Good Life:

(1) Direct reference to activities or states as personally meaningful, worthy, or as providing for a meaningful life; OR reference to activities that provide for increased awareness or understanding of the self, others, and/or the environment. [Experience; Meaningfulness, Satisfaction/fulfillment or Self Knowledge; Satisfaction/ Fulfillment or Wisdom/Knowledge; Satisfaction/Fulfillment]

(2) Implicit or explicit reference to individual freedom to pursue personal satisfaction, interests, goals, etc.; OR explicit reference to exercising self-chosen values, goals, etc. [Freedom; Satisfaction/ Fulfilment or Happiness/Enjoyment]

(3) Explicit reference to not damaging or harming society; OR explicit reference to one's activities as benefiting or maintaining society.

[Society; Good Group Consequences, Upholding Social Ideal]

(4) Implicit or explicit reference to maintaining one's lifestyle (e.g., providing for the self, the family, handling crises, unemployment, etc.). [Material Wealth/Financial Security; Happiness/Enjoyment]

(5) Reference to the self functioning fully, or fulfilling potential. [Ideal Self; Fully Functioning, Self Realization]

Example 1, Hedonism: [What is the Good Life?]
I would like to have a job that I was comfortable with, that was consonant with my interests and what I think is important and would provide for those that are close to me and also allow me enough time to enjoy it. I’d love to run a charter boat service.

The ability to explore and do new things without pressure...free to do things that might bring happiness, without being tied down nine to five.

[Why is it good to be comfortable?] I have no desire to live like the Rockefellers, but I do have a desire not to worry about the minimum things that make life enjoyable--like a two-week vacation, or picking up and flying to Mexico City for the weekend or whatever. {Case 038-2}

Example 1 manifest VCs 1, 2 & 4. That the Good Life would include work that was "consonant with my interests and what I think is important" refers to activities that are considered personally meaningful (VC 1). The idea that the Good Life would include "the ability to explore and do new things..." to be free "to do things that might bring happiness" refers to individual freedom to pursue personal satisfactions (VC3).

The statement that work in the Good Life would "provide for those that are close to me," and that "I do have a desire not to worry about the minimum things that make life enjoyable" demonstrates the notion of maintaining one's lifestyle (VC 4). This example is in the Hedonism (social) Orientation because of the focus on individual freedom, comfort, and pleasure and enjoyment as human ends.

Example 2, Perfectionism  [What is the Good Life?] First, it would be a life that has purpose and meaning built into it...to generate one's own goals that were appropriate for the particular time in one's life. It would be a sense of functioning at one's fullest...of using full capacity... and be trusting of one's own values and competencies.

[Why would that be Good?] Because in this way, you feel your life has meaning...and it would have to have meaning for the society, too. It seems to me that a fully functioning person benefits others as well as the self. {CC 1}

This example demonstrates VCs 1, 2, 3 & 5. The conception of a Good Life that has "purpose and meaning" and includes the feeling that "your life has meaning" indicates the value of personal meaningfulness (VC 1). The idea that in the Good Life activity would be focused on the generation of "one's own goals" manifests the value in self-chosen goals and interests (VC 2). The statement that the Good Life would "have to have meaning for society" and that the "...person benefits others as well as the self" indicates the value of benefiting society (VC 3). That meaningfulness is found in "a sense of functioning at one's fullest...of using full capacity..." demonstrates VC 5. This example is of the Perfectionistic (functionalism) Orientation because it places intrinsic, non-relative value on the concept of the fully functioning person.

STAGE FIVE
THE GOOD LIFE: Autonomy

The Good Life is conceptualized from a rational, consistent (equilibrated), generalizable or universal framework of values. The Good Life is expressed through values that are constructed autonomously, considered worthy for persons in general. Values are consistent with one another in a consciously constructed ethical system. Intrinsic and extrinsic values are differentiated and life goals focus on the former. Good Work and intimate relationships are prevalent values. The Good Life for the self and the Good Life for society are either considered synonymous or dealt equitably with general moral principles. In the Perfectionistic Orientation, The Good Life is achieved through activities that express the development of meaning and autonomy, while maintaining a deep connection with the society, world, or universe. In the Hedonistic Orientation, the Good Life is the life of peace and pleasure achieved through thought and knowledge.

Value Criteria for the Good Life:

(1) Implicit or explicit reference to the construction or the development of a value hierarchy or a theory of value (e.g., reflecting upon and/or working through one's value system, etc.). {Ideal Self, Self Knowledge; Upholding Autonomy}

(2) Reference to furthering, or to the advancement of persons or society; OR reference to the need for equity between the self's Good Life and the society's Good Life. {Society; Upholding Human Development, Maintaining Equity}

(3) Reference to involvement with one's highest level mental capabilities, particularly intellectual problems and ideas. {Intelligence; Satisfaction/Fulfillment}

(4) Reference to one's capacities as a vehicle to empower others, or to enable others, to fulfill their goals (intelligence as a good to others). {Ideal Self; Intelligence; Upholding Human Development}

(5) Direct reference to the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value and a preference to the latter. {Self Knowledge, Nature; Upholding Intrinsic Value}

(6) The fully lived life or the fulfillment of potentialities as an imperative for all persons; OR the Good Life as the fulfillment of individuals' life plans. {Conscience; Upholding Human Development, Serving Human Dignity}

(7) Identification of the self or persons with the human community, world or the cosmos. {Ideal Self; Community, Humanity; Upholding Unity}

Example 1, Perfectionism {progressivism}:

[What is the Good Life?] In the ideal life, everyone should have an opportunity to participate in life to the fullest. But not all people have equal capacity. This doesn't mean that any person, any social institution, or social values should limit their development. The ideal life for everybody should be maximizing whatever their potential is, which varies with people.

[Why is that good?] From an abstract, universal point of view, it's part of the natural order of things. For me, the natural order of things is an evolutionary, ongoing, growing process...In the evolutionary process, the process is to maximize the development of life. I mean we started as one cell and we are now man, and we can follow this train of thought to the development and maximization of the potential of individual lives...man cannot select who ought to be given opportunity. It could be arbitrary--it's manmade. {Case 017-2}

This example manifests VCs 6 & 7. The phrase, "in the ideal life everybody should..." and the context statement, "from an abstract, universal point of view" demonstrates an explicit universal
conception of the Good Life found at stage five. The idea that this subject's conception of the Good Life is based on "the natural order to things...the development of life" can be considered a reference to being a part of something larger than the self's Good Life (VC 7). The notion that "all persons should have an opportunity to participate in life to the fullest" and that "man cannot select who ought to be given opportunity...it could be arbitrary...manmade" demonstrates the presence of a normative ethical ideal that everyone should "be maximizing whatever their potential" (VC 6).

Example 2, Perfectionism (rationalism): [What is the Good Life?]

Certainly good work would be a part of it. It would be a major part of that. I think the other part of it is that there's a certain notion of community and responsibility that that kind of work can enhance, but that would also be related to the ability to see ourselves in relation to, ultimately, to the rest of the world--to nature as well as to the human community.

[Why is community Good?]
I think part of our identity is based on community. I think we are socially made, that is, we are products of a whole culture, a whole civilization. And we cannot really appreciate or realize our identity until we see that...we have to be aware of that.

Not just connections with the social world, but also the natural world that produces us also. So, I think that kind of continuity and that sense of, well, a sense of wholeness or oneness is what we miss so much now. Since we don't have that, we don't know what our community is.

[Would this be a "cosmic" or "spiritual" experience?]  
Sure, I think it could be cosmic...that's, you know, ultimately what we all want is some kind of cosmic sense of identity...but it doesn't have to be supernatural as far as I'm concerned, it can be observed in persons and in nature.

[Why is responsibility good?]
In my thinking, I tend to confine "responsibility" to situations that have to do with causal or moral responsibility; obligation is what I identify with commitments. For example, we are responsible toward nature, which is to say we have certain commitments that must be observed regarding nature. We cannot take an exploitative stance toward nature and be right. It is related to the fact that we see some intrinsic value in nature that places a moral demand upon us to recognize that and to honor that. It would be similar to how you would act responsibly toward anything in the world...that you recognize the value that something has...particularly persons...and that value puts limits on what you can do to them. So, in the Good Life, people would recognize the intrinsic value in nature and persons and then anything that is destructive of this value would have to be justified. {Case 043-2}

Example 2 is a sophisticated stage 5 or 5/6 response. It manifests VCs 1, 2, 5 & 7, but not in the straightforward ways of a typical stage 5 response. The entire example demonstrates a normative, universal conception of the Good Life: The subject identifies himself with all other people and speaks of what "we ought to do". Similarly, the entire example is clearly a result of a constructed value framework or philosophy and consists of a normative ethical view (VC 1). The only really concrete example of this Value Criterion is when the subject gives his distinction between two forms of responsibility: "In my thinking, I tend to confuse the notion of 'responsibility'...etc." The idea that one must see the value in persons and then recognize the moral obligation to uphold that value manifests the notion of commitment to the advancement of persons (VC 2).

The statement concerning our "ability to see ourselves in relation to, ultimately, to the rest of the world--to nature as well as the human community" demonstrates a notion of being a part of something greater than the individual (VC 7). Finally, the last paragraph focuses on the notion of intrinsic value and the obligation to uphold that value, "It is related to the fact that we see some intrinsic value in nature that places a moral demand upon us to recognize that and honor that" (VC 5). This example is in the Perfectionist (unity) Orientation. It is Perfectionistic because of the non-relativistic values to be upheld as ends in themselves rather than a means to pleasure. It is the unity sub-group because of the emphasis on "wholeness," resulting from connections with not only the social world but also the natural world.

Section VIII: GOOD WORK SCORING MANUAL

STAGE ONE

General Stage

The Good Life consists of physicalistic and sensory experiences that gratify the self's desires and realize the self's fantasies There is no conception of specific criteria for valuing. Thus, the Good Life is synonymous with the desired life, without consideration of the self's or others' real capacities or of behavioral consequences. Doing good is undifferentiated from having good experiences. The Good Life and the Bad Life, and any of its contents are completely dichotomized and simplistically labeled in terms of surface attributes, e.g., "nice," "pretty," "clean," etc. There is no distinction between happiness, contentment, satisfaction, and pleasure.

GOOD WORK: Egoistic Hedonism

Good Work consists of those physical or sensory activities, fantasized or experienced, that are pleasurable and desired by the self. There is an absence of a conception of the instrumental value of work to provide for the self's material needs.

Value Criteria for Good Work:

(1) The self's desires as sole criteria for evaluation of work activities. [Work; Seeking Pleasure]

(2) Reference to the physicalistic or sensory benefits of work (e.g., going, doing, seeing, hearing, etc.). [Experience: Excitement/stimulation, Good Individual Consequences]

(3) Reference to unrealistic, fantasy work roles. [Role Identity: Good Individual Consequences]

Example 1: [What is Good Work?]

I would like to be a mother.

[Why is that Good Work?]
Just because I wanna.

[What's good about being a mother?]
Because you get to be with kids. {Case 208-1}

The above example manifests VCs 1, 2 & 3. In the first response, there is no distinction between the desire to "be a mother" and a concept of a work role, demonstrating the lack of differentiation.
between real and fantasized work roles (VC 3). Wanting to be a mother is then expressed as a sufficient reason to consider being a mother Good Work (VC 1). The response, "...to be with kids" expresses the benefits of work in physicalistic terms (VC 2).

Example 2: [What is Good Work?]

I think when I grow up, I'm going to get a job. I'm going to be on a crew in a submarine. Once I looked at a picture of a submarine...the minute I saw the picture, all I wanted was to be in a submarine and reading books about submarines.

[Why is that Good Work]

All the fish you see...and you might see a whale, you know that?!? {Case 044-1}

This example manifests VC 1, 2 & 3. Although included is the idea of "getting a job," the notion that choosing to become a crewmember on a submarine is a result of looking "at a picture of a submarine" appears unrealistic, or magical (VC 3). The idea that what a crewmember does is to see fish also has this quality. In this example, wanting to be in a submarine appears to be the major criterion of its goodness (VC 1). In addition, the statement about the seeing of fish as a reason why such work is good also demonstrates the idea of the sensory benefits of Good Work (VC 2).

STAGE TWO

General Stage

The Good consists of those activities, objects, and persons that serve the individual's needs and interests, both emotional and material. There is a consistent conception of the Good Life that includes concrete considerations of both the self's and others' motives and intentions and the contemplation of consequences of behavior. There is no distinction made, however, between the "desired" and the "desirable" (that which is worthy of being desired). There is an instrumental need for others. This is manifested in a strong desire to be praised, liked, cared for, and helped. Simultaneously, a desire for independence, egoistic freedom, and power is also prevalent. Socially approved "goods" are affirmed simplistically, or evaluated in terms of their surface features. There is a beginning distinction between happiness and pleasure.

GOOD WORK: Instrumental Hedonism

The recognition of the reciprocal relation between working and its consequences of serving the self's needs is clear. There is the presence of a self, separated from a work concept, that can evaluate work activities and consequences. Work roles, however, are described in terms of their surface features, their concrete, visible results. Doing good work is seen not only as a source of material reward, but also as a source of personal gratification paradoxically either through the praise of others or from the capacity to be independent of others. Socially approved work roles are often mentioned and justified in terms of concrete, positive consequences. Good Work is often seen as equivalent to hard work.

Value Criteria for Good Work:

(1) Reference to liking the activity; OR Reference to activity that makes the self happy. [Choice: Happiness/Enjoyment]

(2) Reference to activity that is praised by others. [Praise/Recognition; Good Individual Consequences]

(3) Reference to hard work (e.g., work that takes effort, etc.). [Achievement/Productivity; Blaming/Approving]

(4) Reference to high material reward. [Material Weath; Happiness/Enjoyment]

(5) Reference to independent activity, as in working on your own (e.g., not being supervised, not being told what to do, etc.). [Freedom/Independence; Good Individual Consequences]

(6) Simplistic conception of socially approved work roles (e.g., doctor, because they cure people, etc.) as a standard of Good Work. [Role/Identity; Blaming/Approving]

[NOTE: Do not match the above criteria in the presence of elaborated explanation]

Example 1: [What is Good Work?]

It is good if I like it...well, also because I need to do it...or money.

[What does it mean, to like it?]

Good work is when someone likes what I am doing and says that I'm doing a good job...especially if it's hard work...also the money!! {Case 019-1}

The above example manifests VCs 1, 2, & 3. The idea of VC 1 can be found in the first phrase, "It is good if I like it." Although this phrase is reminiscent of the stage one conception that Good = Desired, the "if" assumes an evaluative process of determining Good Work, since it implies the existence of alternatives (if not), and a separate self that can "like," that is, have preferences. The mention of real and desireable consequences of work, money for doing it (VC 3), someone saying they like it (VC 2), and the condition of "hard work" (VC 3) are all stated criteria for evaluating Good Work.

Example 2: [What is Good Work?]

Being a psychiatrist like my mom.

[Why is that good?] You make a lot of money and you help a lot of people and it's a pretty hard working job...it's very hard!...lots of stuff...mail, lots and lots. My mom used to work in a hospital.

[What would be good about that?]

You cure lots of people. {Case 045-1}

In this example, VCs 3, 4, & 6 are manifested. As in the previous example, conceptions of making money and "hard working job," define criteria for evaluating Good Work (specifically, VCs 4 & 3, respectively). In addition, the statements that in psychiatric work, "you help a lot of people," and that working in a hospital is good because "you cure lots of people" implies a simplistic conception of a socially approved work role (VC 6).

STAGE THREE

General Stage

Good is an affective sense of happiness or fulfillment, a result of positive, mutual interpersonal experience that is distinguished from pleasure. The Good Life is predominantly determined by affective experience, that is, what feels good; good is often determined by the absence of bad feelings. The Good Life consists of activities in accordance with stereotypical, interpersonal and personal virtues. A major theme of which is helping the self and/or others to feel good (be happier, more successful, etc.) and promotes mutuality between self and others in the immediate social environment.
GOOD WORK: Interpersonalism

Good Work is identified with socially beneficial work roles that promote mutuality between self and other in one's immediate work environment. Good Work results in personal enhancement, satisfaction, or fulfillment. These results manifest themselves in positive, affective, personal experience. In general, the means to these ends is interaction with others in the immediate work environment and particularly, from directly helping others. In addition, a match between individual capabilities or interests and the actual skill requirements begins to be mentioned.

Value Criteria for Good Work:

(1) Reference to interpersonal interaction and reciprocity as the primary value in Good Work; OR, Reference to serving and/or helping others in the immediate work environment. [Affiliation; Reciprocity; Altruism; Satisfaction/fulfillment]

(2) Reference to self enhancement, self fulfillment, self satisfaction, personal growth, etc. that results from interpersonal interaction in the work setting. [Affiliation; Self Realization, Satisfaction/fulfillment or Happiness/contentment]

(3) Explicit reference to positive affect (psychological feeling) within the self as a determinant of Good Work (e.g., "a sense of contentment," "I feel a certain satisfaction," "it gives a feeling of fulfillment," etc.) [Ideal Self or Needs/Motives; Happiness/Contentment or Satisfaction/Fulfillment]

[NOTE: Do not score responses that use these values in reference to groups outside the individual's immediate social experience, such as the greater community, the society, or the world.]

Example 1: [What is Good Work?]

I'd consider people-oriented work good work. Like in the medical field where you have an opportunity to help people and teach them things they do not know and bring up their level of awareness in an area they don't know anything about.

[Why is that good?]

Helping people makes it good. It gives a feeling of fulfillment to help someone do something they have not been able to do before. {Case 202-1} 

In the above example, VCs 1 & 3 are manifested. The general emphasis on interpersonal interaction as a primary value of work (VC 1) can be found in a number of statements: "I'd consider people-oriented work good work," "an opportunity to help people and teach them things," "helping people makes it good," etc. Moreover, there is a specific emphasis on helping people throughout the example (VC 1) [It is important to note that these statements are made in the absence of any reference outside the immediate interpersonal context, e.g., society (see NOTE, above).] The emphasis on positive, psychological feeling as a determinant of Good Work (VC 3) can be found in the statement, "It gives a feeling of fulfillment to help someone..."

Example 2: [What is Good Work?]

Working with people is good work. Trying to help others.

[Why is that good?]

Like in teaching I feel a certain satisfaction in having the opportunity to touch a few lives. I enjoy working with children for this reason...and I am getting back from it all the time. {Case 021-1}

Like the previous example, this example emphasizes both interaction with others, "working with people," and helping others, "trying to help others" (VC 1). There is also a reference to feeling as a determinant of Good Work, "I feel a certain satisfaction..." (VC 2). [Again, there is an absence of reference to the society outside the immediate work environment in determining Good Work.]

Example 3: [What is Good Work?]

Acting is good because it's an emotional high for me to be on stage...it's an outburst of energy.

[Why is it such a high?]

Because you're entertaining the audience. You're the one doing this for the people...They are there for your satisfaction and for the audience's own satisfaction. It gives you such a feeling inside.

[What sort of feeling?]

A good feeling that you made them laugh or cry. Your character really did it. Your character put a smile on their face, or whatever. It is fantastic...one of the greatest feelings!! {Case 23-2}

The above example differs from the other two in that the emphasis on interpersonal interaction is not as easily discriminated from a seemingly self-serving perspective. However, the evaluation of Good Work rests on the presence of positive, mutual interaction between the actor and the audience, "you're entertaining the audience. You're the one doing this for the people...The audience is there for your satisfaction and for the audience's own satisfaction" (VC 1). In addition, the experience of Good Work is expressed in terms of feeling: an "emotional high," "a good feeling," "one of the greatest feelings!" for not only the actor, but also for the audience, "that you made them laugh or cry," "...put a smile on their face" (VC 3). [As in the two previous examples, there is no reference to the society outside the immediate work environment in the evaluation of Good Work.]

Example 4: [What is Good Work?]

I believe good work is work in which a contribution is made.

[Contribution to what?]

The most important contribution would be to the other people I work with.

[Why is that Good?]

Two reasons...because it's more satisfying than working with numbers or making money. And because those people to whom I would be contributing would be able to give me the feedback that I need for my own personal growth. {Case 211-1}

The above example can appear to be manifesting reasoning about Good Work that is higher than stage three, due to the use of the concept "contribution" (as in "social contribution," stage four). However, when probed, the contribution is to the individuals in the immediate work environment, with no mention of the larger society [see NOTE, above]. The contribution to co-workers and the "feedback" received indicate mutual interaction with immediate others (VC 1). The statement concerning such interaction as a
necessity for "personal growth" manifests VC 2.

STAGE FOUR

General Stage

Good is the expression and pursuance of the individual's self-chosen, internalized interests and values (as opposed to the consensus values of stage three). There is the beginning of a hierarchy of values. Happiness, fulfillment, satisfaction, and pleasure are not only distinguished but are seen as ends that are freely chosen prioritized. The Good is found in activities that are considered personally meaningful. The society at large must be maintained and either benefited or not harmed by the individual's pursuit of the good.

GOOD WORK: Individualism

Good work is a self-chosen activity that meets personal standards in terms of worthiness or value. Multiple criteria for Good Work are often ordered in terms of ascending value to the individual (hierarchy). Value is often relativized, particularly in the Hedonistic Orientation. In the Perfectionism Orientation, work must be not only personally meaningful but must also be of benefit to others. In this orientation, some values appear to be viewed non-relativistically across persons. There is an acknowledgement of variety in human personality and a desire for greater self development and understanding of others. In the Hedonistic Orientation, Good Work provides enjoyment, physical comforts, and financial freedom to enhance and maintain one's lifestyle. Although almost any work can be Good Work, society should not be harmed by an individual's pursuit of their Good Work.

Value Criteria for Good Work:

1. Reference to individual or personal choice in evaluation of Good Work. [Choice, Individuality; Upholding Self Respect, Satisfaction/Fulfillment, Happiness/Enjoyment]

2. General reference to either providing social benefit/utility or not harming society. [Society; Good/Bad Group Consequences, Upholding Social Ideal]

3. Direct reference to the personal meaningfulness or worthiness of the work to the individual. [Role/Identity, Purpose; Meaningfulness/Worthiness]

4. General reference to utilizing full personal capabilities or fulfilling personal "potential." [Work; Fully Functioning or Self Realization]

5. General reference to productivity, effectiveness, efficiency (e.g., work well done, etc.). [Work or Ideal Self; Achievement/productivity]

6. Direct reference to personal creativity as primary criterion of Good Work. [Creativity; Satisfaction/Fulfillment]

Example 1: [What is Good Work?]

In the first place, it should be something you can at least feel comfortable with, if not enjoy. In the second place, it should be something useful. It should be of some value to yourself or society at large, or an idea that you are committed to. Virtually anything can be of value. It should contribute to the overall good of mankind but who's to say that a washer and dryer repairman us not contributing to to the overall good when a

research scientist is?...Good work is a definition that everyone has to make for themselves.

[Is money an important part of Good Work?]

I have no desire to live like the Rockefellers, but I do have a desire not to worry about the minimal things that make life enjoyable--like a two-week vacation, or picking up and flying to Mexico City for the weekend or whatever. [Case 38-2]

This example manifests VCs 1 & 2. The response begins with "...it should be something you can at least feel comfortable with, if not enjoy." This statement contains a minimal criterion of value ("at least") indicating the implicit value hierarchy apparent at stage four. The third statement includes "It should be of some value to yourself..." and, "...an ideal that you're committed to" both acknowledging the necessity for personal choice VC 1). Also included here, "(value) to society at large," and later, "It should contribute to the overall good of mankind" are references to social utility as a value of Good Work (VC 2). This example is of the Hedonistic {social} Orientation due to the emphasis on comfort and enjoyment that Good Work provides. Moreover, the idea that "virtually anything can be of value" and "good work is a definition that everyone has to make for themselves" is indicative of the value relativism more apparent in stage 4's Hedonistic Orientation.

Example 2: [What is Good Work?]

Any work is good as long as it's productive of something useful and meaningful, something that you can truly appreciate. It can be constructed as something useful or meaningful by almost any terminology that you can imagine. I've been a doctor for a long time and that's good because it provides a useful service to society.

[What is most important in Good Work?]

You have to enjoy what you are doing...you should love doing it... that you are good at it and it has meaning to you. And, importantly, I want to feel secure. I want to live the way I'm living now and know that if something comes up, it would not adversely affect my lifestyle.

This example is similar to the previous one. It manifests VCs 2 & 3. There is more emphasis here on personal value or meaning, however, than is found in the previous example. The statements "something you can truly appreciate," that work is good if "it's productive of something useful and meaningful," and later, "you are good at it and it has meaning to you" demonstrate the conception of personal meaningfulness (VC 3). The justification that being a doctor is good because "it provides a useful service to society" demonstrates an implicit conception that work should provide benefit or utility to society (VC 2).

The last statement, "I want to live the way I'm living now and know that if something comes up, it would not adversely effect my lifestyle" emphasizes maintaining one's lifestyle. Value relativity is expressed in the statement "it can be construed as useful or meaningful by almost any terminology that you can imagine". Both of these ideas would place this example in the Hedonistic {social} Orientation.

Example 3: [What is Good Work?]

Work that is productive personally and beneficial to the society in which you live.

[Why is that Good?]

Because it is personally satisfying to be productive and you
fulfill a personal and social purpose by doing work that is beneficial to others.

[What sort of purpose?]  
Personally, when you're productive, you're learning and growing. And the work should be productive and beneficial to society because being a human being means to live successfully in a community of other people.  (Case 211-2)

The above example manifests VCs 2 & 3. First, the idea that work should be "personally satisfying" and "fulfill a personal ... purpose" implies the notion of individual or personal value and meaningfulness (VC 3). Second, that work should "fulfill a social purpose..." by doing work that is "beneficial to others," that it should be "beneficial to the society which you live" is indicative of VC 2. The distinction and integration of personal value and social benefit in the last paragraph indicates an implicit ordering of personal values or implicit hierarchy that is evident at this stage. The emphasis on growth and learning, as opposed to "enjoyment" as in the two previous examples, and the prescriptivity, or non-relativism of value places this example in the Perfectionistic {Progressivism} Orientation.

Example 4: [What is Good Work?]

I think whatever you are doing, it would have to meaningfully related to what you consider to be your highest values. But you must also accomplish something worthwhile to others in addition to yourself.

[Why is that Good?]  
Because then you are functioning at your fullest. It also gives you a sense of meaning to be contributing to society.  (Case 39-2)

Although this is a relatively short response, it can still be scored with VCs 2, 3, & 4. The statement that one's work must be "meaningfully related to what you consider to be your highest values" indicates an implicit hierarchy of personal values. A part of that statement, "...meaningfully related..." and the phrase later in the response, "It gives you a sense of meaning ..." both refer to the necessity of personal meaningfulness (VC 3). The general notion that Good Work should be "Contributing to society," manifests VC 2. Finally, the idea that "you are functioning at your fullest" is a general reference to utilizing full capability (VC 4). This example would be placed in the Perfectionism {functionalism} Orientation because of the prescriptive statement that in Good Work "you must also accomplish something worthwhile to others in addition to the self" and the emphatic on the fully functioning person.

STAGE FIVE

General Stage

The Good Life is conceptualized from a rational, consistent (equilibrated), generalizable or universal framework of values. The Good Life is expressed through values that are constructed autonomously, considered worthy for persons in general. Values are consistent with one another in a consciously constructed ethical system. Intrinsic and extrinsic values are differentiated and life goals focus on the former. Good Work and intimate relationships are prevalent values. The Good Life for the self and the Good Life for society are either considered synonymous or dealt equitably with at general moral principles. In the Perfectionistic Orientation, The Good Life is achieved through activities that express the development of meaning and autonomy, while maintaining a deep connection with the society, world, or universe. In the Hedonistic Orientation, the Good Life is the life of peace and pleasure achieved through thought and knowledge.

GOOD WORK: Autonomy

Good work is evaluated through an individual's consciously self-constructed ethical system (personal philosophy of value) and must also be consistent with the individual's principled sociomoral perspective. The Good Work concept is constructed from a general, or universal perspective and is a most salient activity in the Good Life. Good Work consists of activities that require intellectual challenge and the use of one's higher level capabilities. The activity in Good Work concerns greater understanding of the self, the society, nature, or the universe. In the Hedonistic Orientation, the value of Good Work is experienced through the pleasures and satisfactions of exercising and challenging one's highest level capabilities. Although altruism or self-sacrifice is not required, the pleasures that Good Work provide the self must be balanced with the social utility of the work. In the Perfectionistic Orientation, Good work consists of activities that support progressive individual and social development. The progressive furthering of the self's knowledge and capacities in particular, and the contribution of one's work to the forward movement of mankind in general, is viewed as an end in itself. In this Orientation, the societal good of one's contribution and the self's personal good often become one within a conception of a social or universal self.

Value Criteria for Good Work:

(1) Reference to the imperative to use one's highest-level mental capacities, [Intelligence; Upholding Human Dignity,Satisfaction/fulfillment]

(2) Explicit reference to the necessity of fairness or equity principles in Good Work. [Work; Maintaining Equity]

(3) Reference to a personal commitment to the advancement of humankind, society, etc. [Ideal Self; Upholding Human Development]

(4) The necessity of one's Good Work to contribute to the embetterment of individuals, society, humanity, the universe; OR the necessity to balance the personal and social benefits of Good Work. [Work; Upholding Human Development or Society; maintaining Equity]

(5) The activities of Good Work concern increased understanding of the self, humankind, the society, nature, etc. [Wisdom or Self Knowledge; Satisfaction/Fulfillment]

(6) Good Work as fulfilling one's life plan, life goals, life purposes, etc. [Purpose; Satisfaction/fulfillment, Upholding Self Respect]

(7) Preference for inherent or intrinsic value, as opposed to extrinsic value in Good Work. [Work; Intrinsic Value]

Example 1: [What is Good Work?]

Of course, good work would be an important part...maybe the most important part of the good life. In good work, there are several features involved. First, I feel that work has to be stimulating and have upward mobility. It should be a learning process, not a repetitious thing that you do every day. But, at the same time, as you move up, the work has to be a trade-off between self-satisfaction and service. I feel that the ultimate work is when you get self-satisfaction out of service.
[What else makes good work?]
I think the contributional effect: You feel more and more a part of the universe, in an abstract sense, ...that you are here and that you are making a contribution.

[What is a good contribution?]
I would say that, ultimately, it would be to commit your life to the advancement of life and man.

[Why is that Good?]
I've arrived at a point where, frankly, nothing else appears to be of any real or essential value. {Case 017-2}

This example manifests VCs 3, 4, & 7 and is in the Perfectionistic Orientation. The first statement demonstrates the integration of Good Work with the Good Life. The next three statements indicate the universalizability of the stage five good work concept because the individual is advocating a general Good Work concept. This is further supported by the later justification, "You feel more and more a part of the universe, in an abstract sense" due to the use of the general 'you' pronoun and by the implication of a generalized hierarchy of valuable aspects in life that is to go beyond this particular individual. The idea that "the work has to be trade-off between self-satisfaction and service," which is later extended in a definition of the "ultimate" work as "when you get self-satisfaction out of service" places the value of Good Work in its contribution to others and manifests both aspects of VC 4. The notion that the ideal contribution would be to "commit your life to the advancement of life and man," manifests VC 3. Finally, the last statement "nothing else appear to be of any real or essential value implies a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value (VC 7). The example is of the Perfectionistic {progressivism} Orientation due to its emphasis on progressive development of both the self and "life and Man," the reference to feeling a part of the universe, and by its integration of social and personal good.

EXAMPLE 2: [What is good work?]

Work that would be meaningful as far as being related to what a person feels their purpose in life is. Also Good Work must contribute to the progression of mankind.

[Why is that Good?]
It must be something that carries knowledge further...something that's carrying mankind further than what is currently going on, not just maintenance. Progression is also important on a personal level. Whatever you're doing it is not a stagnant, maintenance type thing... that it's progressing your own knowledge, and understanding, particularly of the environment around you. {Case 042-2}

This example manifests VCs 4, 5 & 6. The first statement of this response appears to be scorable at stage 4 since what could be meant is that any work is good if it is meaningfully related to an individual's personal purposes (Stage 4, VC 3). However, the concept of "life purpose" is not found at stage 4. Thus, the first statement manifests VC 6. In addition, this response goes on to define criteria for a generalizable conception of Good Work that relates beyond the individual and his society: "Good work must contribute to the progression of mankind," "something that carries knowledge further," etc. indicating stage 5. The idea of "progression of humanity," and "something that's carrying mankind further" refers to contributing to the embetterment of humankind (VC-4). The idea that Good Work should also be personally progressive, "Progression is also important on a personal level..." and that work should progress one's "knowledge and understanding, particularly of the environment" emphasizes increased knowledge of the self and the environment and is indicative of VC 5. Finally, This example is in the Perfectionistic {progressivism} Orientation because of its emphasis on progressive embetterment.

EXAMPLE 3: [What is Good Work?]

In Good Work, one pursues one's interest and, in my case, my interests are related to working on significant social problems and social issues. I decided in 19 or 19 that I wanted to make contributions to significant issues or problems. Working on these and making headway...is the source of happiness for me...the main source.

[Why is it good to make these contributions?]
Those are things that society needs, that people need in order to advance society. And I see them as a match of my particular capabilities and interests. If I work in interests that are lower than my highest capabilities, it of seems a betrayal of my capacity for what I can do. It becomes somewhat irresponsible because it's a disservice to others. I do see a person's distinctive talents as socialized--not personal privileges. That doesn't mean I'm a slave to society. That is balanced with the satisfaction I get from doing the work. {Case 207-2}

This example manifests VCs 1 & 4. The first statement demonstrates a Good Work concept advocated from a generalized perspective, "In good work, one pursues one's interests." In addition, the notion that working...is the source of happiness...the main source" suggests that Good Work is a major part of the Good Life. That contributions are made based on the "things that society needs, that people need to advance society" acknowledges the necessity for one's Good Work to contribute to the embetterment of society, and the idea that social benefit is "balanced with the satisfaction I get from the work both indicate VC 4. The statement, "If I work in interests that are lower that my highest level capabilities, it seems a betrayal of my capacity" clearly states a necessity to use one's highest-level capabilities (VC 1). It is difficult to assess Philosophical Orientation from this response. The emphasis on happiness or satisfaction as the motive (or end) would lead the scorer to the Hedonistic Orientation. However, without knowledge of this subject's conception what it would mean to "advance society" and whether such advancement is a means to something else or an end in itself the Orientation of this response cannot be determined.

Section GOOD FRIENDSHIP SCORING MANUAL

STAGE ONE

General Stage

The Good Life consists of physicalistic and sensory experiences that gratify the self's desires and realize the self's fantasies. There is no conception of specific criteria for valuing. Thus, the Good Life is synonymous with the desired life, without consideration of the self's or others' real capacities or of behavioral consequences. Doing good is undifferentiated from having good experiences. The Good Life and the Bad Life, and any of its contents are completed dichotomized and simplistically labeled in terms of surface attributes, e.g., "nice," "pretty," "clean," etc. There is no distinction between happiness, contentment, satisfaction, and pleasure.

GOOD FRIENDSHIP: Physicalistic Hedonism

With no distinction between the Good and the desired, a good friend is one who provides the self with what he or she desires. The content of such desires is physicalistic and/or concrete. A good
friend is one who both likes and is liked by the self. Liking is demonstrated by giving presents to, playing with, and being nice to the self.

Value Criteria for Good Friendship:

(1) Reference to the others in terms of serving self's wants and needs as sufficient criterion (e.g., to be liked, to be treated nice, to be given presents, etc.). [Affiliation; Seeking Reward]

(2) Reference to physicalistic activity (e.g., coming to my house, playing with me, etc.) [Experience; Seeking Pleasure]

Example 1: [What is a Good Friend?]

Someone that you like...if they're nice to you. They play with you and come to your house....And on your birthday, they give you things. {Case 208-1}

Example 2: [What is a Good Friendship?]

Well, I like Gary, because he's my friend Gary.

[Why is he a Good Friend?]

He likes me.

[Why are friends important?]

That they like you and like to play with you. {Case 45-1}

Both of the above examples manifest VC 1 & 2. That a friend is "someone you like," who is "nice to you," "gives you things," "likes me," and "likes to play with you" shows the concrete benefits and fulfillment of the self's desires that Good Friendship provides (VC 1). The physicalistic quality of the benefits, e.g., playing with you, coming to your house, giving presents, etc., manifests VC 2.

STAGE TWO

General Stage

The Good consists of those activities, objects, and persons that serve the individual's needs and interests, both emotional and material. There is a consistent conception of the Good Life that includes concrete considerations of both the self's and others' motives and intentions and the contemplation of consequences of behavior. There is no distinction made, however, between the "desired" and the "desirable" (that which is worthy of being desired). There is an instrumental need for others. This is manifested in a strong desire to be praised, liked, cared for, and helped. Simultaneously, a desire for independence, egoistic freedom, and power is also prevalent. Socially approved "goods" are affirmed simplisticly, or evaluated in terms of their surface features. There is a beginning distinction between happiness and pleasure.

GOOD FRIENDSHIP: Reciprocal Instrumentalism

A good friend fills the self's need for positive companionship in shared experience. Such companionship goes beyond physical presence and provides love, caring, helping, safety/security, and approval for the self. A good friend can be trusted not to harm the self purposely. Although the focus is on the self rather than the relationship, sharing and trusting is understood in terms of concrete reciprocity. Thus, being a good friend is acknowledged and defined as considering the other person's feelings, needs, and interests. In a Good Friendship, likes and interests of the parties should be similar, if not identical.

Value Criteria for Good Friendship:

(1) Reference to the sharing of concrete experiences, having company, or confiding secrets. [Affiliation; Happiness/Enjoyment]

(2) Reference to the help or safety that a friend provides the self. [Friendship; Personal Security]

(3) Reference to the ability to trust a friend not to harm the self (e.g., take your money, tell your secrets, talk about you behind your back, etc.). [Trust; Good Individual Consequences]

(4) Reference to the absence of conflict (e.g., always getting along, liking the same things, not fighting, etc.). [Friendship; Good Individual Consequences]

(5) Reference to simplistic, superficial, positive psychological characteristics of Good Friends (e.g., nice, understanding, etc.) [Virtuousness; Good Individual Consequences]

Example 1: [What is a Good Friend?]

You have good times together...you play together.

[Why is Good to be together?]

Well, you can share the fun. And you might feel more secure with a friend. 'Like, if you go on a scary ride, like a roller coaster, it's nice to sit with your friend. {Case 208-2}

The above example manifests VC 1 & 2. The emphasis on being together and "sharing the fun" conotes the idea of sharing concrete experiences (VC 1). The statement that one might "feel more secure with a friend," demonstrates the value of safety and security that a friend can provide (VC 2).

Example 2: [What is Good Friendship?]

Where you always get along...and you like the same things...and you just like being with the person...a lot...And knowing that each person likes him a lot.

[Why is it important for both people to know the other likes him?]

'Cause it makes the person feel good and trusting to that person.

[Why is trust important?]

Because then it makes you feel good that your friend isn't gonna do something to you or something like that...like take your money or something.

Example 2 demonstrates VC 1, 3 & 5. That friends should "like the same things" and that they should "always get along" emphasizes the value on absence of conflict (VC 5). The idea that "you just like being with the person" conotes the notion of having company (VC 1). Finally, the statement that trust is important because a friend "isn't gonna do something to you...like take your money," demonstrates the need to believe that friends will not harm the self (VC 3).

STAGE THREE

General Stage

Good is an affective sense of happiness or fulfillment, a result of positive, mutual interpersonal experience that is distinguished...
from pleasure. The Good Life is predominantly determined by affective experience, that is, what feels good; good is often determined by the absence of bad feelings. The Good Life consists of activities in accordance with stereotypical, interpersonal and personal virtues. A major theme of which is helping the self and/or others to feel good (be happier, more successful, etc.) and promotes mutuality between self and others in the immediate social environment.

GOOD FRIENDSHIP: Mutuality

The conception of Good Friendship includes an idea of the relationship itself, which is viewed as an entity greater than, and distinct from, the sum of the individuals who comprise it. There is a general change in focus from a stage two view of friendship as reciprocal coordination with others for the self's benefit to a stage three notion of collaboration for mutual benefit of self and other. Thus, mutual giving to and learning from one another is a criterion of Good Friendship because it results in positive consequences for both the self and the other. In a Good Friendship, there is a feeling of mutual belongingness and understanding resulting from openness, warmth, and acceptance that is shared and has continuity over time. Good Friends are free to share their personal thoughts and feelings and are loyal and supportive to one another. Absolute honesty is recommended but there is a sense that good friends "know" and accept the inner workings of another unconditionally, without full, direct communication.

Value Criteria for Good Friendship:

(1) Reference to positive, mutual (reciprocal), interpersonal interaction as primary criterion of Good Friendship. [Friendship; Reciprocity]

(2) Reference to the moral guidance and/or general learning that friends provide. [Wisdom/Knowledge, Self Knowledge; Upholding Character]

(3) Reference to honesty in sharing inner, psychological experience. [Honesty/Communication; Happiness/Contentment]

(4) Reference to experiencing positive feelings within the self as a determinant of, and a result from, Good Friendship (e.g., caring, loving, warm feelings, etc). [Friendship; Happiness/Contentment]

(5) Reference to feelings of approval, acceptance, or belongingness, even in the absence of complete agreement; OR reference to trust and understanding when friends do not completely agree. [Trust, Acceptance; Reciprocity]

Example 1: [What is a Good Friendship?]

I think good friendship is having someone who you could count on to talk to, whose going to be open to listening and who in turn will be able to count on you for the same. A true friendship is one were there is a shared amount of giving to each other. It is someone who will take a real interest in your true self.

[Why is that Good?]
I believe that if you have these components then you have the trust and acceptance that's important.

[Why is trust important?]
Because if you are able to confide in someone and feel that they will respond to you in a way that is caring then that trust must be there.

[How is this trust achieved?]
I'm not advocating a complete honesty that could be translated as tactless...there are some things better left unsaid. But I really do feel that when you get into a subject that you should feel free enough with the person to express your views and have them listen and accept your views, even if they don't particularly agree with you. {Case 021-2}

This example manifest VCs 1, 3, & 5. The emphasis on mutuality or reciprocity can be most clearly inferred from the phrases, "...able to count on you for the same," and "...a shared amount of giving to each other" (VC 1). The statements about taking interest in one's "true self," "confiding in someone," and feeling "free enough to express your views" demonstrates the idea of sharing one's inner experience (VC 3). The emphasis on general acceptance, "I believe that if you have these components, then you have the trust and acceptance that's important" and acceptance of one's personal ideas or feelings: "[a friend should]...listen and accept your views," manifest VC 5.

Example 2: [What is Good Friendship?]

My friends are caring...to be a friend you have to do that too. You do mostly "do unto others as you would like them to do unto you"--that's affection.

Also friends help to tell each other what's right and what's wrong...you learn a lot from your friends.

[Is it very important to have friends?]
Yes...it's the good feeling of being with people...being close to people...it can hurt...friends can be heart breakers...but it's important to be close to your friends. {Case 023-2}

This example demonstrates VCs 1, 2, & 4. The idea that to be a friend you have to "do that [be caring] too," and the statement of the Golden Rule both demonstrate an emphasis on mutual reciprocity (VC 1). Moreover, the equating the Golden Rule with affection, the statement concerning friends as "caring," and a value of friendship as "the good feeling of being with people" all emphasize the importance of experiencing positive emotional feeling (VC 4). That friends "help to tell each other what's right and wrong" and that "you learn a lot from your friends" demonstrates the idea of friends as a source of both morality (or social norms) and knowledge (VC 2).

STAGE FOUR

General Stage

The Good Life consists of activities that express the individual's self-chosen, internalized interests and values (as opposed to the consensual values of stage three). There is the beginning of a hierarchy of values. Happiness, fulfillment, satisfaction, and pleasure are not only distinguished, but are also seen as ends that are freely chosen and prioritized. The Good is found in activities that are considered personally meaningful. The society at large must be maintained and either benefited or not harmed by the individual's pursuit of the good. In the Perfectionistic Orientation, the Good Life is generalized to other persons. It is the self-fulfilled life, accomplished through developing and exercising one full capabilities and increasing one's understanding of the self and others, to the benefit of the self and the society. In the Hedonistic Orientation, the Good Life is viewed relativistically. It is the enjoyed life, but what what is to be enjoyed is defined individualistically. Minimally, it is one in which the individual can be comfortable and maintain his
or her "life style" without harming others.

Stage Four: Individuality

The Good Life consists of activities that express the individual's self-chosen, internalized interests and values (as opposed to the consensus values of stage three). There is the beginning of a hierarchy of values. Happiness, fulfillment, satisfaction, and pleasure are not only distinguished, but are also seen as ends that are freely chosen and prioritized. The Good is found in activities that are considered personally meaningful. The society at large must be maintained and either benefited or not harmed by the individual's pursuit of the good. In the Perfectionistic Orientation, the Good Life is generalized to other persons. It is the self-fulfilled life, accomplished through developing and exercising one full capabilities and increasing one's understanding of the self and others, to the benefit of the self and the society. In the Hedonistic Orientation, the Good Life is viewed relativistically. It is the enjoyed life, but what is to be enjoyed is defined individualistically. Minimally, it is one in which the individual can be comfortable and maintain his or her "life style" without harming others.

GOOD FRIENDSHIP: Mutual Equality

Friendships are seen as flexible relations that can vary due to the multicomplexities of individual interests and needs. An Ideal Friendship is one in which the uniqueness and individuality of one another is acknowledged and supported. To have a Good Friend is to have your individuality valued as worthy. Self-reflection as well as attending to the other's inner self is required in Good Friendship, with mutual support of one another's differing psychological and emotional needs. Another requirement is the capacity to be truly empathetic of one another's experience. Good friends are loyal and reliable, retain full, open communication, and can expect tolerance or acceptance of personality from one another.

Value Criteria for Good Friendship:

1. Reference to the recognition and acceptance or tolerance of differences in personality or "faults" in the other's personality. [Personality; Upholding Self Respect]
2. Reference to the other's valuing of one's true/real self or one's individuality. [Personality; Worthiness]
3. Reference to respect, empathy, and/or elaborated psychological understanding and support; OR reference to open communication. [Friendship; Honesty/Communication; Upholding Character]
4. Reference to unconditional loyalty and/or reliability. [Loyalty/Reliability; Having a Responsibility]
5. Growth and development as a result of sharing personal experience. [Honesty/Communication; Self Realization]

Example 1: [What is a Good Friendship?]

Acceptance, loyalty, and understanding.

[Why is acceptance Good?]

In a friendship you want to feel that however you are is accepted by the other person because you are valued by them, even though there may be aspects of you that they don't appreciate. Similarly, that's how you would feel toward the other person, that you accept them as an overall worthwhile person person whom you enjoy knowing. Therefore, you accept their faults.

[Why is loyalty Good?]

That means you respect the other person's rights and needs and not betray them...support them when they need it, that they call upon you for more than civility. They can call on you for effort and sacrifice. {Case 039-2}.

The above example demonstrates VCs 1, 2, & 4. The notion that "however you are is accepted by the other person," and that with a friend, you "accept their faults" demonstrate a conception of necessary tolerance of differences in personality (VC 1). This is to be distinguished from stage three's unelaborated, general sense of acceptance (stage 3, VC 5). The idea of being "valued" by the other and accepted as a "worthwhile person" demonstrates VC 2. The mention of loyalty, absence of betrayal, and that friends "...call on you for effort and sacrifice" demonstrate the idea of unconditional reliability or loyalty (VC 4).

Example 2: [What is a Good Friendship?]

You have to be able to tolerate one another's differences and inadequacies. You have to feel valued by the other person and to value them. And a certain amount of shared interests and trust.

[Why are these things important?]

Without tolerance, there can be no acceptance of one another. You cannot have a good friendship if you always want someone to be other than who they are. You must value the way they are. Trust is also important so that you can open up to a friend and he or she will not belittle you for the feelings that you reveal ...and you have to know that they will be there for you in times of need...that you can count on that. {Case 038-2}

This example also manifests VCs 1, 2, & 4. There is a clear conception that tolerance of differences in personality is required in order for there to be acceptance (VC 1). The statement that one has to both "feel valued by the other person" and that you must "value them" demonstrates VC 2. The emphasis on trust and loyalty in: "you have to know that they will be there for you...that you can count on that," demonstrates an emphasis on loyalty and reliability (VC 4).

STAGE FIVE

General Stage

The Good Life is conceptualized from a rational, consistent (equilibrated), generalizable or universal framework of values. The Good Life is expressed through values that are constructed autonomously, considered worthy for persons in general. Values are consistent with one another in a consciously constructed ethical system. Intrinsic and extrinsic values are differentiated and life goals focus on the former. Good Work and intimate relationships are prevalent values. The Good Life for the self and the Good Life for society are either considered synonymous or dealt equitably with general moral principles. In the Perfectionistic Orientation, The Good Life is achieved through activities that express the development of meaning and autonomy, while maintaining a deep connection with the society, world, or universe. In the Hedonistic Orientation, the Good Life is the life of peace and pleasure achieved through thought and knowledge.

GOOD FRIENDSHIP: Mutual Autonomy

Good Friendship in viewed as a progressive relationship in
which each individual contributes to the life quality and character of the other and supports and enhances one another's life purposes and commitments. Unconditional acceptance and loyalty is transformed into a principle of respect for the other's integrity or personality. Interpersonal relations are seen as vehicles for mutual insight, growth, change, and for affirmation of one's life experiences as well as for a form of intimacy in which the other may know the self better than the self does.

Value Criteria for Good Friendship:

(1) Reference to respecting other's personality, way of life, or way of thinking as primary value in Good Friendship; OR recognizing and/or honoring the worth or integrity of the other for its own sake. [Personality; Upholding Self Respect or Upholding Human Dignity/Integrity]

(2) Reference to mutual understanding of, and contribution to, one another's life goals, purposes or quality of life; OR the importance of sharing important life decisions; OR mutual, progressive growth or development. [Honesty/Communication; Upholding Character, Friendship; Upholding Human Development, Purpose; Satisfaction/ Fulfillment]

(3) Reference to the mutual responsibility to share thoughts and ideas, particularly those that might be critical of, or opposed to, the other's viewpoint. [Honesty/Communication; Having a Responsibility, Upholding Character]

(4) Reference to the necessity of Good Friends to aid in knowing oneself; OR explicit reference to the affirmation of one's life experiences. [Friendship; Self Knowledge]

(5) Reference to the responsibility between Good Friends to confront morally wrong action and to act in behalf of, or to encourage, the other's moral character. [Morality; Upholding Character]

(6) Good Friendship as a vehicle of communication with, or participation in life, the world, or the universe. [Communication; Upholding Unity]

Example 1: [What is Good Friendship?]

It primarily involves respect. Respect for the differences between the person and yourself...between two people and the way they live their lives. You are not imposing boundaries on the way they chose to live as long as they aren't doing things that are morally wrong. You are responsive to the other person, and responsible as far as letting them know and communicating what you think about their ideas and their actions and so forth. But you must respect the way they live their life, even if it's different from yours.

[Is Good Friendship based on unconditional love or acceptance?]

No. I think that friendship should be based on interaction not unconditional love, whatever that is. It should be based on the interactions and the actions of each other. Respect for the personality of the other does not entail unconditional acceptance of all actions.

[Why are friendships important?]

It is important for people's growth to have friendships. Sociality is a basic human need. It is a form of participation in human life and I don't think one can progress in life without friendship. {Case 042-2}

The above example manifest VCs 1, 3, 5, & 6. The statements concerning "respect for the differences...between two people and the way they live their lives" and "respect for the personality" demonstrate the principle of respect for personality (VC 1). The idea that friends communicate to one another "what you think about their ideas and actions" acknowledges the interdependence of person in pursuit of truthful thought (VC 3). The specific reference to the non-acceptance of morally wrong action in friends demonstrates the felt responsibility between friends for one another's moral character (VC 5). Finally, the statement that friendship is "a form of participation in human life" demonstrates VC 6.

Example 2: [What is Good Friendship?]

Having a set of persons with whom one can think with full honesty. People who understand and affirm one's experiencing of life, stimulate further questioning and enhance it. People to share the thoughts and feelings about life because things are best thought through interpersonally with others, not just with oneself.

People to whom one's friendship is important. It goes both ways. It's someone for whom you can be with to make your deepest decisions in stressful times when you have to make your own--or they have to make theirs. The absence of judgment of the person is assumed, unless the person is going to compromise an important value or moral principle. So that you can receive strength for your particular stand, encouragement for the will to act against compromise.

There is also a deep love and companionship. A good friend is someone who understands your particular choices and your purposes in life...the meaning of your life. {Case 207-2}

The above example manifests VCs 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5. The statement, "The absence of judgment of the person is assumed" implies the idea that, outside of morally wrong action, friends respect one another's life choices (VC 1). The ideas that friends "understand and affirm one's experiencing of life" and the statement, "things are better thought through interpersonally with others, not just with oneself" both demonstrate the notion of interdependence, or the limits of self-knowledge in perceiving the self and the world (VC 4). The notion that friends are people "with whom you can think" and with whom one can "share the thoughts and feelings about life" implies the sharing of thinking and ideas (VC 3). In addition to one with whom one can share thoughts and ideas, a friend is someone with whom one can also share their "deepest decisions," and, importantly, someone who one can make such decisions with (VC 2). Although respect for personality and choice is assumed, such respect is limited by certain values and moral principles. Thus, friends must judge when the other "is going to compromise an important value or moral principle." Moreover, friends give "strength for your particular stand, encouragement for the will to act against compromise." Both of these ideas manifest the sense of responsibility for one another's moral character (VC 5).

Section X: GOOD PERSON SCORING MANUAL

STAGE ONE

General Stage

The Good Life consists of physicalistic and sensory experiences that gratify the self's desires and realize the self's fantasies. There is no conception of specific criteria for valuing. Thus, the Good Life
is synonymous with the desired life, without consideration of the self's or others' real capacities or of behavioral consequences. Doing good is undifferentiated from having good experiences. The Good Life and the Bad Life, and any of its contents are completely dichotomized and simplistically labeled in terms of surface attributes, e.g., "nice," "pretty," "clean," etc. There is no distinction between happiness, contentment, satisfaction, and pleasure.

GOOD PERSON: Physicalistic Egoism

The Good Person is described in terms of an unelaborated set of physicalistic, overt behaviors and qualities judged to be good in absolutistic terms. A Good Person has physical strength and power and provides physicalistic or materialistic benefits for the self. Good and Bad persons are dichotomized into superficial categories of good and evil. A bad person is someone who gets punished or who hurts the self.

Value Criteria for The Good Person:

1. Reference to physicalistic or materialistic benefits that Good Persons provide the self (e.g., they come to my house, they give me presents). [Affiliation; Seeking Reward]

2. Radical labeling of Good Persons as nice, happy, etc; OR Good Person as strong or powerful. [Virtuousness; Blaming/Approving, Power; Blaming/Approving]

3. Bad Person as one who is sad, mad, mean, gets into trouble, spanked, punished, etc. [Person; Blaming/Approving]

Example 1: [What is a Good Person?]8

A good person is happy.

Is it good to be happy?
Yes.

Why is it good to be happy?
Because then you are not sad.

Is it important to be a good person?
Yes.

Why?
Because bad people are rotten...they get in a lot of trouble.

Example 1 manifests VCs 2 & 3. Both ideas that a Good Person is a "happy person" (VC 2) and that "bad people" "...get in a lot of trouble" (VC 3) demonstrates the radical labeling present in stage 1. The notion that bad people are those who are punished represents evaluation of the Good Person as a process external to the self.

Example 2: [What is a good person?]

I don't know.

If you like someone, what is good about that person?
They're nice....some are mean...those are bad people.

What is a bad person?
They don't act nice.

What do people do when they act nice?
They give you free stickers...like those oily stickers that nobody gives to me...or they trade stickers...or trade friendship pins.

[Is there anything else that people do that are nice?] They give you presents for your birthday. [Case 401]

Example 2 demonstrates VCs 1, 2 & 3. In the initial response, this example demonstrates the difficulty children at this stage have with an abstract conception of a Good Person. The idea that a Good person "acts nice" and that bad people "don't act nice" can be understood to imply the physicalistic or behavioral quality of a Good Person at stage 1. Similar to the previous example, the simplistic labeling of persons, "They're nice...some are mean...those are bad people" demonstrates VCs 2 & 3. That a Good Person "gives you free stickers," and gives you "presents for your birthday," demonstrates the materialistic benefits that Good Persons provide the self (VC 1).

STAGE TWO

General Stage

The Good consists of those activities, objects, and persons that serve the individual's needs and interests, both emotional and material. There is a consistent conception of the Good Life that includes concrete considerations of both the self's and others' motives and intentions and the contemplation of consequences of behavior. There is no distinction made, however, between the "desired" and the "desirable" (that which is worthy of being desired). There is an instrumental need for others. This is manifested in a strong desire to be praised, liked, cared for, and helped. Simultaneously, a desire for independence, egoistic freedom, and power is also prevalent. Socially approved "goods" are affirmed simplistically, or evaluated in terms of their surface features. There is a beginning distinction between happiness and pleasure.

GOOD PERSON: Instrumental Hedonism

A Good Person is viewed in the context of other persons. Individuals' goodness is evaluated in terms of their motives and intentions (psychological characteristics) or their particular talents, not merely in terms of immediate, physicalistic qualities and behaviors (stage 1). The psychological characteristics of Good Persons, however, are described in stereotypical terms such as "nice," "understanding," etc., with little elaboration. It is important to be a Good Person so that others will be good to the self. There is difficulty distinguishing between the Good Person and the good person for the self. In addition, there is no distinction between being a Good Person and doing good things.

Value Criteria for The Good Person:

1. Simplistic, positive psychological characteristics (e.g., nice, understanding, sharing feelings, etc.). [Person; Needs/Motives]

2. Explicit reference to positive, psychological or mental consequences to the self (e.g., a good person cares for you, etc.). [Affiliation; Good Individual Consequences]

3. Doing things that require talent or competence (scientist, doctor, professional football player). [Role/Identity; Achievement/Productivity]

4. Reference to surface attributes such as beauty, wealth, age, social role, etc. [Material Wealth, Beauty, Experience, Role/Identity; Blaming Approving, Good Individual Consequences]

Example 1: [What is a Good Person?]
Oh, I would say someone my age, very pretty, a girl, and one who is nice and understanding and she's willing to talk to me and to share her feelings and she likes me a lot. That would be the dream girl.

[Why is it important to share feelings?]

Because you need to know if they're mad at you...or if they are sad about something. [Case 044-2]

This example manifests VCs 1, 2, & 4. The idea that a Good Person is "very pretty," "my age," and "a girl" demonstrates the valuing of surface attributes (VC 4). That a Good Person is also "nice," "understanding," "willing to talk," as well as the idea that it is necessary to know "if they are mad...or sad" represents a description of unelaborated psychological characteristics (VC 1). In addition, the idea that a Good Person talks "to me" and "likes me a lot" describes the Good Person as good to the self (VC 2).

STAGE THREE

General Stage

Good is an affective sense of happiness or fulfillment, a result of positive, mutual interpersonal experience that is distinguished from pleasure. The Good Life is predominantly determined by affective experience, that is, what feels good; good is often determined by the absence of bad feelings. The Good Life consists of activities in accordance with stereotypical, interpersonal and personal virtues. A major theme of which is helping the self and/or others to feel good (be happier, more successful, etc.) and promotes mutuality between self and others in the immediate social environment.

GOOD PERSON: Mutual Concern

A Good Person is defined in the context of interpersonal interaction in the immediate environment. The evaluation of a Good Person is based on social norm expectations that are fulfilled through a set of virtues appropriate for the social culture within which the individual interacts. In contrast to stage two, most typical of the Good Person conception at this stage are the altruistic virtues of concern for immediate others over concern for oneself. Such virtues include being considerate, kind, helping, caring, loving, etc. The virtue of honesty is prevalent, which is seen as proof of the Good Person's proper intentions. Typical are also the virtues of positive affect, such as being happy, having a positive outlook, etc. There is little elaboration or justification as to why such virtues are good, or why it is important to be a Good Person. The virtues themselves are predominantly demonstrated in a framework of positive affect, that is, positive feelings toward self and other. A Good Person is recognized as such by those with whom he or she interacts and is held in high esteem. The idea of a Good Person and the idea of a moral person are often seen as synonymous.

Value Criteria for The Good Person:

(1) Reference to interpersonal virtues expressed toward others (being considerate, kind, helpful, loving, honest, trustworthy, etc.) with little or no elaboration or no justification. [Virtuousness; Good Group Consequences]

(2) Reference to positive, affective or stereotypical personality traits within the person (e.g., being happy, positive outlook, good disposition, loving personality, having it all together, etc.). [Personality; Character]

(3) Reference to a "moral" person, or a person with "high morals," with no elaboration. [Conscience; Character]

(4) Fulfillment of a social role identity (being a good Catholic, a good Jew, a good mother, a family person, a good gang member, etc). [Role/Identity; Serving Social Ideal]

Example 1: [What is a Good Person?]

An independent person...helping in a lot of respects...very loving, considerate, intelligent, rational, together...cool, calm, and collected.

[Why are those things important?]

I also feel it's a sense of commitment and love. Loving myself, loving people, loving my world. In all I have to have a commitment to what's going on around me and myself. [Case 305-2]

Example 1 demonstrates VCs 1 & 2. The entire response is set in a context of interpersonal virtues expressed toward others--"helping," "loving," "considerate," "loving people," etc.--with little elaboration as to why these virtues, as opposed to others, define a Good Person (VC 1). In all, eleven virtues are mentioned in the absence of elaboration or justification. In addition, the idea of being a "loving," "cool, calm, and collected" individual indicates the criterion of stereotypical, positive personality traits within the person (VC 2).

Example 2: [What is a Good Person?]

Well, it's not just being beautiful or something on the outside. I think that they are just kind and good. One should have a good outlook on life, a good disposition and be happy. Also, I am Jewish and I think it is important to be a good Jew.

[Why is that important?]

Well, to do the right thing is important. And I think that it's important whatever religion you are...to be good--just to be a good person.

[Does being moral have to do with being a good person?]

Yes, if you're a good moral person, you have high morals, good morals.

[What are they?]

Going back to being truthful and good and understanding and kind and all the good things. [Case 203-2]

This example manifests VCs 1, 2, 3, & 4. The mention of positive, interpersonal virtues, "kind," "good," "truthful," and "understanding" demonstrates VC 1. The statement, "One should have a good outlook on life, a good disposition, and be happy" acknowledges the necessity of positive, affective personality traits (VC 2). The statement, "it's important to be a good jew" in the absence of elaboration or justification, demonstrates the importance of fulfilling external role expectations as part of being a Good Person (VC 4). The idea that "if you're a good moral person, you have high morals, good morals" indicates the equating of good and moral (VC 3).

STAGE FOUR

General Stage: Individuality

The Good Life consists of activities that express the individual's self-chosen, internalized interests and values (as opposed to the consensual values of stage three). There is the beginning of a hierarchy of values. Happiness, fulfillment, satisfaction, and
pleasure are not only distinguished, but are also seen as ends that are freely chosen and prioritized. The Good is found in activities that are considered personally meaningful. The society at large must be maintained and either benefited or not harmed by the individual's pursuit of the good. In the Perfectionistic Orientation, the Good Life is generalized to other persons. It is the self-fulfilled life, accomplished through developing and exercising one's full capabilities and increasing one's understanding of the self and others, to the benefit of the self and the society. In the Hedonistic Orientation, the Good Life is viewed relativistically. It is the enjoyed life, but what is to be enjoyed is defined individualistically. Minimally, it is one in which the individual can be comfortable and maintain his or her "life style" without harming others.

GOOD PERSON: Individuality

The good person identifies and lives consistently by personal values and beliefs, and constructs his or her own moral rules. Although the relativism of these beliefs, values and rules is recognized, the Good Person must act consistently with his or her own. Although belief systems are relative, one is bound by a limited morality: one cannot gain at the intentional expense of others. Good persons are tolerant and accepting of themselves and others. The Good Person lives a personally meaningful existence and recognizes that others find differing meanings. In the Perfectionistic Orientation, the Good Person is the self-realized person who exercises his or her higher capacities in a variety of areas. In the Hedonistic Orientation, the Good Person identifies those things that provide satisfaction and is able to achieve them.

Value Criteria for The Good Person:

(1) Direct reference to internal self-consistency (e.g., being true to oneself, standing for one's one values, living by one's own guidelines, etc.). [Conscience; Upholding Self Respect]

(2) Reference to restrictions on harming others; OR General reference to contributing to society or the world. [Person; Good Group Consequences, Serving Social Ideal]

(3) Reference to tolerance and acceptance of oneself and/or of others' differences or "faults" in personality. [Acceptance/Tolerance; Upholding Self Respect]

(4) Reference to the necessity of personal meaning or worth. [Ideal Self; Meaningfulness/Worthiness]

(5) General reference to the use of one's full capacities; OR reference to productivity or effectiveness. [Ideal Self; Fully Functioning, Productivity/Effectiveness, Satisfaction/Fulfillment]

Example 1: [What is a Good Person?]

The ideal person would be living in the way that I have talked about in the Good Life, a meaningful life. They would have physical vitality, pleasant to look upon, they would be very intelligent, very aware, with a deep capacity for feelings in many areas, particularly for other persons and for the self. One must be accepting of others as well as of oneself. And, the individual must be integrated within all these areas. Additionally, one must stand for his own humanitarian principles, yet respect those of others. [Case 39-2]

This example manifests VCs 1, 3, 4 & 5. The idea that one must "stand up for his own humanitarian principles" indicates the necessity for self consistency (VC 1). The idea that "one must be accepting of others as well as of oneself" demonstrates VC 3. That the Good Person would be living a "meaningful life" indicates the necessity for personal meaning (VC 4). Finally, that the Good Person "would be very intelligent, very aware, with a deep capacity for feeling" demonstrates the general idea of using one's full capabilities (VC 5).

Example 2: [What is a Good Person?]

A Good Person is one who is true to oneself...you have to live within your own honest definition of morality...that's a requirement. But, my definition might or might not be anything like the next guy's. But as long as I live within my own guidelines, then I can have the peace of mind that goes with that and not lose a great deal of sleep over it.

[What are your own guidelines in defining a Good Person?] To be tolerant of others...to be communicative about who I am and to be interested in others. In the big picture, a person needs to give a certain amount of morality because a certain amount is returned. I guess a good person for me is one that knows what he wants, pursues what he wants, but not at others' expense. [Case 38-2]

Example 2 demonstrates 1, 2 & 3. The statement, "A good person is one who is true to oneself...you have to live within your own honest definition of morality" is a clear indication of the requirement of self-consistency (VC 1). The idea that one's definition of morality "might or might not be anything like the next guy's" and that the subject describes the "good person for me" demonstrates a reference to value relativism apparent at stage 4. The idea that one must be "tolerant of others" demonstrates VC 3. Finally, that a good person knows and pursues what he wants, "but not at others' expense" demonstrates the self-generated restrictions against harming others (VC 2).

STAGE FIVE

General Stage: Autonomy

The Good Life is conceptualized from a rational, consistent (equilibrated), generalizable or universal framework of values. The Good Life is expressed through values that are constructed autonomously, considered worthy for persons in general. Values are consistent with one another in a consciously constructed ethical system. Intrinsic and extrinsic values are differentiated and life goals focus on the former. Good Work and intimate relationships are prevalent values. The Good Life for the self and the Good Life for society are either considered synonymous or dealt equitably with general moral principles. In the Perfectionistic Orientation, The Good Life is achieved through activities that express the development of meaning and autonomy, while maintaining a deep connection with the society, world, or universe. In the Hedonistic Orientation, the Good Life is the life of peace and pleasure achieved through thought and knowledge.

GOOD PERSON: Autonomous

The concept of a Good Person is constructed from a universal or generalizable perspective that differentiates and includes moral and non-moral components. In contrast to the relativism of stage four, the Good Person acts in accordance with generalizable ethical and moral principles. The Activity of the Good Person is the living of the Good Life, with a commitment to exercise his or her highest capacities, particularly in the intellectual and emotional domains. Opposed to the notion of strict individuality and separateness (stage 4), the Good Person acknowledges and values interdependence.
between self and other, while achieving autonomy in thought. Similarly, the Good Person recognizes and accepts different aspects of the self that may appear paradoxical. In the Perfectionistic Orientation, intelligence and achievements are seen as social goods for the simultaneous embetterment of the self and the society. In the Hedonistic Orientation, the Good Person pursues the pleasures of humankind's highest capabilities.

Value Criteria for The Good Person:

(1) Explicit reference to autonomy in thought. [Ideal Self; Upholding Autonomy]

(2) Reference to action in accordance with universal or generalizable moral principles. [Conscience; Maintaining Equity, Just Distribution, Upholding Human Dignity, Upholding Self Respect]

(3) Reference to the preference to use one's highest level mental capabilities. [Intelligence; Serving Social Ideal, Satisfaction/Fulfillment]

(4) Acknowledgement of interdependence with others for the realization of the self. [Affiliation; Self Realization]

(5) Reference to the obligation to contribute to others' development, progress, liberty, etc. [Conscience; Upholding Human Development, Upholding Social Ideal, Having a Duty]

Example 1: [What is a Good Person?]

There are some central, or minimal requirements that I would want in any good person...First, in the moral domain, they would reason and act from a conception of justice. In situations where there is a conflict of goods, the good person would consistently act on judgments made from the position of the ideal spectator, which is only to say that she would be impartial.

[Why would that be good?]
I think that to be consistent with the principle of respect for personality, the good person will only judge the value of another's claim based on the content of that claim.

But a good person must be more than moral...that's a right person. A good person must, in some sense have psychological health. She must have a true sense of herself and be able to have a true sense of others. She must acknowledge the paradoxical parts or herself and others and recognize that that is part of what it is to be human. In a way, it is dependent on being moral because she must be both willing and able to view the world and herself from the eyes of others.

[Why is that Good?]
Because we are all interdependent on one another. Not only can you not have a self in the absence of society, you cannot have self knowledge without intimate relations with others. She must also be able to empower other individuals, in both a social and a personal sense.

[Why is that good?]
Once one recognizes such interdependence, and its value, one has an obligation to enhance its quality. On cannot merely benefit from it. Similarly, once you recognize the unconditional value in others, you have an obligation to uphold that value and to promote it. {Case 206-2}
"Relativistic" goods can also be so divided.

The Ethics (Ostwald trans., 1979) focuses on the perfection of the individual and the activities that attend this perfection that are under the control of the agent under certain conditions. Aristotle believed, however, that man could only fulfill his true end or nature as part of "society," the city-state. The Ethics, used as the main source for this section, was considered by him as a sub-category of study under the more inclusive master science: Politics.

This table was adapted from Ross, 1923, p. 203. This is a simplified presentation of Aristotle's identification of the virtues. Because the focus of this study is on the good, the discussion of justice, which is a primary virtue, will not be presented.

Mill is most widely known for his systematic attempt to support utilitarianism as a viable morality of right action. For the purposes of this work, however, the focus goes behind his socio-political thought to determine his conception of the good and of the good life upon which the principle of utility depends.
Adapted from Rawls, 1980.

Dewey's work was greatly informed by the sociology of G. H. Mead (1934).

Also see Kohlberg (1981): "Progress in moral philosophy and in moral psychology occurs through a spiral or bootstrapping process in which the insights of philosophy serve to suggest insights and findings in psychology that in turn suggest new insights and conclusions in philosophy" (p.98).

Elsewhere (Kohlberg & Armon, 1984) this distinction between two types of stage models is discussed in detail.

See Commons, Richards, & Armon (1984) for a collection of works on this topic.

Loevinger has been previously criticized for this omission; see, for example, Broughton and Zahaykevich, 1977. For a more complete discussion of the contrasts between a structural stage model and Loevinger's model of ego development, see Kohlberg and Armon, 1984.

It should be noted that the distinction made between "the good" and "the right" is considered invalid and arbitrary by Gilligan.

Adapted from Maslow, 1964, p. 92-93.

Maslow explicitly states that his use of the term "ought" denotes "intrinsic to the organism," not external or a priori.

Both of these studies were shown to be problematic in terms of their findings concerning the relation of age to stage attainment.

A more detailed explanation of the analysis is found in the scoring manual, Appendix A.

All correlations reported in this section were significant at at least the .0001 level.

EMS (Ethical Maturity Score) and MMS (Moral Maturity Score) refer to the interval scales of the good life and moral judgment stage scores.

Although interrater reliability reflects the capacity to communicate the scoring method to others who wish to use it, a more important consideration of reliability here is the stability of the construct that is being measured. This was another reason for calculating the standard error of measure based on the long term test-retest reliability data across four years in addition to it being the lowest correlation.

It is important to note that the word theory, as it is used in this discussion, refers to a particular organization of meaning that would not necessarily lie within a subject's consciousness and, so, be articulated by him or her.

Value elements 1-6 and those with parenthetical numbers have been taken from Colby & Kohlberg (in press). Some of the other value elements have been adapted from Rokeach (1979) and Maslow (1964).

Social perspective-taking stages one through three are adapted from Selman, 1980; the stages four through six have been constructed by the present author.

In the analyses using age as an independent variable, ln(age) accounted for significantly more variance than untransformed age itself, as well as other polynomial fits such as age squared and age cubed.

All references to the "adult group" refer to the subjects over 20 years old in 1977, unless otherwise specified.
Only change scores of 1/4 of a stage or more were considered meaningful and are the lower limit for consideration here.

This model of making judgments about the Good is adapted from Nowell-Smith, 1954.

Norms 1-12 were taken from Colby & Kohlberg, 1984. Issues and Norms are listed together because some concepts can be categorized as an Issue or a Norms depending on the way they are used in a judgment.

Value Elements 1-6 and those with parenthetical numbers were taken from Colby and Kohlberg (1984). Some of the other Value Elements were adapted from Rokeach, (1979).

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Stage conceptions 1-3 adapted from Selman, 1980.

This example is adapted from Selman, R. L., Assessing Interpersonal Understanding: An interview and scoring Manual in Five Parts Constructed by the Harvard-Judge Baker Social Reasoning Project, Conception of Persons section.

This is a shortened version with only the questions for which responses appear in the manual.